

110135

JPRS 82977

1 March 1983

Southeast Asia Report

No. 1259

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A
Approved for Public Release
Distribution Unlimited

19990806 057

DTIC QUALITY INSPECTED 4



FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

Reproduced From
Best Available Copy

11
161
A08

NOTE

JPRS publications contain information primarily from foreign newspapers, periodicals and books, but also from news agency transmissions and broadcasts. Materials from foreign-language sources are translated; those from English-language sources are transcribed or reprinted, with the original phrasing and other characteristics retained.

Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets [] are supplied by JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text] or [Excerpt] in the first line of each item, or following the last line of a brief, indicate how the original information was processed. Where no processing indicator is given, the information was summarized or extracted.

Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or transliterated are enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a question mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear in the original but have been supplied as appropriate in context. Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an item originate with the source. Times within items are as given by source.

The contents of this publication in no way represent the policies, views or attitudes of the U.S. Government.

PROCUREMENT OF PUBLICATIONS

JPRS publications may be ordered from the National Technical Information Service, Springfield, Virginia 22161. In ordering, it is recommended that the JPRS number, title, date and author, if applicable, of publication be cited.

Current JPRS publications are announced in Government Reports Announcements issued semi-monthly by the National Technical Information Service, and are listed in the Monthly Catalog of U.S. Government Publications issued by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

Correspondence pertaining to matters other than procurement may be addressed to Joint Publications Research Service, 1000 North Glebe Road, Arlington, Virginia 22201.

JPRS REPORTS

Japan Report
Korean Affairs Report
Southeast Asia Report
Mongolia Report

Near East/South Asia Report
Sub-Saharan Africa Report
West Europe Report
West Europe Report: Science and Technology
Latin America Report

USSR

Political and Sociological Affairs
Problems of the Far East
Science and Technology Policy
Sociological Studies
Translations from KOMMUNIST
USA: Economics, Politics, Ideology
World Economy and International Relations
Agriculture
Construction and Related Industries
Consumer Goods and Domestic Trade
Economic Affairs
Energy
Human Resources
International Economic Relations
Transportation

Physics and Mathematics
Space
Space Biology and Aerospace Medicine
Military Affairs
Chemistry
Cybernetics, Computers and Automation Technology
Earth Sciences
Electronics and Electrical Engineering
Engineering and Equipment
Machine Tools and Metal-Working Equipment
Life Sciences: Biomedical and Behavioral Sciences
Life Sciences: Effects of Nonionizing Electromagnetic
Radiation
Materials Science and Technology

EASTERN EUROPE

Political, Sociological and Military Affairs
Scientific Affairs

Economic and Industrial Affairs

CHINA

Political, Sociological and Military Affairs
Economic Affairs
Science and Technology

RED FLAG
Agriculture
Plant and Installation Data

WORLDWIDE

Telecommunications Policy, Research and
Development
Nuclear Development and Proliferation

Environmental Quality
Epidemiology

FBIS DAILY REPORT

China
Soviet Union
South Asia
Asia and Pacific

Eastern Europe
Western Europe
Latin America
Middle East and Africa

To order, see inside front cover

1 March 1983

SOUTHEAST ASIA REPORT

No. 1259

CONTENTS

INDONESIA

Decline of Aliran in PPP (Fachry Ali, Iqbal Abdurrauf Saimima; PRISMA THE INDONESIAN INDICATOR, Jun 82)	1
Continued Resistance in Timor Acknowledged (DIARIO DE NOTICIAS, 16 Jan 83)	24
Briefs Former FRETILIN Leader Arrested	25

KAMPUCHEA

Sim Var Analyzes Sihanouk-Khmer Rouge Relationship (MOUL KHMER, Nov 82)	26
Visit to Kampuchean-Thai Border Defense Post Related (Nguyen Dinh Cao; QUAN DOI NHAN DAN, 20 Dec 82)	28
Vietnamese-Kampuchean Troop Cooperation on Western Front Reported (Pham Xuan Luc; QUAN DOI NHAN DAN, 20 Dec 82)	31
Economic Resurgence Seen by French Journalist (TIEN PHONG, 10 Jan 83)	34

LAOS

Mong District's Poppy Growing, Vang Pao Remnants, SRV Assistance Discussed (Viangkham Thabousai; SIANG PASASON, 21 Dec 82)	36
Chemical, Food Tender Notice Offered (THE NATION REVIEW, 17 Jan 83)	39
Industrial Sector Reports Increased Output Over 1981 (SIANG PASASON, 20 Dec 82)	40

SIDA Funding of Forestry Project Reported (SIANG PASASON, 18 Dec 82)	42
Briefs	
Vientiane District Population	44
MALAYSIA	
State of CPM Examined (THE NATION REVIEW, 18 Jan 83)	45
Location of Chin Peng Questioned (THE NATION REVIEW, 18 Jan 83)	49
Security Forces 'Cripple' Communist Movement in Peninsula (THE NATION REVIEW, 18 Jan 83)	50
Islamic Party Leader Quits in Party Feud (ARABIA THE ISLAMIC WORLD REVIEW, Jan 83)	52
Head of Islamic Party of Malaysia Interviewed (ARABIA THE ISLAMIC WORLD REVIEW, Jan 83)	54
Malaysia Eyes Fleet of 77 Large Ocean Ships in 1985 (PHILIPPINES DAILY EXPRESS, 4 Feb 83)	55
NEW CALEDONIA	
Choice of Future Status Causes Strife (Patrice de Beer; LE MONDE, various dates)	56
Melanesians Arrested Following Sarramea Ambush (LE MONDE, 12 Jan 83)	63
Nickel Company Experiences Steady Losses (Francois Renard; LE MONDE, 13 Jan 83)	65
PHILIPPINES	
Diokno Seen as Emerging Leader (Danny M. Gonzales; VISAYAN HERALD, 20 Jan 83)	66
Parties Bare Election Plans (C. Valmoria; BULLETIN TODAY, 30 Jan 83)	68
Peace and Order Situation in Mindanao (T. Pe. Rimando; BULLETIN TODAY, 31 Jan 83)	69
Large Number of Delinquent Soldiers Out (PHILIPPINES DAILY EXPRESS, 26 Jan 83)	70
Army Commanders Said Using 'Colonial Ways' in Combatting Rebels (PHILIPPINES DAILY EXPRESS, 30 Jan 83)	72

Army Teams Go After Terrorists (PHILIPPINES DAILY EXPRESS, 4 Feb 83)	74
NPA Holds Barrio for Days (BULLETIN TODAY, 30 Jan 83)	76
Saudis To Help Fund Madrasahs (PHILIPPINES DAILY EXPRESS, 3 Feb 83)	77
Finland Seeks More Trade With Philippines (BULLETIN TODAY, 31 Jan 83)	79
Banking System To Expand Credit (BULLETIN TODAY, 26 Jan 83)	81
Overseas Worker Wage Remittances (George T. Nervez; PHILIPPINES DAILY EXPRESS, 26 Jan 83)	82
TUCP Hits Cheap Labor Policy (VISAYAN HERALD, 18 Jan 83)	84
Price Hike for Cigarettes Approved (Mel Mauricio; PHILIPPINES DAILY EXPRESS, 26 Jan 83)	86
Multicropping Plan Pushed (BULLETIN TODAY, 31 Jan 83)	88
New Corn Program Launched (Alfredo M. Lobo; BULLETIN TODAY, 3 Feb 83)	89
Briefs	
TUCP Wants EPZ Wages Pegged to Dollar	90
Israeli Joint Venture Welcomed	90
Central Bank Loan Set for March	91

VIETNAM

MILITARY AFFAIRS AND PUBLIC SECURITY

Senior Colonel Interviewed on Induction in Hanoi (Do Hoang Mao Interview; HANOI MOI, 24 Nov 82)	92
Deficient Public Security Agents Improved by Ideological Education (Vinh Yen; HANOI MOI, 24 Nov 82)	95
Vigilant Vendor Assists in Catching Robbery 'Victim' (NHAN DAN, 20 Dec 82)	98

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, TRADE AND AID

Briefs

Soviet-Built Car Repair Station	100
---------------------------------	-----

PARTY ACTIVITIES AND GOVERNMENT

Party Schools Reorganized (NHAN DAN, 10 Jan 83)	101
--	-----

Highlights of Achievements in 1982 Summarized (NHAN DAN, 31 Dec 82)	103
--	-----

ECONOMIC PLANNING, TRADE AND FINANCE

End of Year Bonus Policy Explained (NHAN DAN, 10 Jan 83)	104
---	-----

AGRICULTURE

Hai Hung National Assembly Deputy on Agriculture (Nguyen Van Phuc; NHAN DAN, 10 Jan 83)	107
--	-----

Land Regulation, More Cooperatives Set Up (Thien Anh, Tuan Anh; NHAN DAN, 20 Dec 82)	109
---	-----

Scientific Applications Bring Changes to Agriculture (Nguyen Ngoc Triu; KHOA HOC VA DOI SONG, 1 Jan 83)	112
--	-----

Editorial Advocates Increased Agricultural Intensive Cultivation (Editorial; NHAN DAN, 17 Dec 82)	118
--	-----

Food Minister Discusses State Control of Grain (La Lam Gia; NHAN DAN, 28 Dec 82)	120
---	-----

Measures To Improve Quality of State Grain Proposed (Hong Hanh; NHAN DAN, 29 Dec 82)	125
---	-----

Ha Son Binh Records Highest Grain Production (Phan Huy; NHAN DAN, 10 Jan 83)	129
---	-----

Tien Giang Extends Rice-Growing Area, Uses Labor Better (Tran Quoc Khai; NHAN DAN, 20 Dec 82)	133
--	-----

Grain Production Problems Examined (Huu Tho; NHAN DAN, 16 Dec 82)	136
--	-----

Quang Ninh Increases Marine Products Output (Tam Huyen; NHAN DAN, 10 Jan 83)	141
---	-----

Quang Ninh Shrimp Exports Reported (Nghiem Thanh; NHAN DAN, 10 Jan 83)	144
---	-----

Briefs		
Northern Provinces' Grain Collection		145
HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE		
Unofficial Cultural Materials Entering Country		
(NHAN DAN, 18 Dec 82)		146
BIOGRAPHIC		
Information on Vietnamese Personalities		147
Biographic Sketch of Gen Van Tien Dung		
(SIANG PASASON, 3 Jan 83)		152

DECLINE OF ALIRAN IN PPP

Jakarta PRISMA THE INDONESIAN INDICATOR in English Jun 82 pp 32-54

[Article by Fachry Ali and Iqbal Abdurrauf Saimima: "The Decline of Aliran in the Partai Persatuan Pembangunan"]

[Text]

Nearing the general election held recently in May, the PPP party was once again fraught with internal conflicts. According to the authors, there is a correlation between the national political system, the emergence of the PPP leadership and the conflicts within the party. Religion in this party seems to play the role of a mediator between the disputing factions.

Fachry Ali is currently a researcher at LP3ES. He writes frequently for *Prisma* and the daily *Kompas* in Jakarta. *Iqbal Abdurrauf Saimima* is on the editorial staff of *Panji Masyarakat*, a weekly magazine on Islam.

The Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP) or the United Development Party, is a merging of four Islam-based political parties. Interestingly, the PPP is the only remaining party based on a religion since the other parties, deliberately or otherwise, have abandoned their religious bases. The parties which currently form the PPP are the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), the Partai Muslimin Indonesia (Parmusi), the Partai Syarikat Islam Indonesia (PSSI) and the Pergerakan Tarbiyah Islam (Pertti).

But religion, together with the federative nature of the party has presented certain problems within the PPP, because each religious base is a reflection of a social system that is bound to what Smith terms as the traditional religio-political system.¹ In such a

society, its ideological components are drawn from religion, without any secular ideology. Furthermore, religion functions to legitimize political acts and various forms of power. As such, the political community is simultaneously the religious community. Consequently, the role of religious figures in such a society is extensive, not only in the socio-cultural field but in politics as well. In this context, PPP as a community, more or less reflects the presence of its religious figures, the *Kyais* or the *Alim Ulamas*. The major question is what their role and influence within this Islam-based political party should be.

Added to this problem, are the elements within PPP, for each of them has different historical and cultural backgrounds and separate religious concepts. This difference undoubtedly creates further differences in political perceptions. In view of the

1 Donald E. Smith, *Religion and Political Development*, (Little, Brown and Co., 1970), pages 6-7.

fact that PPP elements are basically mass organizations having the same religious base as their ideology, PPP may be considered to reflect an *aliran* party.²

As such the PPP exists within a society in the process of modernizing itself. And the "party" stamp itself is an assumption of modernizing elements within this society, for the party concept automatically implies the right to freedom of opinion. The concept implies an alliance with one organization, and the secession from other organizations with different programs.³ In other words a party can only develop in a democratic society. And democracy itself is an absolute condition of a modern political society.

Within the framework of such an approach, the questions that are liable to appear are what the effects produced by this form of party may be towards the party mechanism; whether the conflicts that occur within its body—such as currently evident—bear any relation to the party's nature and form; whether other factors exist to affect these conflicts; if so, which factors dominate; and further, whether the *aliran* concept can still be applied to PPP, and what the prospects are for the future. The following analysis attempts to seek answers to the above questions.

History of the PPP

The factors encouraging the establishment of PPP were not based

2 What is meant by *aliran* here is a party consisting of various voluntary organizations pursuing the same ideology.

3 Sigmund Neumann, "Towards a Comparative Study of Political Parties" in Miriam Budiardjo (ed) *Partisipasi dan Partai Politik; Sebuah Bunga Rampai* (Jakarta: Gramedia, 1981), page 59.

on the religious similarities of its supporters, for as history notes, the merging of various political aspirations and of Islamic doctrines in Indonesia during the Masyumi period, did not endure for long. The difference in cultures and development stages of the respective elements supporting Masyumi at that time played a far larger role than did the common basis of religion. Thus, another factor had a part in encouraging its establishment: a nation-wide change in the political system. One of the characteristics of the political system during Sukarno's time was the existence of numerous parties, which caused the differing ideologies to produce endless conflicts throughout. Consequently what emerged was political instability,⁴ as evidenced by the rise and fall of governments of whichever party held power at the time.⁵ This situation was further aggravated by 45 protest demonstrations, 85 riots and 615 thousand deaths resulting from the political violence that occurred between 1948 and 1967.

Based on these facts, Suharto's regime which replaced that of Soekarno, regarded the factors responsible for this instability as originating from the multi-party system. In order to resolve this situation, the political system had to be reorganized, and one process in which this was realized was the simplification of political parties. Out of this process, PPP was born as a

4 Compare with Mc. T. Kahin, *Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia*, Ithaca, New York, 1952.

5 Charles Lewis Taylor and M.C. Hudson, in *World Hand Book of Political and Social Indicators*, note that of the 25 cabinets governing Indonesia since Independence, only 7 cabinets lasted for 12 to 23 months. 12 other cabinets lasted between 6 to 11 months, and another 6 cabinets 1 to 4 months. See Arbi Sanit, *Sistem Politik Indonesia*. (Jakarta: CV. Rajawali, 1981).

result of the merging of four Islamic-political parties.

From the viewpoint of PPP, its establishment was more or less connected with the Islamic Masyumi party, which in 1945 initially embraced the aspirations of all Islamic political groups in Indonesia.⁶ However, Masyumi did not hold these groups for long, for in 1947 PSII seceded, followed in 1952 by NU. Since then, its only support has come from Muhammadiyah, Al-Wasliah, and other minor Islamic groups. In 1960, Sukarno abolished Masyumi.

Since then, only three remaining political parties represented the political aspirations of Islam, they are respectively the PSII, Perti and NU. But the departure of Masyumi from the political arena created a vacuum for these who followed "modernistic" Islamic groups such as the Muhammadiyah. As a result, in 1964 Muhammadiyah had plans to establish the Partai Islam Indonesia (PII).

But because there was such a zeal to reestablish Masyumi—in spite of the government's disapproval—these plans were abandoned. In 1967, there were also rumours that Hatta and the alumni of the Islamic Students Association or Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam (HMI), intended to establish a party to replace Masyumi, to be called the "Partai Demokrasi Islam Indonesia" (PDII) or Islamic Democratic Party, but as with PII, the PDII was never realized.

Following the establishment of the New Order, the drive to revive Masyumi once again began. But as previously stated, these efforts were able to

6 On the history and development of Masyumi, see Herbert Feith, *The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia*, Cornell University Press, 1973.

produce only the "Partai Muslimin Indonesia" (Parmusi) under the leadership of Djarnawi Hadikusuma and Lukman Harun as Secretary General (1968-1970). Following the coup by John Naro and Imran Kadir, Parmusi was headed by Mintaredja SH. It was Parmusi, under the leadership of Mintaredja, together with NU, PSII and Perti, that in 1971 were to represent the aspirations of Islam in the First General Election held during the New Order. And in 1973, these four Islamic political parties fell subject to the party simplification laws. Thus PPP was created on January 5, 1973, or in the Islamic calendar of Zulhijah 30, 1392 H.⁷

Characteristics of PPP's Main Support Elements

From the viewpoint of its foundation and elements, PPP is both a religious and an *aliran* political party. The presence of four religious *alirans* with separate historical backgrounds, has contributed considerably towards shaping the party's attitudes and actions, for this resulted in a diversity of political interpretations. It was also affected by the extent of each element's development. An analysis of the relationship patterns, the history, and the characteristics of each element would have been immensely useful in clarifying the real situation.

7 Following the government's proposal for the simplification of the party system, the Islamic faction held a meeting at the residence of Anwar Tjokroaminoto in 1972. At this meeting, Subchan .Z.E. proposed the name "Partai Pancasila" to unite the Islamic parties. But the meeting agreed on Lukman Harun's proposal for a "Partai Persatuan" (United Party), to represent unity among the Islamic political groups. It is not clear who added the word "Development" to the name. From an interview with Lukman Harun on October 9, 1981.

However, the lack of data restricts efforts in which to clearly analyze NU and MI. These two groups can be studied only on the basis of membership and performance and how they play a major role in PPP's present direction.

*Perti and Syarikat Islam*⁸

The Pergerakan Tarbiah Islam (Perti) represents one of the nativist traditional Islamic movements, in the sense that its style and teachings are not far removed from the local cultural system within which it develops. This movement follows the Syafi'i school strictly, and it was for this reason that it did not join either MIAI or Masyumi at that time. The movement was created in West Sumatra on November 30, 1945.

During Soekarno's rule, Perti under the leadership of K.H. Siradjudin Abbas was known as the "Pink" group, because of its leanings towards Soekarno and the PKI. But when the Gestapu-PKI incident erupted, Siradjudin Abbas was discharged on November 1, 1965, following measures to clean up Perti's Islamic spirit of Communist influences. Abbas was replaced by H.A. Rahman as Chairman and Drs. Anwar Sulaiman as General Secretary.

Meanwhile, the Syarikat Islam (SI)⁹ was created as an off-shoot of the PSII which had undergone additional changes since its establishment in 1911 by K.H. Samanhudi in Surakarta. Following the 1971 elections and nearing the merging, PSII held a congress in

Majalaya, West Java, which resulted in the election of H.M. Ch. Ibrahim as President of the Lajnah Tanfidziah, H. Wartomo Dwidjojuwono as Secretary General and H. Bustaman SH as Head of the Central Council.

The PSII leaders elected in this congress were known to be hard-line critics of the government. Therefore they rejected the merging of the Islamic political parties into the PPP. This stand resulted in the usurpation of PSII leadership by another group of leaders, who were Anwar Tjokroaminoto, Syarifudin Harahap, H. Gobel, and the late Dr. Farid Bakry Laksamana. The usurpers then established a "rival" executive body headed by Anwar Tjokroaminoto. When Anwar passed away, he was replaced by H. Gobel as Chairman of the Central Council and Ahmad D. Tjokroaminoto became Secretary.

The Lajnah Tanfidziah, in the meantime, was headed by Mrs. M.A. Gani, with Chalid Jamari as Secretary General and it was this "rival" executive body that formed the SI element within the PPP.

Muslimin Indonesia: A Floating Group?

Within the context of a "Modernist-Traditionalist" dichotomy as propounded by Deliar Noer and Allan Samson,¹⁰ Muslimin Indonesia (MI) bears some resemblance to the first group, the modernists. This resemblance can be seen from the backgrounds of MI members in PPP. Some of them originate from HMI, PII (the Indonesian Islamic Students), Al-Wasliah and Muhammadiyah. These two last groups supported the Masyumi political party before its dissolution. Masyumi was

⁸ Information concerning the political processes undergone by these two elements since the 1970s was obtained from Pipip Ahmad Rifai, the Deputy Secretary General of HMI on January 7, 1982.

⁹ Concerning SI origins, read Deliar Noer, *Gerakan Modern Islam di Indonesia*, (Jakarta: LP3ES, 1981), pages 114-169.

¹⁰ Deliar Noer, *ibid.*, See also Allan Arnold Samson, *Islam and Politics in Indonesia*, (Dissertation for Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science), University of California, Berkeley, 1969, pages 1-41.

then an Islamic party which largely consisted of modernistic groups, of which a large part of its leaders were Western-educated intellectuals.

Thus, culturally the MI was not so different from Masyumi. This relationship becomes increasingly clear with the linking of MI to the establishment of Partai Muslimin Indonesia (Parmusi) in 1968 by various Islamic social and educational organizations, of which most of its exponents originated from Masyumi. Parmusi was formed following the establishment of the Badan Koordinasi Amal Muslimin (the Coordinating Body for Muslim Charity) in December 1965. This body included various Islamic social and educational organizations, among them Muhammadiyah, Jamiatul Al-Wasliyah, Gasbiindo, Persatuan Nahdlatul Wathan, Mathla 'ul Anwar, PUI and others. In addition, two other organizations supported the establishment of Parmusi, but were unwilling to be mentioned.¹¹

However, during Parmusi's first Congress, a majority of the elected leaders consisted of Masyumi members (whom "military politics" regarded as having committed some offence), and as a result the composition of party organizers was not accepted by the New Order government. It was only after various meetings were held between high officials and Parmusi founders that Parmusi was formally established under the leadership of Djarnawi Hadikusumo and Lukman Harun, under Presidential Instruction No. 70/1968.

But because the Muslims still hoped to include former Masyumi leaders as evident during the Muhammadiyah Congress of Yogyakarta held in 1968, Parmusi's relations with the

government became strained. It was then that John Naro and Imran Kadir in October 1970 issued a statement accusing Parmusi leaders of opposing the Armed Forces, and appointed themselves the task of forming a new leadership. During this crisis, the government passed Instruction No. 77/1970 on November 20, 1970 ordering the change in Parmusi leadership and appointing H.M. Mintaredja as the new Chairman. Mintaredja, together with Idham Chalid then formulated the governing body of the PPP for the first time in 1973 in order to implement the party simplification concept. In the new leadership Idham Chalid was President and Mintaredja was Vice-President, while Naro became one of the heads of central management. Parmusi members who joined the PPP were later known as Muslimin Indonesia (MI). Naro rose to the leadership of MI and PPP after Mintaredja voluntarily resigned following the 1977 General Elections. Together with Sudardji he then headed the MI group in Parliament.¹²

What remains unclear about MI at present are its characteristics. It is difficult to put it in the first category of the "modernist-traditionalist" dichotomy, because, so far, it has displayed neither religious thinking nor religious activities. It is also difficult to place it in the same category as Masyumi, not only because most Masyumi supporters no longer recognize MI, but because individual Masyumi leaders do not always agree with MI's present image.

11 K.E. Ward, *The Foundation of the Partai Muslimin Indonesia*, (Cornell University Press: Modern Indonesia Project, Southeast Asia Program, 1970), pages 69-70.

12 This information was obtained from Ali Tamin SH: "Since MI was directed to PPP, MI leaders agreed to be involved in social-educational-religious fields, but so far "we have not acted yet within these two fields," because MI leaders are more active in practical politics within PPP." (*Wawancara*, November 11, 1981).

Masyumi leaders in every way represent the fundamentalists, with high principles and a powerful commitment towards their followers and the concepts they believe in; their hard struggle in the political arena does not merely indicate a power scramble and they will not forsake principles for convenience. During the Masyumi period they acted for, and had their roots in, the people, and were not dependent on the whims of the government. Their commitment was also applied to their relationship with NU, with whom they often differed. Another characteristic distinguishing Masyumi from MI was their intellectual qualifications. Masyumi leaders did not restrict themselves to practising politics, but were also thinkers and statesmen. This last characteristic is hardly found among present MI politicians.

The impression thus presented by the MI is that of a floating group. This group usually has its origins among the "modern" educated world. Although their origins lie in Islam-based mass organizations, their membership in MI remains personal and bears hardly any relationship with their respective original organizations. In fact, their political behavior is often at odds with those of their former organizations.

The difficulty in drawing a connection between Masyumi and MI, the background of modern education, the absence of religious thinking—giving it a "modernistic" stamp—and the nature of its membership have provided MI with a separate characteristic of a "floating group,"¹³ thus bearing some implication on the attitude and behavior of its activists. The estrangement with the people has caused its

13 This characteristic is temporary in nature, and is an interpretation based on data accumulated from interviews and elsewhere.

presence in politics to be immensely dependent on the extent of its relationship with the elite within MI and the government.

NU: A Group in Transition?

As a social-political group, the NU is one of the oldest in the political history of Indonesia.¹⁴ The organization that was only formalized as a political party in 1952—following a disagreement with Masyumi leaders—represents a mass organization with strong roots in the rural communities of Java and a number of places in the outer islands.

The main strength linking them to the masses are the *kyais* (religious leaders) as organization leaders. The *kyais*, apart from being members of well-to-do families, and owning vast areas of land, are also from the aristocracy. The accumulation of their attributes, in addition to their wide religious knowledge, has turned them into charismatic figures in the eyes of the people. Another of their strengths is the similarity and simplicity of their teachings and ideas, so that there is little cultural gap with the masses.

The tradition most emphasized within its religious teachings, handed down from generation to generation of the *ulamas* as the Prophet's descendants—forms the source of "emotional-religious" ties not only with the lower classes, but also among NU's middle classes who have experienced and absorbed some external cultures. The

14 Nadhlatul Ulama (NU) was established as a social and educational organization on January 31, 1926 in Surabaya. The first "Rais Akbar" or Chairman was KH. Hasyim Asy'ari and the Khatib Awwal or Secretary General was KH. Abdul Wahab Hasbullah. See PB NU *Amal Bakti NU pada Agama, Bangsa dan Negara*, August 9, 1981. Nahdlatul Ulama means the "Rise of the Ulama." Concerning background and history, see also Deliar Noer, *op.cit.*, pages 241-254.

tradition of near-absolute obedience towards the ulamas has greatly influenced the political character of NU members. The tradition and charisma of the kyais were also responsible for the great number of votes successfully obtained by Masyumi when NU was still united to it.

Such an understanding of religion has created a different attitude towards politics. By such an attitude political incidents and activities are regarded as an integral part of religion. Reference for political moves, whether radical or in compromise with the government, are always sought on the basis of religious values in legitimizing them.¹⁵

The ulamas occupy a central role within NU. This is clear in a statement issued by Abdurrahman Wahid, the First Secretary of the Executive Board of NU, which declared the office of *Rois Aam*, or chairman of the Religious Field of NU, as the "supreme spiritual leadership" with "veto" rights in politics. The ulamas are autonomous and are not subject to the instructions issued by the NU Executive Board of the *Tanfidziah* or Executive Council. This position of the ulamas does not vary greatly from the Nakamura interpretation of the situation during the 26th Congress of the NU Executive Board on June 1979 in Semarang. During this Congress, Nakamura observed various critical reactions from all branches and areas of NU in Indonesia towards the NU Executive Board policies during the tenure of Idham Chalid and Achmad Syaichu. Idham Chalid gave no reaction to these criticisms

except to admit his errors and offer his apologies. Idham's attitude was received warmly by all the participants. On the other hand, Syaichu received barely any significant reaction when he attempted to respond to criticisms rationally and argumentatively. Congress participants regarded this attitude as belittling and disrespectful to the ulamas throughout the country. As a result, Idham Chalid was reelected Chairman, because apart from being regarded as clearly understanding NU traditions he also demonstrated his respect towards the ulama in spite of his considerable high rank in government.¹⁶

As a socio-political group, NU exerts immense influence in Indonesia. According to Idham Chalid, it is this group, which he calls a "big cottage," which presently boasts followers over the entire country. The geographic distribution of its supporters is apparent in the number of PPP District heads who are generally NU members. Such support is at odds with the Masyumi experience. The latter had counted on support from outside Java as well, but unlike NU, it had very little, or no basis at all in Java. This was another of Masyumi's weaknesses.

The great number of supporters and the powerful role of the ulama or kyais, and the will to retain tradition are factors which greatly affect the political character of the PPP. Since the 1970s, NU changed its politics towards radicalism.¹⁷ This radicalism was not

16 Mitsuo Nakamura, "The Radical Traditionalism of the Nahdlatul Ulama in Indonesia: A Personal Account of the 26th National Congress, June 1979, Semarang," in *Southeast Asian Studies*, Kyoto: Center for Southeast Asian Studies, Kyoto University. Vol. 19, No. 2, September 1981.

17 Nakamura, *op.cit.* But during the Old Order it tended to be compromising. See also Ridwan Saidi "Response towards K.H.

15 This is based on an interview with Mahbub Djunaedi and Yusuf Hasyim concerning a debate among NU kyais with reference to Koranic and Hadist verses to validate, on the one hand and reject on the other, the participation of NU in Soekarno's Gotong Rojong Cabinet.

determined by the politicians but by the kyais assembled within the Syuri'ah Council. Political decisions taken by the politicians did not automatically become Syuri'ah Council decisions. Thus NU radicalism in politics was interpreted by the ulamas as political tendencies in opposition to tradition and religion.

Nevertheless, NU's strict traditionalism appears to be moving towards change. The decision of the Mukhtamar Anshor (Congress of the NU-affiliated Youth Organization) to support the nomination of Soeharto as President in the coming term is one such indication, for the National Conference (Munas) of the Alim 'Ulamas of the Nahdlatul Ulama held in Kaliurang, Yogyakarta from August 30 to September 2, 1981 issued no such declaration. This decision merely stated that "The National Conference instructs the Executive Board of NU to submit at the correct time the presidential nomination in a constitutional manner before the General Session of the MPR which was elected during the 1982 elections".¹⁸

This incident clearly indicated a new wave within NU. Furthermore, another indication was the support of the Jakarta branch of NU towards Naro's policy with regard to the registration of Parliament nominees, which in fact was not to NU's advantage. Indeed, Fachrurrozi, the Chairman of the Executive Board of the Jakarta NU was bold enough to urge the rejection of NU Head Yusuf Hasyim's "poisonous inducement" to vote *Golput* (non-Saifudin Zuhri: Honesty towards History as a Principle of Political Morality is Required," in *Merdeka*, December 3, 1981, and in *Merdeka*, December 4, 1981'

18 *Keputusan Musyawarah Nasional Alim Ulama "Nahdlatul Ulama" di Kaliurang, Yogyakarta tentang Pemilihan Umum dan Jabatan Presiden R.I., 2 September 1981.*

voting group) in the 1982 elections, in spite of the fact that Yusuf Hasyim is both a Kyai and a Haj, which in NU circles occupy a respected position. These incidents may well be an indication that NU is heading towards some kind of transition, which is increasingly apparent from the growing role of moderate NU groups (the intellectuals) in determining important policies, both in political and leadership matters. Nevertheless, in the foreseeable future, the strict adherence of NU towards tradition seems to remain firm.¹⁹

The Present Organization of PPP


The present organization of PPP grew out of a number of factors, which were the historical background of PPP's establishment, in close connection with the background of changes in the overall political system, the characteristics of its supportive elements, the factor of religion and also the recognized forms of modern organization. It was these factors that influenced party components and political events within the party, such as the structure, leadership, the membership system, and conflicts occurring within its body.

Organizational Structure and Leadership

The organizational structure of the PPP greatly reflects the united principles

19 *Merdeka*, November 21, 1981. The election of Kyai Ali Maksum as NU Rois Aam and the deletion of Chalid Mawardi from NU's list of nominees—due to Anshor's declaration on the Presidential nomination—and the demands for NU's exit from politics according to interviews with various parties from the moderate groups. These tendencies were a new indication. Previously, important decisions were mostly determined by senior ulamas.

DIAGRAM: 1. Organization Structure of the PPP.



NOTE: ——— Linear connection (direct hierarchy)
 ----- Indirect connection (consultative)

of religion and modernization. The principle of religion is apparent in the "Majlis Syura Partai" which precedes the "Dewan Pimpinan Partai," or Party Executive council within the hierarchical structure. The highest position is occupied by the "Mukhtar" which represents the supreme power in the party. It is through the Mukhtar that Majlis and Dewan members are elected.

The influence of religion in the organizational structure is apparent in the function of the Majlis Syura, as a council which provides advice and consideration on all matters, primarily in the fields of religion, and those "connected to the Party." The Majlis consists of doctrinal ulamas called the "Rois Aam" and "Rois." At the lower levels, such as Districts and Branches,


the function of the Majlis Syuro still applies, in the forms of the Majlis Pertimbangan Wilayah (District Deliberative Council) respectively.

Meanwhile, the modernization element is found in what Almond and Powell²⁰ describe as *structural and functional differentiation*. The organizational structure is shown in the following diagram (see Diagram 1).

But on further observation, this form of organizational structure is also influenced by its various elements. In comparison with the organizational structure of NU, for instance, the

20 G.A. Almond and G.B. Powell Jr., *Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach*, Oxford & IBH Publishing Co., New Delhi-Bombay-Calcutta, 1978, pages 16-41.

DIAGRAM 2: Organization Structure of the NU.



NOTE: 1. The NU Syuriah Council's function is similar to the Majlis Syura of the PPP, and so on, until the Unit level of the Syuriah Council. 2. The NU Tanfidziah Council's function is similar to the Party Executive Council of PPP, and so on, until the lowest level.

SOURCE: Mitsuo Nakamura, *The Radical Traditionalism of the Nahdlatul Ulama in Indonesia*, (Southeast Asian Studies), Kyoto: The Centre for Southeast Asian Studies, Kyoto University, September 1981.

influence of the members on the organizational structure of PPP is more evident. (See Diagram 2).

If the organizational structure is influenced by several overlapping factors, then the leadership pattern presents a similar picture. Formally, the leadership is processed through a power formation, as described in the statutes. Central leaders are recruited through the Mukhtar (Congress), while at the District and Branch levels, they are recruited through a Conference. Branch, sub division and Unit leaders are recruited through a Musyawarah and a Members' Meeting.

Nevertheless, except for a National Conference of the Party Council, a Mukhtar has never been held. The temporary recruitment mechanism of

leaders developed informally, by consensus among the PPP members. Thus both the recruitment and replacement of leaders is greatly influenced by the members.²¹

It is this type of party leadership that is currently dominant. According to H. Amin Iskandar, "it is caused by the incomplete merging of PPP's supporters. Thus, although several leaders are elected democratically, others are elected in 'other ways' outside the usual democratic methods."²²

21 Interview with Drs. Husni Thamrin, December 2, 1981.

22 Interview with H.M. Amin Iskandar, Parliament member from the PPP fraction, December 1, 1981.

This situation affects the process of change in the leadership pattern, which is greatly dependent upon these elements. The replacement of Mintaredja SH (the Chairman of the PPP Executive Council) by John Naro is a case in point.

These replacements are not considered unusual since a prior agreement was made during the merging. Leaders and party members are only replaced by other members of the same groups. Such a condition is not without risks. As Amin Iskandar judges:

As a result, the balance 'at the top' does not coincide with the balance 'at the bottom.' One example is the case of Idham Chalid. In the coming 'Conclusive Congress', I believe he will not be reelected, as with other leaders. The reason is because the coming congress may not consist of member representatives any longer. To this moment, the merged DPP-PPP consists only of its own respective elements, which is not in accordance with the people at the lower levels.

The recruitment of leaders through their respective groups can cause certain consequences, for the custom of the different group leaders in becoming PPP Branch or District leaders has created stoppages in the party mechanism because excessive time is consumed in the process.²³

With such a system of leadership recruitment, who really makes the decisions in the Party? According to PPP statutes established in 1975 during the First National Congress, the Party President holds a key role in the decision-making process. "And in case of

23 Drs. Husni Thamrin says: "The decision to have element leaders simultaneously act as party leaders such as currently in effect, does have its consequences. The NU element, for instance, can *topple* as a result of its dual position, it has no time to attend to the interests of its own people." (*Interview*, December 2, 1981).

emergency, he is even regarded as bearing the right to make solitary decisions." In addition, a forum manages the decision-making process, this forum being the Presidential Council. The Council consists of four elements. The NU is represented by Idham Chalid, Perti by Rusli Halil, SI by M. Th. Gobel and MI by John Naro. There is also a Party Council consisting of 27 members.

In practice, however, the key role of Party President is not what it seems. The case of the list of Parliament nominees is one example, for in such an important situation, Idham Chalid was not involved, whereas John Naro, the Chairman of the PPP Execution Council participated. The same case applies to the Presidential Council. This Council is controlled more by the Party Chairman and Secretary General. Such malfunctions in theory can be resolved through a Party Council, but council sessions invariably end in discord.²⁴ Consequently, the decisive party in the formal decision-making process does not function as effectively. In practice, the decisive parties are the groups closest to the government, and not those with the most followers. As such it is the groups who have been "integrated" into the government forces, or those who have obtained legitimization of power.²⁵

However, self-integration and power legitimization are not the only ways of looking into the problems confronting the decision making process. The above

24 This Council has met three times, first, when decisions were made at the time of changes in General Election laws; secondly, during the turmoil of Committee appointments in Parliament; and thirdly, with regard to the list of nominees for Parliament in the 1982 elections.

25 Fachry Ali, "The Political Implications of the New Order Bureaucracy", *Kompas*, December 4, 1981.

concept may be more appropriate viewed in the context of external interests, such as in the case of the Parliament nominees. Other problems are to be found in the leadership structure of the PPP, which Husni Thamrin calls "an accomodating structure." This structure was also created as a result of the paternalistic and feudalistic influences of the ulamas. Therefore, although a resolution has been accepted, if an ulama or the Rois Aam were to disapprove, the resolution would still be invalid. It is this which frequently causes stoppages in the internal decision-making process.

Nevertheless, the leaders are not merely selected by internal party factors. When viewed from the perspective of the national political system of the New Order, the selection of PPP leaders is in accordance with the political system.

To view the connection between the political system and the selection of PPP leaders the reorganization of the Indonesian political system after the fall of the old order should be studied. The traumas of tension, conflicts and national division which occurred during the Old Order is regarded as factors for the absence of political stability and national unity, as well as development programs.

To avoid the recurrence of such a situation so that development can take place, the forces that contributed to the turbulences, had first to be disarmed. This included restrictions imposed by the simplification program of political parties and the depoliticization of the bureaucracy, but also confining the movements of the political elite, which were regarded as refusing to support these efforts of the government.

Thus it is seen that during the events that led to the establishment of the

PPP, PSII leaders who opposed this measure were usurped or replaced by more accomodating leaders. The latter groups later became the political elite of the PPP.

This relationship becomes increasingly clear when it is linked to the MI leadership which was later to bear great influence in the present PPP. Parmusi, as noted before, was established through a process of elimination of Masyumi elements within it. The political trauma felt by the Armed Forces as a result of the involvement of Masyumi figures in the PRRI rebellion led it to call for the removal of Masyumi from the political arena. But Parmusi, which was established under the leadership of Djarnawi Hadikusuma (Muhammadiah) based on the Presidential Instruction No. 70/1968, was short-lived. On the grounds that the Parmusi Congress held in Malang had deviated from the New Order, John Naro and Imran Kadir took control and appointed themselves Chairman and Secretary General of Parmusi. The new Naro/Imran Kadir organization consisted of H.M. Sanusi (First Vice Chairman), Agus Sudono (second Vice Chairman), Gazal (Third Vice Chairman), Uwes Abu Bakar (Fourth Vice Chairman), M. Said (Fifth Vice Chairman) and Imran Kadir as the new Secretary General.²⁶

John Naro's actions undoubtedly drew forceful reactions, both for and against the motion. For instance, Agus Sudono, who was reported by Antara to have been in ignorance of his appointment, a day later on October 20, 1970 gave his full support. And on October 22, 1970, Agus Sudono offer-

²⁶ *Indonesia Raya*, October, 19, 1970. Both HM Sanusi and Agus Sudono, however, denied any knowledge of their inclusion in the list of appointees. See *Antara*, October 19, 1970.

ed himself as a mediator in the ensuing disagreements.²⁷ Support for Naro also came from Al-Ittihadiyah, one of the Islamic organizations supporting Parmusi in Medan.²⁸ Naro's opponents were generally in the majority. Nearly all the Districts and Branches of Parmusi in the provinces supported Djarnawi Hadikusuma and Lukman Harun, including Islamic youth organizations, including the Muhammadiyah youth, the Nasyiatul Aisyiah, the Muhammadiyah Student Association, and the Al-Wasliyah Youth, an organization from which Naro originally came.²⁹

Naro and Imran Kadir for their actions and eight of their followers, were dismissed by Parmusi leaders. But Naro in turn dismissed Djarnawi and Lukman Harun.³⁰

The presence of Naro within Parmusi has created some conflict and tension within PPP. The figure whom Rosihan Anwar³¹ called a "self-styled leader" had close connections with the government. Immediately following the "coup," Naro and his companions were received by Internal Affairs Minister Amir Machmud, and the Department of Defence and Security, in this case represented by Lieutenant General Darjatmo.³² He even obtained support from both Golkar and the PNI.³³ This was probably why these groups "regretted" State Secretary Alamsyah's statement,³⁴ in which he explained that to his knowledge, the government still

adhered to SK 70/1968 which he had signed, acknowledging the leadership of Djarnawi Hadikusuma and Lukman Harun.³⁵ The conclusion may thus be drawn that the selection of PPP leaders is closely related to the current national political system.

Party Members and Cadres

In contrast to the above, factors affecting the party membership are limited to elements within PPP. As a result of the merging, members supporting groups automatically became "party members." Such a system of membership was formed out of the declaration which merged PPP elements on January 5, 1975. And although Ordinance No 3/1975 requiring the registration of members—within one year following establishment—was passed, to date registration has never been carried out.

Formally, party membership conditions required an Indonesian citizenship, a minimum age of 17, or married, and a willingness to accept the party's principles and aims. But the party membership system is not strict, in the sense that the system followed is not an active but a passive one. This means that any member may resign from the PPP. Such a membership has resulted in no-card memberships except in Aceh and South Kalimantan.

This system of membership presented difficulties in the classification of PPP as either a "mass party" or a "party of cadres." For in view of the

27 *Pedoman*, October 22, 1970.

28 *Api Pancasila*, October 21, 1970, and *Antara*, October 27, 1970.

29 *Abadi*, October 27, 1970.

30 *Abadi*, October 21, 1970; *Warta Harian*, October 20, 1970; *Merdeka*, October 21, 1970.

31 *Pedoman*, October 26, 1970.

32 *Sinar Harapan*, October 19, 1970.

33 *Indonesia Raya*, October 23, 1970.

34 *Antara*, October 26, 1970.

35 *Sinar Harapan*, October 24, 1970. But Alamsyah's statement was apparently denied by the State Secretariat, which denied that Alamsyah signed SK 70/1968 (*Antara*, October 24, 1970). Naro and his supporters' "regret" of Alamsyah's statement may be read in *Berita Buana*, October 28, 1970 and *Pedoman*, October 26, 1970.

above tendency, the application of these two characteristics to PPP is irrelevant, firstly, because of the *floating mass* concept contained in Act No. 3/1975 concerning the political parties and Golkar. This concept has rendered the work of PPP Unit Commissaries at the Kecamatan (district) level and the Unit Commissaries at the Kelurahan (sub-district) level rather complicated in assembling and mobilizing the masses, as result of being led into what Husni Thamrin calls, a "monolithic system," so that the people are more or less reluctant to openly declare themselves party members. Secondly, the religious nature of the party has brought forth a separate culture within the membership, in which temporary members are recruited during campaigns resulting from persuasion using religious themes. Thirdly, throughout the eight years of its existence, PPP has never had an orientation program to determine whether the PPP was to be a Cadre Party or a Mass Party.

So far, the membership system of PPP remains unorganized. Meanwhile, party cadres still rely on cadres from other organizations such as youth organizations, students, and others.

The Growth of PPP General Elections

Thus with its organizational structure in the form of a union of elements, and its leadership patterns as well as its current party membership system, PPP steps into the future.

Actually, the party's structure has been perceived by the party elite as a source of weakness. This was revealed in the Progress Report of the Leadership Council of PPP during the National Conference of the Party Council held on November 6-8, 1975 in Jakarta.

"Party members of Persatuan Pembangunan are still isolated from one another. The gap between the former NU, Parmusi, PSII and Perti parties cannot yet be narrowed. This will obstruct the integration of members into the Partai Persatuan Pembangunan."³⁶

Therefore, the PPP is still unsuccessful in creating an image that it belongs to the Islamic populace.³⁷ It was for this reason that on the second anniversary of PPP, then Party President, Idham Chalid, posed the following question:

"Is our party, the Partai Persatuan Pembangunan, currently prepared to realize its functions both as an institution of democracy acting as a media of the people's thoughts and desires to the government, and as a political institution which must implant a sense of religious awareness and responsibility among the people? Is the Party prepared to carry out its function as an instrument of political education which must guide the people towards becoming the purest Pancasilaist human being? Is the Party capable of generating the people's participation in bringing to success the seven creeds of the Second Development Cabinet?"³⁸

In the author's opinion, such doubts were voiced not merely as political rhetoric to unite PPP members, but it also reflected an awareness since the establishment of PPP. The number of obstacles as apparent in the Masyumi split of the 1950s provides a picture of what could possibly be confronted by PPP in the future.

It was for this reason that immediately after the establishment of PPP on January 5, 1973, a meeting was held to form a team assigned with compiling necessary equipment for the organization.

36 Progress Report, of the DPP Partai Persatuan Pembangunan, National conference of the Party Council, 1975.

37 Ibid.

38 PPP President's Address on the second Anniversary of PPP on January 5, 1975.

ion. This team produced the Party Leadership Council, the Majelis Syura, and the party statutes. And on September 4, 1975, the Majelis Syura was provided with members. The years 1974 to 1977 was a busy period. In addition to implementing internal consolidation, including the establishment of the District Leadership Councils (DPW) and the Branch Leadership Councils (DPC)³⁹ as well as domestic reorganization, PPP also had to confront external issues at the national level for instance following the MPR Assembly of 1973, to elect a President and Vice-President and to draw up the National Guidelines; and in 1974 it confronted the bill on the new Marriage Laws. This bill generated a wave of protest from the Islamic population of Indonesia, including Islamic youth who demonstrated in parliament, because the bill was seen as opposing Islamic teachings. These protests were successful, and the bill was drastically altered.⁴⁰ The Majelis Syura created a special team to supervise the implementation of the Marriage Laws.

Thus far, the implications of the "cross influences" which established the PPP in its present form do not appear to be negative. In fact a kind of cooperation has even been established. This is apparent in the publication of the daily "Pelita" as the party's voice on April 1, 1974, and the National Conference of the Party Leadership Council (Munas DPP) on November 6-8, 1975 in Jakarta.

39 Until November 1975, 26 DPWs were established and only the East Java DPW remained incomplete, because its composition and personnel were not in accordance with the statutes. (*Progress Report DPP-PPP 1975*).

40 R. William Liddle, "Indonesia 1977: The New Order's Second Parliamentary Elections", in *Asian Survey*, vol. 18 No. 2, February 1978.

The Munas was of great significance to the PPP in facing the 1977 General Elections. It was from this conference that internal consolidation in the party was strengthened, the party statutes were altered, and the working program drawn up for the formation of a victorious strategy for the 1977 General elections.

An interesting point in this strategy was the aim of PPP participation in the General Elections, in addition to other aims, which is commonly known to have contained a dictum indicating the *ibadah* religious service nature of PPP participation, as quoted in the following:

"The participation of the PPP in the General Elections is based on the aim to conduct a religious service, and fully guided by the principles of *amar maruf nahi munkar* as clearly contained in Chapter 5 of the PPP's Program"⁴¹; This aim is to establish the characteristics of its struggle, "which are that the PPP is a union of the Islamic people of Indonesia which is part of the World Islamic Unity. It is also an instrument to eliminate mistaken concepts and opinions concerning Islam; an instrument of struggle of the Islamic people of Indonesia to free the people from poverty and to realize equality in living and law. It is also an instrument of struggle of the Islamic people of Indonesia to realize, to guide and to develop a democratic government."⁴²

During this national conference, an Islamic Body for General Elections (BPUI) was established, party apparatus from the Central level to the provinces was consolidated and procedures to activate party dynamism were promoted.

It is within this context that religion (Islam) plays a significant role. First, it provided a basis for self-identification; secondly, it also functions as

41 In *Bahan-bahan Munas DP-PPP, 1975*.

42 *Ibid.*

PPP's central theme. Third, during elections, it serves to act not only as a spiritual link with the people, but it has also become a means to legitimize religion to attain PPP victory.

Religion had also encouraged religious figures to take an active political role in their relations with the people. The grass-roots charisma of the kyais or ulamas, have turned them into most effective vote-getters. In the 1977 elections, a circular signed by KH Bisri Samsuri, the PPP Rois Aam, which urged the Islamic people to vote for PPP,⁴³ together with PPP campaigners, established PPP as a significant rival of Golkar. Liddle has dramatically described the elections as "Government versus Islam."⁴⁴ The same phenomenon described by Liddle came up again during the 1982 general elections.

It was indeed this religious factor which, according to Liddle caused the government to view PPP as a serious threat to Golkar even at the beginning of the campaign. As a result, Interior Minister Amir Machmud's campaigners tried to counter (with difficulty) the image among Islamic people that Golkar was an "abangan party"⁴⁵ and that it consisted of anti-Islamic groups, mainly referring to the Catholics (because a number of prominent Catholic politicians and intellectuals at the Center, in Central Java and other regions had become Golkar Activists since 1971). In order to eradicate this impression prior to the 1977 elections, Golkar formed new and used old local Islamic teachers' groups (GUPPI), which the

PPP called the "Shadow Kyais" to challenge PPP's arguments that the Islamic people were required to vote for the Ka'bah (the shrine in Mecca—symbol of the PPP).

Following the announcement of the dismantlement of an anti government plot—which strangely enough appears at every election—called the Jihad Commando, Sudomo, in charge of the Order and Security Command early in February 1977 announced the "four don'ts" applicable to the election campaigns. They were: "No intimidation against opponents; no attacks on the government and its officials; no attempts to destroy national unity; and no criticisms of government policies."

According to William Liddle, these were clearly efforts to obstruct PPP (and PDI) in conducting any serious campaigns.⁴⁶

Nevertheless, the election results were as unexpected to PPP as to Golkar and PDI themselves. Although the overall number of votes PPP obtained was far below that achieved by Golkar, in Jakarta and Banda Aceh PPP won a majority.

The results achieved by PPP during the 1977 elections at least represented the great efforts expended by PPP at that time, considering its unprepared position (still being in the process of integration), a leadership pattern affected by external factors and a severe lack of party cadres. A point which should be noted on these results is the factor of religion and religious figures who played an extremely significant political role in the programs suggested to the people. In reality, this factor is a source of strength and a source of weakness for the PPP. For religion can only be relied upon to attract votes, but it is difficult to be

43 Daniel Dhakidae, "Pemilihan Umum di Indonesia" (General Elections in Indonesia), in *Prisma*, No. 9, September 1981.

44 R.W. Liddle, *op.cit.*

45 In 1971, Golkar created a strong anti Islam impression, and actively worked for the *abangan* support who feared the rise of an Islam-based state, *ibid.*

46 *Ibid.*

used continuously to sustain more practical programs. This last factor is still sorely lacking within the PPP, as evident during the elections of 1977 and 1982.

PPP Conflict: A Shift in Typology of Leadership and The Decline of Doctrines in the Party?

The success achieved by PPP during the 1977 elections, as it turned out, could not be repeated. Nearing the 1982 elections the "Masyumi 1947-52" phenomenon appeared to shadow PPP's progress once again. The merging of the parties by external factors and considered to contain this problem⁴⁷ is the focus of the party's entire misfortune and errors. In fact the information obtained from PPP figures strengthens the conclusion that the merging of PPP is restricted only to politics and is not a characteristic of all the elements.

Accordingly, the merging which Mahbub Djunaidi describes as a "half-portrait" was not without consequences. Differences among the supporting elements, have of their own accord, planted the seeds of conflict within the party. And this conflict cannot be resolved by the religious values which represent the party's foundation.

In view of this, dissension may be due to the different political perspectives of PPP's two main elements. To NU, for instance, the issue of the General Election laws is a matter of principle. The laws do not reflect the political aspirations of either the political party or its elements, and therefore NU rejects them. But to MI, the issue is no more than another rule

⁴⁷ Editorial in the daily *Abadi*, issued after the PPP national conference on November 6-8, 1975.

in the game of politics.

As Yusuf Hasyim states, NU's rejection was aimed at reminding the people that the 1968 MPR decision concerning the General Elections, "the increasing role of political parties and Golkar in the implementation and supervision of General Elections" is not reflected in the General Elections Bill and that it owns a responsibility towards voters, towards history and towards God. This rejection also created an image of NU's concern on the implementation of the General Elections which does not agree with the aspirations of the people.

NU's rejection of the General Election Laws was the beginning of the split within the PPP.⁴⁸ The absence of NU elements at the same time indicated their refusal to be responsible for the passing of the General Election Laws which was enacted on March 3, 1980 in Parliament. A decision was taken because until March 2, 1980 the PP fraction had not yet come to a decision agreeing to the Bill, which had previously been accepted by a Special Team.

Dissension within the party later widened, so that although an MI-NU re-union was announced, NU accused MI of orientation towards outside interests. This statement was issued in relation to the increasingly evident split between MI and NU within PPP regarding Parliament nominees, which was the proportion allotted to each element.

But prior to this, disagreements over another matter had already taken place, in this case over the allotment of the position of committee heads. It is said that MI demanded five seats. The composition of committee heads in PPP

⁴⁸ When the General Election Laws were passed on March 3, 1980, only 38 FPP members attended, all of which came from non NU elements.

would thus be five seats for MI, five for NU, two for SI and one for Perti. The NU rejected this proposal⁴⁹ on the grounds that in 1977/1978 NU obtained seven seats, MI four seats, SI received two seats and Perti none. In the 1979/1980 session, this composition was retained. In the next annual session, NU won more seats, making 8 seats for NU, while MI and SI each got two chairs, and Perti none. NU naturally rejected the allotment of seats proposed, but NU was powerless when Sudardji began his actions and succeeded in isolating NU from the other elements, although five seats had to be vacated in the process. In the latest formation, NU and MI maintained equal positions, with respectively three chairs each, while Perti occupied none, and SI occupied two chairs.

The impression of an outwards orientation as mentioned previously, was in fact difficult to avoid. One example occurred when MI succeeded in gaining five out of 13 seats for the position of Committee Head in Parliament, not as a result of internal consensus, but due to the support of the Karya Pembangunan and the Armed Forces Fractions.⁵⁰ Nevertheless this is understandable in view of the fact that the "lowly" elements as Perti and SI were conveniently ignored; Perti, throughout various annual sessions was never provided with the opportunity to occupy one seat. NU in this case, appears to have acted as the "Golkar" within PPP.

This incident portrays the present situation of PPP. In the *first* place, it is an indication of the PPP's vulnerability which is obvious - not only in the lack of a united opinion

within the party that calls itself "united", but also in the external intervention in determining internal policies, as in the above-mentioned case of committee-head selections. *Secondly*, since 1973, PPP has not been able to create a mechanism for curbing and reducing conflicts resulting from factionalism. *Third*, it is an indication of the very real absence of a legitimate and powerful leadership within its body. *Fourth*, it reveals the tendency of the elements to put their respective interests above those of the party. *Fifth*, all of these factors simultaneously indicate an extremely low level of internal dialogues. *Sixth*, the party is no more than a federal association. Thus the patron-client relationship has a powerful influence on the party mechanism.

It is no surprise that these six tendencies create conflicts between NU and MI, between NU and Perti, and between NU and SI.⁵¹ Actually the other two elements are not too deeply involved in this conflict. But the conflict between the two main elements at times has been overdone, for instance when they discredit each other. Yusuf Hasyim once asserted that "bad people" should not be allowed to be made a party leader. Although he did not refer openly who the "bad people" were, the impression he created could

51 This conflicts appears to reflect a polarization between NU and non-NU elements. The basis of this conflict lay in the change effected in the composition of Parliament nominees for the 1982 General Elections. The NU obtained 56 seats, MI 25, SI 14 while Perti obtained 4 seats. This was based on the results of the 1971 election, decided by the 1975 Munas Council. This composition naturally did not satisfy non-NU elements. Nevertheless SI did not demand a reduction of NU's share, for as M.A. Gani (SI) accedes, "NU is still the element with the greatest number of followers." See *Tempo*, October 3, 1981.

49 *Kompas*, August 28, 1981.

50 *Tempo*, October 3, 1981. NU obtained six seats and Perti-SI respectively one seat for the position of committee head.

only point to J. Naro, Chairman of the PPP Executive Council.⁵²

This statement was actually not a reaction towards the repeated moves made by MI (in this case directed to Sudardji). Sudardji issued a statement that he (implying MI) was capable of moving alone to head the party. He emphasized that MI would not retreat from its demands for their composition of the PPP in Parliament, because he did not see the NU element as any greater than the other three elements. In fact, he demanded that not a single more Parliament nominee from NU be included in the list. Sudardji's demands were based on the General Election bill, that NU had boycotted by walking out, that it had supported the 50 Petitioners and signed a questionnaire on Pertamina. He further stated that if the 50 NU members were still to be nominated, the existence of the New Order would be threatened. He even stated—as *Merdeka* quotes—"how can one who has not agreed to the General Election Laws, stepped on the democracy of Pancasila, and torn apart consensus, be participated as a Parliament member?"

At times this gives the impression that the political conflict between NU and MI does not exist *except to involve Sudardji*, according to Chalik Ali of NU. Chalik said that lately Sudardji appeared to be acting strangely. He is considered to frequently violate the decision of the F-PP sessions. For instance, Sudardji openly supported the increase in the price of domestic oil.⁵³

Sudardji apparently is the focus not only of his political opponents, but also of a number of Islamic youth figures.

52 The impression conveyed was that of a figure involved in the "Hwa-Hwe" business, much like the commodities market affair in which John Naro was involved. Read *Merdeka*, October 19, 1981.

53 *Merdeka*, August 22, 1981.

For instance, the *Angkatan Baru* interviewed various Islamic youth figures, who concluded that the conflict surrounding PPP lies with Sudardji's behavior.

The continuous conflict between the two elements may give rise to the conclusion that all the elements within the party are making no serious efforts to resolve their internal problems. This impression is gained not merely from the volley of attacks in the mass media, which could generate more serious conflict. Indeed, in the case of the Parliament nomination, a solution of this internal conflict was sought from the other parties, in this case the government.⁵⁴

These tensions and conflicts may be an indication that the root lies—as with the other party components—with several overlapping factors.

But if it is linked to the leadership process generated by an adjustment to the present developing political system, it becomes slightly clear that these

54 The nomination sequence proposed to the government dragged on endlessly. The problem was only resolved on October 27, 1981 determined by the government. Naro himself submitted the list of nominees to the General Elections Institution (LPU). According to some newspapers, the list was the product of a PPP consensus (*Kompas*, October 28, 1981). The product of this consensus was the enactment of changes in the composition of the number of seats for each PPP element, with 49 seats for NU and 59 for the others. Of the 7 seats reduced, four were presented to MI, two to SI and one to Perti. The affair was then considered settled. But the daily *Pelita* issued a statement by Yusuf Hasyim to the effect that the list submitted by Naro was not the result of a PPP consensus. In fact he admitted ignorance of the list's contents and composition. Naro submitted the list to the Minister of the Interior, not at the LPU Secretariat, but at the residence of the Minister, Amir Mahmud. It was this list which was announced as PPP's list of nominees. (Editorial of *Merdeka*, October 30, 1981).

conflicts may be influenced by the national political system and its aim to enact a change in the leadership within PPP.

This leadership typology consists of two types. The first is the old typology represented by the senior politicians from NU and from several non-NU party elites such as Djadil Abdullah. The characteristics of this typology is its "relative radicalism." From the political viewpoint, this type may be considered unsuitable for the needs of leaders at the national level. The second is the new typology. Its most obvious trait is the "accommodating" nature towards the present power structure and political system. This group consists of junior politicians.

These conflicts resulted from a process of pressure carried out by leaders of the second typology with the encouragement of members of the national political system, and the opposition of the leaders of the first typology. This tendency is clearly evident from the attacks by the MI group and the retaliations launched by NU.

These tensions and conflicts bear immense implications upon the PPP as a whole, mainly in the resulting gap in the relations between the elite of the PPP and the masses in which each element has its roots. This gap also resulted because of the leadership pattern in Parmusi, which was later to affect PPP.

As previously discussed, the fall of Djarnawi and Lukman Harun from the Parmusi leadership resulted from the sentiments of Masyumi and its supporting mass organizations within politics, and their subsequent shift to social and educational fields. But such an attitude carried an immense implication towards MI, which is one of PPP's elements. As a result, MI membership may be said

to be exceedingly individual in nature and can longer be said to have its roots in Islam. Therefore, although Ali Tamin SH, the Deputy Secretary General of MI, claims that 80 percent of MI supporters at the Center and in the provinces are from the Muhammadiyah,⁵⁵ Lukman Harun, a member of Muhammadiyah's Central Organizers, as several dailies in the capital have reported, issued a statement to the contrary. In his statement he mentioned that Muhammadiyah had no connection with MI, going so far as to state that "to even recognize MI as Parmusi's successor is doubtful". This statement was further clarified by AR. Fachrudin, Chairman of the Muhammadiyah PP, to the effect that the resolution of the Muhammadiyah Tanwir Session in Yogyakarta in 1979 states that MI is not connected to Muhammadiyah, and members are even forbidden to join MI.⁵⁶ This disassociation with MI was also expressed by Kyai Haji Misbach, the former Head of Masyumi for the East Java District, and Al-Irsyad and Persis.

Such a situation resulted in the loss of MI's politicians whose roots lie with the people. What later transformed was a self-integration into the government's aspirations, or to be more precise, to

⁵⁵ Interview with Ali Tamin, SH (November 11, 1981).

⁵⁶ *Tempo*, October 3, 1981. AR Fachrudin then continues, "to recommend Muhammadiyah members to enter PPP is not feasible with PPP in such a condition. (We would like) to forbid entry into Golkar, yet Golkar is accommodating. Therefore Muhammadiyah prefers to remain silent." According to a Muhammadiyah figure interviewed on December 26, 1981, Muhammadiyah will give the right to free choice to members in the coming General Elections. *Tempo* even reported one Muhammadiyah member as saying, "rather than follow a Golkar (*antek*) it would be far better to join Golkar itself," *Ibid*

those of the rulers and the social political groups closest to the government, such as Golkar. This is apparent not only from the close relations of Naro and companions with the government,⁵⁷ but also from the obvious support exhibited by the Karya Pembangunan and the ABRI Fraction for MI in its effort to gain 5 out of 13 seats for the position of committee heads in Parliament.

Nevertheless, self-integration is not the monopoly of MI. The union of Perti and SI against NU, despite other factors, is a similar symptom.

In fact, similar tendencies are apparent within NU. These vague tendencies may be seen in Idham Chalid's political behavior. As Party President he barely achieved anything. His last effort was to submit a rival list of nominees to LPU, without demanding an explanation from Naro as his subordinate.⁵⁸

These facts — concerning self-integration — at the same time indicate that the elites of PPP may be said to

have lost contact with the people. Unfortunately, self-integration only serves to provide certain positions and power in weakening other elements, which in turn weakens the entire PPP itself. One case in point is the appointment of young NU figures as PPP nominees. Dissensions within NU are thus created, serving to strengthen the position of the integrated elite, not in the eyes of the people but in the government. The process of self-integration is one of the sources of conflict within PPP. It is also an indication of the inaccuracy of viewing PPP as a "party of *aliran*."

Conclusion

The political changes at the national level which demanded the simplification of the party system brought about the merging of several former Islam-based political parties into PPP. The basis for this merging was the religious similarity of the parties. The desire to avoid national tension and conflict in the past was the background for changes within the political system which at the same time affected the leadership process of each element within PPP. This leadership pattern in turn affected the entire political behavior of PPP. The presence of such leaders simultaneously negated the previous type of leaders, who were considered inappropriate for the type of party leadership currently in demand.

In this context, we view the roots of the conflicts presently occurring within PPP, as a result of the process of elimination of the previous type of leadership to be replaced by a leadership more in accordance with the existing political system. This conflict then involved the party's elements, merely because the right type of lead-

57. Following a conflict within PPP over the list of nominations, Naro and companions composed a new list which was well-accepted by the government, while the proposal for amendments by NU was rejected.

58. Exclusive information obtained during an interview with a youthful NU figure who desires to remain anonymous indicate the increasing doubts voiced by the NU younger generation regarding the presence of Idham Chalid, because his actions appear to provide more advantage to the government than to NU. Furthermore, there are indications of a meeting among NU figures in progress in preparation of the coming 1982 general election. On this occasion, one young NU figure questioned Idham Chalid whether he had obtained certain promises as a result of the Anshor agreement to nominate Soeharto as President of the next term (1983-1988) to which Idham Chalid replied "No!". Whereupon the questioner responded with the reply, "what a great loss we suffer, to sell something for nothing ...".

ership, and the wrong type, with regard to the present political system, can be found within these elements.

Thus the conflicts indicate a tendency towards the present state, in the sense that such conflicts emerge when the political system increasingly demands the adaptation of leadership typologies. The force of this demand, is caused by the old typology, which day by day indicates a growing tendency to obstruct the establishment process of the national political system. The parliament walk-out, the "50 petitioners," and the "Pertamina questionnaire" involving the old leadership typologies are evidences of a process of obstruction towards the establishment of a national political system and structure. Therefore, the offenders had to be eliminated from the political arena.

But the conflict may not have occurred with such intensity if each element had had similar historical backgrounds, traditions and political perceptions. But it was this very similarity which is absent in PPP, at least with regard to the two main elements, respectively MI and NU.

On the one hand, MI's characteristics have placed it in a position which, both through political processes and through the individual backgrounds of its members, are less rooted within the people, but is more or less endowed with skills according to its profession. On the other hand, the NU's characteristics have made it establish a defensive position. Its grass-roots have indirectly endowed it with the ability to conduct political bargaining, not on the basis of skill. This bargaining power is undoubtedly disliked by the MI. Such interaction by themselves contain the seeds of dissension and erupt when the "signal" is given by the national political system.

In this manner, a correlation between the political system with the selection of PPP leaders and the conflicts arising within its body, exists. Whereas the interaction between the elements contained in the merging and based on religion, only serves to act as an extremely temporary media in resolving the conflict. In the end, the merging and religion are powerless to extinguish the conflict which had always remained latent. And the role of religion in political processes within PPP for the coming 1982 elections grows increasingly indistinguishable. It will probably remain as the central political theme in order to attract the masses. But this will be carried out at a time when the ulamas—who lead the religious masses—have been first put aside.

In such a situation, the MI cannot expect much from the modern organizations from which they originate, for very early in the process, they had declared their disassociation with MI.

The growth of PPP becomes significant when examined through these processes, for the processes appear to indicate that this period is the most critical, which if it is not immediately resolved may give rise to a situation entirely different from the one portrayed in the history of Islam-based parties in Indonesia.

Such a statement may not be excessive. For never in the political history of Islam in Indonesia, has the ruling group in a party, which is the sole representative of the political aspirations of Islam, lost the trust of nearly the entire large mass organizations—both traditional and modernist—of Islam in Indonesia.

If NU were to exit from PPP—the idea of which is being increasingly voiced—the leadership of PPP will be totally transferred into the hands of MI, as desired by Sudardji, within such

a floating condition. The question that arises is what will be their directions?

In this context, PPP appears to be a party in transition. If the Islamic *alirans* which support it were to suddenly back out, the ruling group,

the MI, would have to depend on a supra-party force. As a result, the stamp of "a party of *aliran*" will no longer be evident. Oligarchy and the decline of *aliran* within the party are perhaps more descriptive of the PPP today.

CSO: 4200/360

INDONESIA

CONTINUED RESISTANCE IN TIMOR ACKNOWLEDGED

Lisbon DIARIO DE NOTICIAS in Portuguese 16 Jan 83 p 3

[Text] An Indonesian army officer acknowledged yesterday that 500 FRETILIN [National Liberation Front of Timor] rebels continue to fight for the independence of East Timor which was annexed by Indonesia 7 years ago. Meanwhile, FRETILIN sources told DIARIO DE NOTICIAS the movement has more than 4,000 armed men in the region.

In a meeting with Indonesian journalists who visited the province, Colonel Purwanto pointed out the difficulty in fighting the guerrillas because of the support they enjoy among villagers intent on defending their homes.

However, according to the same officer, the FRETILIN (which has a government in exile) has a limited supply of arms. They number no more than the 100 used in the sporadic attacks against buses and villages.

According to the officer, Indonesia's policy against the insurgents is to repair the houses and villages attacked by them so that they will "tire and grow weary of always doing the same thing." Once they have used up all their ammunition "they will surrender".

FRETILIN sources contacted by DIARIO DE NOTICIAS in Lisbon put the number of their armed men operating in the region at 4,000 (the so-called "regular forces") and a large number of civilians in the mountain villages who make up the people's militias.

The same sources stated that the FALINTIL (the FRETILIN army) is organized in companies and it moves about from the easternmost part of East Timor to the Indonesian border. They also stress that the guerrillas act under cover of local support.

9935

CSO: 3542/25

INDONESIA

BRIEFS

FORMER FRETILIN LEADER ARRESTED--The Angolan news agency, ANGOP, reports that Rogerio Lobato, the former FRETILIN [National Liberation Front of Timor] defense minister of East Timor, is being tried on a charge of diamond trafficking. According to the same source, Rogerio Lobato, who had also been a member of the East Timor Liberation Organization's (FRETILIN) central committee, had been expelled from the organization in March 1982 for political conspiracy against the organization's leadership. ANGOP notes that, soon afterwards, he was given authorization to settle in Angola where he also reportedly betrayed the local authorities by becoming involved in shady businesses dealing, in particular, with illegal diamond trafficking. According to the same source, the former FRETILIN leader was associated with a network of Angolans and foreigners with overseas connections--particularly with Portugal, Spain, Switzerland and other Western countries. Lobato is to be sentenced on 18 January 1983. [Text] [Lisbon O DIA in Portuguese 15 Jan 83 p 8] 9935

CSO: 3542/25

KAMPUCHEA

SIM VAR ANALYZES SIHANOUK-KHMER ROUGE RELATIONSHIP

Paris MOUL KHMER in Cambodian Nov 82 pp 12-14

[Text] We heard that President Prince Norodom Sihanouk and Vice President Khieu Samphan of the Anti-Vietnamese coalition government have once again agreed to ask Hanoi to sign a "non aggression pact."

If it is true, one should really wonder about this. If two nations wish to have this kind of alliance they are of rough equality. A small country never asks to make this kind of agreement with a larger nation. If this is real, this story can be compared to the story of a rabbit asking a tiger to be his friend.

We still do not know what Pham Van Dong, prime minister of North Vietnam thinks about this. We assume that Pham Van Dong will have a good laugh because the coalition sounded so proud and righteous from the beginning and now it turns to make an agreement with Vietnam.

It happened before when Prince Sihanouk had a bright idea of making the Khmer nation like Switzerland. Claiming that no country dared to oppress Kampuchea, Prince Sihanouk asked the National Assembly to approve legislation stating that Kampuchea must remain neutral. But the legislation also stated that the military force should not be large. On the other hand, Switzerland has enough weapons to defend its neutrality and its people are ready at any time for Mobilization to defend their neutrality. Prince Sihanouk's neutrality was empty handed. With no place to turn, Prince Sihanouk turned to Vietnam and asked to have its troops, the enemy of the Khmer people, to be deployed on Khmer territory which destroyed Khmer neutrality.

The Vietnamese troops not only settled on Khmer territory, but they made life miserable for the Khmer people. So, unsuccessfully threatening the Vietnamese troops, Prince Sihanouk decided to leave for France in order to meet with Lon Nol who was in Neuilly hospital for treatment. The purpose of that meeting was to ask Lon Nol to return to Kampuchea to mobilize people for an uprising against the Vietnamese. He understood that secret contacts with the Vietnamese would not reach the outside world. If the Khmer people were to rise up in demonstrations against them, other nations

would be aware of the situation. Prince Sihanouk intended to go to Moscow and Beijing to ask both governments to intervene to get the Vietnamese to withdraw from Kampuchea.

When Lon Nol returned to Kampuchea, he incited the Khmer people as Prince Sihanouk had requested. The turmoil went a little bit too far and the demonstrators sacked and destroyed the embassies of North and South Vietnam. At that time Prince Sihanouk blamed Lon Nol. A displeasure with Prince Sihanouk's attitude and an anger with Vietnamese mistreatment of villagers manifested itself among the Khmer people. So with the will of the Khmer people, the National Assembly and the Royal Council agreed to meet and vote Prince Sihanouk out as head of state. When the prince heard about this, he joined the Khmer Rouge. Then the Prince brought the Vietnamese troops and the Khmer Rouge forces to attack Kampuchea both to get revenge and to regain his power.

If one considers the matter of Prince Sihanouk and the Khmer Rouge, one could tell that Prince Sihanouk and the Khmer Rouge knew long ago of the Vietnamese intention of swallowing the Khmer territory when the opportunity arose.

The prince and the Khmer Rouge, however, went to the bitter enemy of the Khmer people and asked for help to regain power. It was a violation of the law and murder of our own people.

As for Prince Sihanouk, he himself claimed that he had killed over a thousand Khmer people and that it wasn't wrong. As for the Khmer Rouge, they killed more than three million Khmer people--half of the Khmer nation with a projected plan to keep only one million people in order to rebuild the nation. The rest would have to be disposed of or subjected to forced labor and worked to death in the work sites with the understanding that they were all corrupt. But this aim was not achieved because the Vietnamese troops invaded Kampuchea and the Khmer Rouge fled to the mountainous jungles where they are now.

For this reason Khmer nationalists should learn a lesson for national salvation. If they do not learn this lesson, Kampuchea and the Khmer nation will vanish without a trace.

When can all those leaders of Kampuchea who are too greedy for power come to their senses that they themselves are destroying their nation?

Do the Khmer people who have been subject to maltreatment and persecution agree to let the same murderers to lead Kampuchea again?

If they still allowed themselves to be cheated as before, then it should be concluded that the "Khmer disease" is such that the nation of Kampuchea could not find a magic doctor to cure it.

If one cooperates with the deadly enemy of Kampuchea in order to attack his own nation and then acts as if he is the leader of the Khmer nation to lead the attack on the Vietnamese aggressors, is it conceivable that we could believe him any more?

7429

CSO: 4212/16

VISIT TO KAMPUCHEAN-THAI BORDER DEFENSE POST RELATED

Hanoi QUAN DOI NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 20 Dec 82 p 2

/Article by Nguyen Dinh Cao: "Stanch Riflemen On the Southwestern Border"/

/Text/ Splitting the waves, the ship sailed toward the seashore of Koh Kong, a southwestern coastal province of Kampuchea bordering on Thailand. The wind was blowing strongly over the evenly blue surface of the sea but could hardly dissipate the stuffy atmosphere characteristic of the late dry season on the land of stupas.

The ship arrived at the port after a 12-hour voyage. A cadre of the Kampuchean Liberation Army, aged about 40 and of a medium but sturdy stature with a fairly dark complexion, led us to visit a border defense unit.

It was the 11th Battalion which was fulfilling its mission on high point 225-- a strategically important position designed to control the enemy who has come over from Thailand to violate the border by land, sea and air.

The path leading to the strong point was really perilous because it went through thick and thorny bushes interspersed with rugged cliffs. We had to exert ourselves strenuously to catch up with our guide.

After climbing passes and going down slopes for more than 2 hours, our guide told us:

--We are coming near the unit's barracks which are over there!

Looking at the direction he pointed with his finger, we saw scattered small huts half-hidden by the leafy shade of large trees.

On a vacant lot, a group of soldiers were playing volley ball and another a folk game which consisted in throwing shuttlecocks named "con" at each other; they ran after each other, seized each other by the waist and laughed joyfully.

The guide told us that was a folk game usually organized in Kampuchea on the occasion of the traditional New Year.

Buon, the battalion commander, cordially welcomed us into a shack built at the foot of a thickly leafy tree with many long branches and used as the battalion command headquarters and also as his rest house.

Made of bamboo, the shack had been built half on the ground and half underground. There were shelters behind it and fortifications and trenches round it.

The comrade commander said cordially with a broad smile:

--It is very kind of you to go to a lot of trouble seeing us here. We hope that your stay here will be fruitful and that you will take it easy and feel quite at home. Please don't stick to formalities in dealing with people here. Only by behaving in such a manner can we become brothers who are fighting against a common enemy.

He showed us round the place and the way the unit was positioned. He said:

--Our mission while stationed here is to firmly defend each inch of land, each wave on the sea and each portion of the airspace of our beloved fatherland. It can be said that we have been working 24 hours standing guard and patrolling with circumspection, ready to smash all schemes and intentions of the enemy to violate our country's frontier.

You surely know clearly that ours is a burdensome mission full of hardships. However, each and every combatant in our battalion is fully aware that this glorious mission has been entrusted to us by the fatherland, the party and the people throughout the country. No matter how great the difficulties, hardships and dangers may be, we are determined to fulfill this sacred mission.

We are all the more confident as the Vietnamese comrades are always standing side by side with us to fight against a common enemy.

He led us to an elevation where we could cast a sweeping glance over all this dangerous border area. He said:

--Far away is the vast ocean. The immense forest over there stretches out on the borderline between two countries--Kampuchea and Thailand. Above us is the limitless sky. Supported by reactionaries among the Thai authorities, enemies of all kinds from the other side have constantly sought to break through the Kampuchean frontier by means of the most cunning and brazen tricks.

Hardly has any day passed without a violation of the sea area, airspace and territory /of Kampuchea/. The L19 aircraft of Thailand frequently violated the /Kampuchean/ airspace in their reconnaissance flights to spot targets to help the reactionaries on the ground make incursions or shell the Kampuchean territory with mortars.

Artillery guns from Thai ships on the open sea or from the other side of the frontier were fired many times in the direction of Kampuchea to support the reactionaries' attempts to violate the border and commit crimes against the people. However, all of their schemes were foiled by the border defense combatants in this region.

Standing guard at night on the strong point, a combatant named Nau Khuol once promptly detected a group of enemy troops coming from Thailand by sneaking

through the forest with the intention of launching a raid against the border defense troops and committing crimes against the people. Armed only with an AK rifle and some cartridge magazines, our comrade cleverly and valiantly thwarted the raid, annihilating a number of enemies and chasing the remainder back to the other side of the Thai border.

The combatants named Don Phat and Chon Peng knew each path and tree in the forest as well as they did each line in the palms of their own hands. They often detected quickly the trail left by scouts and bandits who had infiltrated the frontier and they notified their unit to enable it to draw up plans to track down and annihilate the enemy and to check all his criminal acts. After being stationed for more than 3 years in this remote forest region, Don Phat and Chon Peng, like other combatants in their unit, had experienced numerous hardships and dangers and exchanged fire with the enemy hundreds of times; yet all combatants were glad to shoulder the heavy duty to defend this border region of their fatherland.

/Battalion commander/ Buon told us that the parents, wives, children, brothers, sisters and close relatives of 80 percent of the combatants in his unit had been massacred by the Pol Pot-Yeng Sary-Khieu Samphan clique and that their families had previously been the victims of cruel repression and exploitation under the Sihanouk and Lon Nol regimes. On hearing the stories told by Buon and each combatant in the unit, we understood more clearly the reason why they possessed a staunch fighting spirit and an adamant determination to smash all enemy plots in order to defend the revolution, each piece of land and each portion of the airspace and seashore of their beloved fatherland.

Though our visit to this unit was short, we were deeply impressed by each and every combatant stationed at this outpost. We were very moved when a "teenage combatant" in the unit accepted us as his pledged brothers in the joint struggle for a common ideal. His name was Tuon, 16, a native of Phnom Penh. All of his parents, elder brothers and sisters and close relatives had been killed by the Pol Pot-Yeng Sary-Khieu Samphan clique. He was rescued from the prison by this 11th Battalion. He became what he was today because he was tended, given medical treatment and educated by the unit combatants. Therefore, he voluntarily asked to stay in the army to serve it though he was still a minor because he considered that the 11th Battalion would be a happy home for him. For more than 3 years, "teenage combatants" like him had closely followed the unit and made a worthy contribution to the feats of arms scored by the battalion in fulfilling its mission of fighting against the enemy and firmly defending the fatherland's frontier.

Our hearts filled with attachment and affection, we took leave of the Kampuchean border defense combatants on a nice morning. Young combatant Tuon was authorized by the unit to accompany us and see us off at the Kompong Som Port. Holding our hands firmly before our departure, he said with emotion: "Our close brotherhood will be an invincible strength enabling us to smash all enemies who intend to sabotage the fatherlands and revolutions of our two peoples."

9332

CSO: 4209/182

VIETNAMESE-KAMPUCHEAN TROOP COOPERATION ON WESTERN FRONT REPORTED

Hanoi QUAN DOI NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 20 Dec 82 p 2

/Article by Pham Xuan Luc: "The Far West"/

/Text/ As a district adjacent to the Thai border, Thma Puok suffered from frequent enemy activities. To continue the task of building and defending the border area, Thma Puok District moved a number of hamlets from the coastal area to the inland region. At that time, many difficulties arose: Some 60 percent of the population lacked food and for 2 years ran the risk of starvation because the rainy season came late, with scanty rainfall so that about 40 percent of the total rice cultivation area was left fallow due to the water shortage. Taking advantage of these difficulties, the Pol Pot-Paras (Son San) clique incited the people to leave this region for the land on the other side of the border. Faced with this situation, the command of /Vietnamese/ Group 8 ordered the group deputy commander directly to command the unit and to coordinate its activities with those of the friendly /Kampuchean/ troops to fulfill its mission. Tong Van /the deputy commander/ then began to help the friendly district committee. On the other hand, the group sent a report to the higher level asking it to send in rice to help the people stabilize their life and concentrate their efforts on growing subsidiary food crops on 85 percent of the arable area. As a result, illegal crossings of the frontier have been gradually limited ever since.

To apply the "strong front, stable rear" motto, Group 8 has directed the 416th Detachment--which had won the "Determined to Vanquish" title for 2 years in a row--to coordinate with our friends and carry out propaganda to motivate the people to build combat hamlets and villages. With its tradition of enemy annihilation and hardship endurance, the 416th Detachment has fought in Nimit, Poipet and Kromeach ever since it came to Kampuchea for military operations.

At present, the 416th Detachment is entrusted with the mission of building a base area. Though the unit is stationed 40 kms away in K. Village, liaison is effected by running on foot. Our combatants have had to know the local customs and habits as well as the Cambodian language and to implement the "eating, dwelling and working together with the people" motto. At night, our combatants make combat preparations; in daytime, they go into the hamlets and work together with the people. Though scattered into small detachments, our cadres and combatants have kept strict discipline and won the confidence and

sympathy of the local administration and people. Following a phase of activity /by our combatants/ in K. Village which is composed of 11 hamlets where the security situation is complex, the local people said to each other: "According to the Paras clique, the Vietnamese troops have an aggressive intent in helping Kampuchea" or they asked each other: "Can the revolution defeat the Paras-Pol Pot clique?" Some said: "We believe in the revolution but request the Vietnamese troops not to withdraw." Fully aware of the local people's feelings, our combatants gave them explanations to make them fully confident so that they might have their minds at ease while building their hamlets and villages.

By winning the people's trust, the 416th Detachment has recently helped the locality organize the study of the revolutionary policy for 16,095 people as well as the training of 193 hamlet and village cadres. The various units have motivated and called on 3 Paras soldiers to surrender with their weapons, called on 72 Pol Pot soldiers to surrender and seized 8 installations from the Pol Pot clique and 8 others from the Paras gang. Realizing that they were wrong in providing supply for the enemy in the forest, 115 citizens have admitted their guilt and pledged to discontinue such activities. Some 339 Pol Pot soldiers have voluntarily reported /to the local administration/ and been educated and treated leniently.

Displaying self-enlightenment, the local people have contributed bamboo and wood to build defensive fences and have sent 20,000 spikes to the troops in Group 8 for the building of fences to cut off the enemy's transportation lines.

I had the opportunity to attend a meeting of the Thma Puok District People's Committee during which district chairman Hun Savon and public security chief Naut voice their determination to cooperate with the troops in Group 8 in building the border district into a stable one and to thwart all enemy tricks.

Only 3 years have gone by but the district, village and hamlet organs have been strengthened continuously. There are now hospitals, schools and shops in the district. The friendly armed forces have been strengthened and have provided hundreds of youths to replenish the main force. Naut said: "That achievement is owing to the substantial aid of the Vietnamese troops."

I saw the presence of border defense cells in almost all villages. Though scattered while carrying out their activities, our combatants have always displayed vigilance and a good behavior characteristic of the Vietnamese fighters fulfilling their international duties. All of them can speak Cambodian, eat "bo hoc" /a Kampuchean dish/ and dance the "lam thon" and have won the local people's esteem and sympathy. Phon Dong, commander of the friendly district unit, told me:

--The Kampuchean troops are still too young and have not yet got used to the collective life and the border defense task. Therefore, we have to learn a great deal from the Vietnamese troops.

In many hamlets, there are soldiers of the friendly 25th Company who live near our own combatants. Though wearing clothes of different colors, our combatants

and the friendly troops have been sharing the same trenches and feeling attached to each other just like brothers. Phon Dong has frequently met with the commanding cadres of Group 8 to exchange views on the tasks to be done. The soldiers in the friendly units are still faced with numerous difficulties and shortages but when noticing that the Vietnamese troops are also experiencing difficulties and hardships, they have told each other to try and learn /from the Vietnamese/ in order to be able to fulfill their mission satisfactorily.

Ms Soc Duon, chairman of the district women's union, spoke her mind: "We highly regard the Vietnamese troops because they have a good personality and because they love the people and respect women."

Each and every combatant in border defense Group 8 has clearly determined that it is his responsibility to do everything to fulfill his glorious international duties. Our combatants on this far west front love the border area of the friendly country as much as that of their own fatherland.

9332

CSO: 4209/182

KAMPUCHEA

ECONOMIC RESURGENCE SEEN BY FRENCH JOURNALIST

Hanoi TIEN PHONG in Vietnamese 10 Jan 83 p 6

/Article: "Fourth National Day of Kampuchean People's Republic (7 January 1983),
The Kampuchean Will"/

/Text/ The Kampuchean People's Republic is 4 years old. Throughout these 4 years, revolutionary Kampuchea has confronted countless challenges and hardships. However, it is coming around, and is making firm and stable steps on a new road. Serge Baudouin, correspondent for the French LE MONDE DIPLOMATIQUE, who visited Kampuchea in November 1982, reports below some characteristics of this magic achievement.

Kampuchean want to live. Rural areas in Kampuchea have returned to their previous rhythm of life; in the cities, business circles have recovered all their rights to develop. Restaurants in Phnom Penh are proof that the country has traveled a long way since July 1980, when the first eating house was inaugurated near the Kororom Hotel. Now, there are in Phnom Penh numerous restaurants, where diners can choose at will from a profusions of different menus, even ordering French Alsaitian white wine, the where the Parisian-type croissant has begun to reappear.

In the streets, one can also see renovated Honda two-wheelers, Peugeot and Citroen cars. Private houses, most of which were left unoccupied by their owners a long time ago, are being gradually rehabilitated.

True, a visitor continues to see vestigates of the recent tragedy: water and electric power shortages, dangerously clogged up sewers, and the lingering spectacle of destruction and ruin. But, a new face has emerged from behind the somber facade. Presently, it seems that the country has rediscovered all its vitality. It can be said that many cadres have disappeared, most of whom lost their lives under the Pol Pot regime, or left the country.

For instance, there now remain in Kampuchea just 4 agricultural engineers, 2 veterinarians, 2 forestry engineers, and 1 fishery engineer--a total of 9 specialists, compared with 300, prior to 1970. In industry, three-fourths of the factories operate without a single engineer, or high-ranking technical cadre. Of 6,000 railroad workers, only 600 remain, now running the Phnom Penh-Battambang line. According to Heng Teaw, trade unions vice chairman, fewer than 30 percent of workers have survived.

To fill the gap, in addition to school education (with over 1.5 million enrollees), a regular on-the-job training system has been set up. The Kompong Cham Rubber Factory director told us, "By trial and error, we have reclaimed old production methods." Chaa Khong and Run Than of the Ministry of Agriculture said, "Year after year, we have put off establishing an agricultural institute, because it has been more profitable to train ministry personnel in courses, which combine study with labor and last from 3 to 6 months." The Khmer-Soviet Friendship High Technical School director said, "The Soviet Union helped us restore the school buildings, previously demolished by the Khmer-Rouge. The number of students graduating from our school barely meets the requirements of the 1985 plan, in terms of technical cadres for the electric, building and irrigation sectors." However, a more decisive factor lies in the homecoming of 1,500 Khmer students from colleges in Vietnam, the Soviet Union, the German Democratic Republic, Bulgaria, Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Cuba. These students are training to become specialists in a great number of fields, and the first group will come home in 1983.

...The Kampuchean monetary system, previously eliminated by the Khmer-Rouge, has been restored by the Phnom Penh authorities, who put new banknotes in circulation on 20 March 1982. The people welcomed this decision. The Phnom Penh authorities have just inaugurated a new market in Sisophon City, 80 percent of which was destroyed. It seems that they firmly control business activities there. In their judgment, as long as production still is deficient, there will be the "need to utilize and develop various categories of the privately run economy, and to enable the free market to operate; however, leadership and control are also needed to ensure that the free market serves production, livelihood and commodity exchanges," as a resolution of the May 1981 Fourth Congress of the Kampuchean People's Revolutionary Party clearly stated.

9213

CSO: 4209/196

MONG DISTRICT'S POPPY GROWING, VANG PAO REMNANTS, SRV ASSISTANCE DISCUSSED

Vientiane SIANG PASASON in Lao 21 Dec 82 p 2

[Article by Viengkham Thabousai: "New Life of Hom District, the Land of Heroes"]

[Excerpts] The teasing noise of a group of young students along with the singing of young females and males who were growing poppy on the mountains such as Phou Houat, Phou Phan Khao and Pha Lavek was loud and echoed over all the area. This reflects the liveliness and ambition of the forest people in the new regime of the LPDR, their most beloved homeland. This picture also showed the diligence of the Mong people.

Hom District has just been set up. It is one of 9 districts subordinate to Vientiane Province. The special characteristic of this district is that its location stretches far out along the valleys, e.g., Phou Houat, Phou Sot, Phou That, Phou Ving, Phou Ngou, Pha Lavek, Phou Samliam, and other adjoining districts. For example, the border adjoins Saisomboun District on the north, Paksan District on the east, Thoulakhom and Keo-Oudom on the south, and on the west Vang Vieng District, the land of the golden cliff. There are two river valleys: Long San and Long Nam Hom. Of these, Long Nam Hom is the widest. It is suitable for cultivation and animal husbandry, and it is the rice and fish granary for the people in this district. Hom District has 5 cantons: Kengkhoi, Phou Houat, Na Pho, Pha Lavek and Phou Ngou. There are a total of 53 villages and over 13,500 people. Of these 80 percent are Lao Soung, Lao Theung, and Lao Yao. Another 20 percent are Lao Loum. It consists of 2 types of people; over 4,500 original Hom District people and over 9,000 people who are refugees from the Vang Pao special forces.

From its special characteristics and location in the old regime of the American imperialists' and Vang Pao rule, the people in Hom District were faced with hardship and food shortages. Their rights to earning their living which was very low were trampled on, and [they were] unfortunate in all respects. Therefore, when it became the time of the new regime, the party Central Committee and government as well as the party committee and all levels of the local administrative authorities in Vientiane Province paid special attention to determinedly lead the people who have a revolutionary heritage to eliminate the bad effects resulting from the war. They mobilized and guided the people to perform mass-like national defense and public security. This means firm cooperation between the regular forces and the regional forces, and becoming deeply involved with improving and training the guerrilla militia. Now in the entire Hom District

there are 6 guerrilla-militia companies. Recently these forces have scored outstanding achievements in destroying all the enemies' tricks and psychological warfare. They decided to promptly destroy the Vang Pao bandit nests and the remnants and reactionary exiles. This has peacefully turned all the tricks of the American imperialists and the Beijing expansionists in to defeat in all cases. They gradually bring peace and order to society. Meanwhile, they lead the people to emulate each other in expanding the transformation and construction of the social and economic base and socialism unfailingly on the basis of the three revolutions at the same time in order to bring brilliance and happiness to the rural areas of the country.

At a meeting to summarize what has been learned about mobilizing the people to take part in agricultural taxes and to sell rice to the government based on their own income, in the first phase over all of Vientiane Province on 17 December 1982 I had the opportunity to meet Comrade Bourgnang Sisumblong, the secretary of the Hom District party committee. Comrade Bounngang told us that under the brilliance and capable leadership of our party and government, mainly the base party committee, in the past 7 years the new life of the people in Hom District are self-sufficient in terms of the food supply. Everyone is happy with the highland rice harvest of over 2,000 hectares. They also attentively grow a lot of potatoes, corn, etc. The outstanding event of this year was that it marked the first year the Hom District people were awakened to contribute the agricultural taxes and to sell their rice to the government based on their honored and sacred status as Lao citizens. The entire 5 cantons paid 69 tons of rice for agricultural taxes and sold 120 tons of rice to the government, having already stored it in warehouses. Concerning animal husbandry, the district never gives up guiding the people to expand animal raising using new techniques in order to take part in raising the standard of living and steadily improving the draft laborforce. Based on incomplete figures, in 1982 in the entire district there were over 3,300 oxen and buffalo, over 7,300 pigs, several thousand goats, over 15,700 poultry, and several hundred horses. The cultural education that has been carried on in the new regime's curriculum involves academic education, physical education, and art education. These have been expanded throughout and they respond to the policy line. Education must truly be one step ahead of other work. Now the Hom District people from 18 to 45 years of age have completely overcome their illiteracy and are actively moving up to their new classes. Teacher training schools for nationalities [and] general education schools have been set up in all villages, including secondary schools and elementary schools. These have made the Mong workers' children happily go to school all over. In the last academic year the district and the province sent over 10 students who are the children of the Mong in this district to study abroad.

The higher echelons have paid special attention to communications and transportation. The transportation of goods to the people in Hom District can now be made in 3 ways: by water on the Nam Ngum River and continuing to the Long San; the second by the Paksan route for the Pha Lavek area in which there are two cantons. The government mostly uses airplanes to transport goods where ground transportation is inconvenient.

Comrade Boungnang Sisomblong added that the primary work in Hom District in the coming years (1983-1985), especially the 1983 policy line that aims to hurriedly lead the people to new agricultural techniques, is to convert from slash-and-burn cultivation to come down to do rice paddies, and to set up and widely expand agricultural co-ops which is a form of socialist production. They also survey the people's housing locations in order to assign them to the new flatland area with a good foundation to make a living.

One time I met Comrade Khamphai Oundala and Comrade Bounhom Souphanthou of the guiding committee of Vientiane Province who gave their views that 1982 was the second year of carrying out the first Five Year Plan of the government and the basic achievement of the Third Party Congress. Now the party Central Committee and government and especially the party committee and the administrative committee of Vientiane Province are putting all their effort into developing Hom District into a new rural [district] as a strong outpost in terms of national defense and security work, solid organization and political ideology, and wealthy in terms of the economy, standard of living, and socio-cultural advancement. In order to carry out the duty, now Lao technical experts along with the neighboring Vietnamese have come to help to survey and design the hydroelectric dam construction in Vang Louang. They have also received UN aid in the survey for the preparation of the district office building construction, and for schools, hospitals, and model villages. All these are to construct and change our nation's rural area, the heroic land of Hom District, to be advanced and wealthy in the future.

9884

CSO: 4206/38

CHEMICAL, FOOD TENDER NOTICE OFFERED

Bangkok THE NATION REVIEW in English 17 Jan 83 p 17

[Text]

LAO PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC
Peace Independence Unity Socialism
Tender Announcement

The Societe Lao Import Export of the Ministry of Commerce in Vientiane hereby invites producers, agents or sales representatives to submit bids for the supply and delivery of:

MAIZE
SOYA MEAL
FISH MEAL
PAPER BAGS
CHEMICAL PRODUCTS

in types and quantities further specified in tender document No. 21-82/SLIE-SIDA.

Prospective bidders may bid for any combination of items, 1-5, 2-5, 3-5, 4-5, or all of the items in the schedule. No bids will be considered for a single item or lesser quantity of an item than that specified in the Schedule.

Tender documents can be obtained in Vientiane at the Societe Lao Import Export or in Bangkok, Thailand at the Embassy of the Lao PDR, 193 Sathorn Tai Rd during office hours from 3 Jan. 1983 to 25 Jan. 1983 against a non-refundable payment of US\$ 50 or B 1,105 per copy.

Bids received by the Societe in Vientiane before 9 am on 25 Jan. 1983 will be opened publicly at the Societe at 9 am of the same day in the presence of bidders who have chosen to be present.

Societe Lao Import Export.

CSO: 4200/352

INDUSTRIAL SECTOR REPORTS INCREASED OUTPUT OVER 1981

Vientiane SIANG PASASON in Lao 20 Dec 82 p 2

[Article: "The 1982 Achievement in Industry, Handicrafts and Forestry"]

[Text] Aiming at the actual situation in carrying out the 1982 plan which is the second year of carrying out the first Five Year Plan, in economic and social development the industry, handicrafts and forestry sections produce materials to serve the needs of society to raise the standard of living of the workers. Recently, under the direct guidance of the Ministry of Industry, Handicrafts and Forestry from the center on down to the localities and the production base, the sector has struggled to carry out its work in order to make the plan and policy of the party Central Committee become reality. It's achievements are as follows.

Based on the report from the main industrial production bases subordinate to the Ministry of Industry, Handicrafts, and Forestry, and from different provinces, the expected figure for 1982 production is 23.79 percent over that for 1981. For example:

Electrification section: most of the electricity production is from the Nam Ngum hydroelectric dam in Vientiane. In 9 months of 1982 it produced 643.99 million kWh or 80.64 percent of the year's plan. However, when calculated for the whole year it will produce 881.94 million kWh, which is 110 percent of the whole year's plan, and is an increase of 3.29 percent when compared with that for 1981. This includes only 93.11 percent of the year's plan for domestic electricity usage. The electricity that is sold to Thailand is expected to be 111.37 percent of the year's plan.

Mining section: tin production and mining is still in the machinery restoration stage concerning repair with aid from the USSR. Now 80 percent of the entire plan has been completed. This has made the 1982 production 30.10 percent over that for 1981.

For 9 months 40,000 tons of gypsum was produced, which is 100 percent of the plan.

Chemical section: in the 9 months it carried out 71.38 percent of the entire year's plan and it is expected to carry out 107.49 percent by the end of the year. When compared with the period of 9 months for 1981 it exceeded that for

1981 by a factor of 2.5. Of these, powdered detergent was up by a factor of 2.02 over that for 1981; electric wire production was a factor of 1.92 over that for 1981, and plastic bag production was 5.57 times that for 1981.

The tree cutting and tree manufacturing section was 23.57 percent over the 1981 production.

Textile section: the total production for the 9 months was 65.36 percent of the plan for the whole year. It is estimated that the production for the whole year will be 110.14 percent, or 33.27 percent over the 1981 production in comparison.

Over the 9 months the pottery section produced 55,023 units or 125.05 percent of the plan.

Moreover, other sections also actively struggled to carry out their plan including these construction aiming to steadily and widely expand production.

These achievements are an important contribution in gradually raising the standard of living of the people of all nationalities. It is also a well-built foundation for the next step in the expansion of industry, handicrafts and forestry according to the resolution of the Third LPRP Congress.

9884

CSO: 4206/38

SIDA FUNDING OF FORESTRY PROJECT REPORTED

Vientiane SIANG PASASON in Lao 18 Dec 82 pp 2, 4

[Article: "Progress at State Forestry Enterprise No 1"]

[Text] State Forestry Enterprise No 1 was set up in 1979. In the past 4 years they have scored many achievements. For example, they 100 percent successfully constructed to a standard 24 km of route 4 which branches out from route 13 between Paksan District to Phou Ngou, and a 25-km length of road into the forest in order to drag out the logs. The construction of Bailey M3 bridge, 128 meters long with 3 layers of double-reinforced bars across the Nam San River which can support 60 tons has been 80 percent completed. It is expected to be fully completed in March 1983. Concerning housing construction, the construction of a forestry training center consisting of 29 buildings has been 80 percent completed; there is an agricultural warehouse which is able to contain 400 tons of paddies, a tree seedling station and a tree strain research office building, a machine repair garage, and 3 spare parts warehouses and car garages, one of which is 100 percent completed while the other two have been 60 percent completed. Three hospital buildings were constructed, and 4 school buildings for small children. Moreover, they also built 50 collective houses and family houses for cadres. These have been built with materials and labor from within this state forestry enterprise itself.

Funds for the State Forestry Enterprise No 1 operation were provided by a grant from the Swedish International Development and Cooperation Agency (SIDA). This company was assigned to carry out the project. The first phase of the plan, in particular, involves the 4 years from 1979 to 1983. It has a budget of approximately 7 million dollars. The entire first phase of the plan is to be completed by June 1983.

The State Forestry Enterprise No 1 was assigned by the higher echelons to be responsible for the cooperation. In this particular project there are approximately 530,000 hectares covering the area between the Nam Kading and Nam San Rivers, and the back of Phou Ngou up to Mok-Tha Dom District, Xieng Khouang Province. In the wooded area only approximately 100,000 hectares can be cut down. The responsibilities of the State Forestry Enterprise towards this area are to develop the forest, to protect the forest and aquatic animals, nature, and environment, and to develop the mountainous area. This aims to set the forestry foundation on a long-term basis, to train cadres and forestry workers to increase their technical and technological capability to cut down trees for export, to allot trees in place of the natural trees so as to produce new forest, to grow trees and protect them by preventing the forest from being destroyed by providing a settled occupation for the people of all tribes who live around this area.

Concerning the provision of the settled occupation for the people, Comrade Damdouan Phomdouangsi, director of the State Forestry Enterprise No 1, explained that the company has a plan to gradually clear rice-cultivating area. Meanwhile, it will convert the people from engaging in slash-and-burn cultivation to come down to engage in lowland cultivation. In 1982-1983, in particular, the State Forest Enterprise No 1 expects to clear approximately 50 hectares of cultivated area for the people in the part of Ban Thatsiang that is next to the forest area. Next they will try to plant in the rice fields until the people around the forest area have enough land for their rice fields. They will try to gradually decrease shifting cultivation by starting to focus in the forest area only. For the people's shifting cultivation, the company will mobilize them to take the young plants the company has planted for growing between rice-growing. Moreover, they will automatically take care of the forest plants they will plant. Doing this will replace the trees lost in shifting cultivation. At the same time the clearing of the land for the people's rice fields will be widely expanded to guarantee a plentiful food supply.

Along with economic base construction and the long-term forest allocation, the company produces at the same time. In the first year of carrying out the 1981-1982 cooperation plan the State Forestry Enterprise No 1 adopted a plan to cut down 10,000 [units] and the actual result was 10,900 [units]. For the 1982 budget the company had completely paid back the money they owed to the government according to the plan. In 1982-1983 they adopted a plan to cut down 15,000 [units]. The tree-cutting operation is now being actively carried out. The director of the State Forestry Enterprise No 1 told us that the tree cutting this year will definitely guarantee the expected level because the workers have well received training in political ideology and specialized tasks. Starting from this 1982-1983 dry season the average tree cutting has been approximately 180 [units] per day.

The board of directors of the State Forestry Enterprise is now cooperating with SIDA in order to adopt a plan to expand the cooperation to advance to the second phase from 1 July 1983 to 30 June 1986. This will be a period of building industrial and manufacturing factories with a production capacity of 30,000 [unite] per year.

The State Forestry Enterprise No 1 consists of a total of 670 workers. It is located in Ban Meuang Mai which is subordinate to Paksan District, Vientiane Province, and is approximately 12 km north of Paksan District. It is on a straight line from Nam San and Nam Ngiab Rivers, which is another most suitable area for forest development in our nation.

9884

CSO: 4206/38

LAOS

BRIEFS

VIENTIANE DISTRICT POPULATION--In the entire 8 districts and 59 villages of Saisomboun District there is a total of 500 elementary school teachers including 100 female teachers. They are located in all cantons and villages. The population is 12,249, and 5,939 are women. [Excerpts] [Vientiane SIANG PASASON in Lao 21 Dec 82 p 2] 9884

CSO: 4206/38

STATE OF CPM EXAMINED

Bangkok THE NATION REVIEW in English 18 Jan 83 p 5

[Text]

THE figures are certainly impressive. Up to 1,600 Communist Party of Malaya (CPM) terrorists wiped out in six years of combined Thai-Malaysian operations where 3,000 to 3,500 communist terrorists (CTs) had been operating with virtual immunity before.

South of the border, the once resurgent terrorists have been cut down to not more than 400 CTs scattered in penny packets from Kedah to Pahang.

There is little doubt that it is a great triumph for the security forces and a tribute to Thai-Malaysian combined operations. But where have all the rest of the communists gone?

At a conservative estimate, 1,000 CTs who escaped being killed or captured remain unaccounted for.

A few units might have fled deeper into Thai territory. Other CTs would have died from wounds received from clashes with Security Forces, or from disease.

Desertions would account for another handful (though this figure is probably negligible as the communists have drastic ways of dealing with deserters).

The frightening truth is that the bulk of the CT survivors has probably gone underground again, discarding and hiding its uniforms in order to melt in with the general populace.

It is a truth that Malaysian Chief of Defence Forces, General Tan Sri Ghazali Seth, admits.

A glance at the diagrammatic set-up of a CT district gives an idea of the flexibility of the communist guerrilla movement. Whenever a main battalion or company unit is

badly hit or under heavy pressure, the survivors fall back and regroup as stage B units.

If necessary, they will disperse and hide among the civil population again, taking up their former occupations as seemingly peaceful, law-abiding farmers, tappers or labourers.

Although only approximately 400 known CT regulars are still operating in Malaysia, this is only the tip of the ice-berg.

The rule of thumb is that for every armed, CT regular, there are 20 Min Yuen active sympathizers submerged within the population, supporting them with food, clothing, drugs, information, recruits, even arms.

As such, there must be at least 8,000 Min Yuen supporters in Peninsular Malaysia, not to mention the thousands who escaped the security forces' dragnet along the border and escaped into Thailand.

Although it is tempting to write off the CT movement as a spent force, it must be remembered that it is a mythological hydra—each time one of its heads is cut off, it grows a new one.

The table for CT and security forces encounters also give another insight into the resilience of the CT movement.

For instance, although only six terrorists were eliminated last year and four this year, there were 31 and 47 "encounters" respectively.

A glance at the figures will show that the CTs must still be pretty active in the jungle. Perhaps they have been so demoralized and reduced in numbers that the security forces are coming across lone terrorists who flee at the first

**OPERATIONAL STATISTICS IN PENINSULAR MALAYSIA
1975-1982**

YEAR	ENCOUNTERS WITH CT					CAMPS FOUND				
	KEDAH	PERAK	KELANTAN	PAHANG	TOTAL	KEDAH	PERAK	KELANTAN	PAHANG	TOTAL
1975	28	46	11	2	87	1	26	6	1	34
1976	51	130	4	4	189	6	11	2	6	25
1977	13	29	6	11	59	1	18	-	5	14
1978	41	37	6	15	99	7	28	2	9	46
1979	9	19	2	15	45	-	9	2	9	20
1980	4	27	9	12	52	2	19	17	7	45
1981	7	15	3	6	31	3	4	1	9	17
1982 (20 DEC)	25	11	1	10	47	1	3	-	3	7
TOTAL	178	314	42	75	609	21	108	30	49	208

Tables based on statistics provided by the security forces

sight of the opposition.

Isolated CT bands, too, could be attempting to make their way out of the jungle to rejoin their Min Yuen comrades, and are therefore in no mood for a fight.

However, General Tan Sri Ghazali Seth believes that the CTs are actually husbanding their strength to fight another day.

The Malaysian Government is well aware of this. Said Gen Ghazali: "Fighting the CTs in our environment is quite unlike conventional warfare.

"I cannot put a time frame and say that they can be eliminated in five or 10 years. But wiping them out is our ultimate aim, and I think we will."

To keep the surviving CTs off balance and to prevent them from re-establishing new sanctuaries, Malaysian security forces are conducting regular patrols and carefully targeted search-and-destroy operations.

"The idea is to keep them (the CTs) moving and not allow them to breed and in the process (to) kill, capture or force them to surrender," the General explained.

It is dangerous to write off the

CT movement. People did that once when Chin Peng fled with 600 remnants of his band to the Thai border in the 60s.

But like a phoenix, the Communist Party of Malaya rebuilt up its strength, and in the early 70s was strong enough to infiltrate south again, launching a series of sharp, though relatively minor, attacks on selected security forces targets.

NOT too long ago, Peninsular Malaysia was an ill-starred country. Security operations maps during the Emergency were dotted with red stars representing communist terrorist (CT) bases.

Today, most of these stars have disappeared, leaving only six representing the camps of rag-tag units of the Communist Assault Work Forces. They are located in Kedah, Perak, Kelantan and Pahang.

There are good reasons why these camps are located where they are.

It is a fallacy that the CTs operate in trackless, inaccessible country completely cut off from the

rest of the country. All guerrillas need camps which must meet certain standards.

First, they must be secure from enemy detection and attack. They must be near sources of drinking water and adequate supplies of food or food dumps, and they must have reasonable access routes so that runners, couriers and other CT supporters can reach them without having to mount a major expedition that could take weeks of trekking.

The Malaysian jungle is laced with a network of aboriginal and animal trails, as Spencer Chapman noted in his book *The Jungle is Neutral*.

Each camp too, must provide safe and secure escape routes. For instance, the 8th and 12th Assault Units are placed in areas which allow them a number of alternative routes into Thailand across relatively low hill passes.

The 5th Assault Unit found north of Sungei Siput has another added advantage. It is near one of the best Min Yuen and CT recruiting areas in the country. Together with the 7th Assault Unit, they too have fairly easy means of moving north and east.

The four northern camps historically formed a series of staging posts before the CPM split into rival factions.

Significantly, the operational area of 12th Assault Unit near Grik covers part of the East-West Highway, a point which must be obvious to the 3,000 Malaysian soldiers guarding the highway.

The Gua Musang camp is perhaps the most isolated from the West Coast by the Main Range, although there is an easy open plain leading north to the Kelantan border.

But the location of the 6th Assault Unit is perhaps the most interesting. While it is sited in fairly high terrain, it is close to Selangor in the sense that there are many jungle tracks — such as the Bentong Gap — cutting across the mountains.

And Selangor is potentially the richest source of supplies, and even machinery, for the CTs.

Overall, the six camps form a chain which stretches right down the country.

Kelantan (except around Kota Baru and the north and Trengganu have relatively small Chinese populations and the CTs have found it

hard to make inroads into the two states.

IT HAS TAKEN six years, but Malaysian and Thai security forces have wiped out almost half the communist terrorists operating along this common border. And of the 1,900 left, only 300 to 350 are believed to be "active" terrorists, according to Malaysian Chief of Defence Forces General Tan Sri Ghazali Seth.

The general also said that the three major factions of the communist movement — the Communist Party of Malaya (CPM), the CPM Revolutionary Faction and the CPM Marxist-Leninist wing — had been virtually wiped out.

Gen Ghazali said there were now about 1,900 communist terrorists left in Southern Thailand and Peninsular Malaysia, as compared with nearly 3,500 when the first combined operations "Daoyau Musnah" was launched in January 1977.

Most of the 300 to 350 communist terrorists operating along the Malaysian-Thai border belong to residual groups which are broken down into smaller groups called Armed Work Forces. They operate mainly along the borders in Kedah, Perak, Kelantan and in Pahang.

"On the whole military studies show that the communist terrorists are poorly armed, mostly with small arms, remnants from the Emergency," said Gen Ghazali.

Some of their weapons had been captured from security forces. Others had been bought from gun-runners. They also have a few rockets.

The general said that most of the leaders of the main six assault units dispersed all over Peninsula Malaysia were now in their sixties and seventies and efforts to recruit more people have been fruitless because of the socio-economic progress in the border regions.

The Temenggor Dam and the East-West Highway and the Felda schemes were cited as examples of development which helped to discourage communist terrorists attempts to get new recruits.

"The only help they are getting is through intimidating villagers in areas where there are no security forces. They get food and medicine from them and also from unsuspecting aborigines deep in the jungle," said the general.

"The last traditional source is from relatives of communist terrorists and ideological supporters."

In the drive to destroy the communist cells in both countries, a series of major combined operations between Malaysia and Thailand have been conducted involving the use of large infantry, supported by armour, artillery and combat engineers.

Always during such operations, the forces are given air cover by the RMAF, which plays an equally important role in the detection and annihilation of camps, main food supply lines and the observation of basic trends in terrorist activities.

The operations also help in the removal of an important source of income for the communists on both sides — by way of taxes from local people.

Gen Tan Sri Ghazali who has seen 33 years of active army life and who was behind the "Gonzales" series of military exercises, described 1983 as a year that would see more military action against communist terrorists in Peninsular Malaysia.

"A major aspect of this year's fight against communism will be the updated training programmes being worked out for the Armed Forces to achieve maximum efficiency in administration," he said.

"Also, a study will be made by the respective Chiefs of the Army, Navy and the Air Force to review the weaknesses and oversights of the previous year."

He also said that the expenditure plans for certain operations would have to be "tailored" because of the current recession.

CSO: 4200/351

LOCATION OF CHIN PENG QUESTIONED

Bangkok THE NATION REVIEW in English 18 Jan 83 p 5

[Text]

DOCUMENTS seized from fallen communist terrorists indicate that party strongman Chin Peng is not active in the region anymore.

Not one carried his name, rank or signature, or was a directive from him. This has fuelled rumours that the Communist Party of Malaya (CPM) secretary-general died of natural causes in the jungles bordering Perak and Pahang two years ago.

There are also unconfirmed reports that Chin Peng is in Beijing - and the conflicting stories has led Chief of Defence Forces General Tan Sri Ghazali Seth to declare: "I will only believe he is dead when I see his body."

CSO: 4200/351

SECURITY FORCES 'CRIPPLE' COMMUNIST MOVEMENT IN PENINSULA

Bangkok THE NATION REVIEW in English 18 Jan 83 p 5

[Text]

THE back of the communist movement in Peninsular Malaysia has, for the second time, been apparently crippled, thanks to the series of combined operations mounted by Thai and Malaysian security forces.

Malaysian Chief of Defence Forces General Tan Sri Ghazali Seth said that terrorists not only suffered serious casualties, but more than that lost most of their previously secure border sanctuaries.

The result is that the Communist Party of Malaya (CPM) and the other splinter communist factions have lost their freedom to rest and recuperate and — perhaps even more important — their ability to gather and train fresh recruits.

The importance of the Thai-Malaysian combined operations cannot be over-emphasized. For about seven years, the terrorists used their base camps and refuges in south Thailand as an effective springboard for trained CPM cadres to infiltrate the south.

One foreign writer quoting Malaysian intelligence sources, once reported "a picture of widespread penetration, one group estimated in late 1976 at 300 strong was known to have infiltrated as far as central Pahang...and set up jungle camps within a day's striking distance of Kuala Lumpur."

In fact, the situation was so serious that many villages were forced, by kidnap, murder and extortion, into supporting the CPM.

The terrorists even launched a spectacular attack on the East-West Highway then under construction, destroying or putting out of order

many earth-moving machines.

Apart from military operations, internal dissension also weakened the CPM.

The leadership of the CPM were largely survivors of the Emergency which broke out in 1948. By the Seventies, these leaders were already in their 60s or 70s and could not provide the vigorous leadership required for a successful insurgency.

This led to a struggle for power among the younger cadres around 1974. Added to it were disagreements over the question of ideology and the direction the armed struggle should take.

Ultimately, this led to the infamous massacre of "suspect elements" and dissenters by the communists themselves in 1979.

The end result was that the CPM splintered into three different factions — the orthodox, or original, CPM, a breakaway "new generation" CPM (Marxist-Leninist) and the CPM (Revolutionary Faction).

What is the CPM struggle all about? The longterm aim of the orthodox CPM is along classic Maoist lines "to form a united front of peasants and workers rising to overthrow a capitalist government and setting up a communist republic."

The war against communist terrorists is a people's war. The rural population is the coinage of success or failure, and winning their hearts and minds is crucial. Military force alone cannot ensure permanent victory.

The fight is two-pronged, and the Government's "Kasban" or border regional development programme must go hand-in hand with

security operations.

But it is also, in many ways, a battle of ideologies, a fight between free enterprise democracy, and communism.

The communists, however, have always been the most patient of guerrillas.

They are past masters of the waiting game and they try to exploit any issue they can — among them the growing demand for substantial social and economic improvement; current political instability in the region, particularly between ASEAN and Vietnam and her Indochina allies.

The communists too, can be expected to try to make an issue of the current economic recession.

They will attempt to misrepresent the aims of the Malaysian Government's New Economic Policy as well as exploit any political dissent and communal grievances.

But whether they can succeed in the final aim is something else.

The rural guerrillas are unlikely to be able to recruit enough support, especially Malay support, to be able to mount a national insurrection along the lines of the Vietminh in Vietnam, unless social and economic conditions in Malaysia are to change radically beyond all recognition.

Again, military writers, among them J. Clemenson (Malaysia in the Seventies) say that there is no evidence of consistent help for the various CPM factions from Moscow, Peking, Hanoi or anyone else in the communist world.

And there is little proof that the terrorists have new weapons captured by the Vietnamese in 1975 from US stockpiles.

CSO: 4200/351

ISLAMIC PARTY LEADER QUILTS IN PARTY FEUD

London ARABIA THE ISLAMIC WORLD REVIEW in English Jan 83 p 23

[Text]

☉ The resignation of Dato Haji Asri bin Haji Muda as president of the Islamic Party of Malaysia (PAS) has provoked a bitter inter-party struggle. The present dispute could have a profound impact on the future role of PAS in promoting the full acceptance of Islam in the country.

Asri's resignation letter was read to the October party congress by secretary-general Datuk Abu Bakar Umar, who along with the party's treasurer also resigned their posts. In it, Asri declared that "the trend developing in PAS now is swaying towards a way of politicking that is foreign to the party since it was established . . . Apart from that, accusations hurled at me were overwhelming and more serious than were made by PAS political enemies." He declared that moves against him and PAS' new-style politicking were the work of those "operating behind the mask of *ulema* leadership."

Later, in a speech to supporters in the PAS stronghold of Kelantan, Asri referred to his opponents - who are now in control of the party - as "radicals" who had "idolised" the Iranian Islamic revolution and believed that it should be copied "without considering that Muslims in Malaysia are Sunnis and not Shiites."

Asri's resignation was apparently prompted by two amendments to the party's constitution passed earlier at the October congress. The first ended the exclusive power of the party leader in appointing members of the party's central executive committee; these would now be appointed by decision of all elected members of the committee. The second change was the reconstituting of the party's "ulema wing" into a more powerful majlis ulema (Council of Ulema).

Proponents of these moves said they were aimed at streamlining the powers and responsibilities of the central committee as well as elevating the ulema to their rightful position in

the leadership of the party. Asri and his supporters, however, have good reason to see these moves directed at reducing his powers in the central committee and to creating an ulema group with more clout on party policies and decisions than the central committee itself.

The decline in Asri's fortunes began in 1973 when he led PAS into a coalition with its erstwhile rival, the ruling United Malay National Organisation (UMNO). The coalition - the National Front - also included several other parties representing communal groups in the country. The coalition move disappointed PAS' traditional supporters in the villages as well as the local ulema, who had opposed UMNO for cooperating with the non-Muslim parties. Similarly, educated Malay youths, who had their own vision about PAS' Islamic role, disapproved of the party's acceptance of the secular policies of the National Front. PAS began to lose its hold over its grassroots supporters and ceased to attract the emerging generation of educated Malays. Both groups began to direct their interest to the newly-formed and politically-unattached Muslim Youth Movement (Abim).

PAS' alliance with UMNO, however, did not last long. By early 1978 it had left the National Front. By reverting to its original status, PAS began to regain the support of its members as well as the Muslim professionals. Their new interest in PAS was, however, as intense as their criticism of Asri. PAS's poor performance in the 1978 elections, when it lost to UMNO in Kelantan, led to further demands for a leadership change.

The call for new leaders was made credible by the presence since 1978 of a new batch of young and educated members, many of whom had stood as PAS candidates in the 1978 elections. The new group figured prominently among executive committee members elected in the party's 1979 congress.

The new leaders, however, were soon at odds with Asri's group. The two factions differed over the broad issues of the internal party programme and political strategy. The new group criticised Asri for being too election-minded while neglecting activities directed towards improving the Islamic commitment of party members. On the political level, Asri has been accused of having a secular political outlook and of being too soft and accommodative towards UMNO and the non-Muslim parties. Asri replies that as a political party PAS had to be election-oriented. He denies that the training of members had been neglected. As for political strategy, Asri says that he was doing the best for the party within the context of the democratic political system in the country. The two groupings within PAS are now dubbed "ideological group" of the young leaders and "political-electoral group."

At the party's 1981 congress the ideological group captured most executive committee posts, Asri, re-elected unopposed to the presidency, was severely criticised; however, the ideological group's majority in the executive committee was soon negated when Asri used his constitutional powers to appoint his men as the party's secretary-general, treasurer, and six executive committee posts. This led to the ideological group's constitutional amendments which, in turn, precipitated Asri's resignation.


The ideological group now leads the party. Asri's departure is a major change for PAS. The 60-year-old former leader, who had been in the central leadership of the party since soon after its formation in 1951, still has a considerable following. His group could mount a challenge to the new leaders at the 1983 congress, but this is unlikely to succeed.

Leaders of the ideological group have the reputation of being hardliners in political strategy as well as in religious interpretation. As such, they have been politically identified with the Iranian revolutionaries; in religious matters, they are seen as condoning the designation of UMNO leaders and members as taghut (oppressors) and kafirs (infidels). Haji Yusof Rawa, the acting president, who once served as Malaysia's ambassador to Iran in the mid-1970s, has however denied any attempt by the present leadership to adopt the Iranian style.

HEAD OF ISLAMIC PARTY OF MALAYSIA INTERVIEWED

London ARABIA THE ISLAMIC WORLD REVIEW in English Jan 83 p 24

[Text]

 When Asri resigned it fell to deputy president Haji Abdullah Yusof Rawa to carry on the leadership of the party. Haji Yusof, 60, is a founder member of PAS and holds the unique distinction of defeating Dr Mahathir Muhammad, now the country's prime minister, in the 1969 general elections.

Haji Yusof was appointed deputy commerce minister and later ambassador to Iran when PAS was in coalition with the ruling UMNO government from 1973 to 1978. He was, however, never identified as an Asri ally. In the 1981 party elections he defeated an Asri candidate to win the party's deputy presidency with the support of the ideological group. Haji Yusof spoke to *Arabia*.

Dato Asri has been PAS president since 1971 and was re-elected for another two-year term in 1981. Why do you think he resigned?

Because he felt that there now exists a trend within PAS which has deviated from the party's original principles. I do not believe that the party's principles of striving for the implementation of Islam have been violated. It is possible that the methodology adopted by certain groups in the party has deviated, but not the principles. I think Asri resigned after he had observed the strong criticism against him during the party congress.

It is said that the emergence of a young and radical faction in PAS pressured Asri to step down. Is this true?

Young factions and old factions exist in all organisations. But in PAS there are no major differences between the two factions. What happens is that the young group wants to apply the party's principles "positively," while the old faction prefers a more gentle approach. I don't think then that Asri resigned because of the young faction.

But Asri's resignation had not been done under

normal circumstances . . .

I agree. In fact, in my speech accepting the party's acting presidency, I expressed my shock over his sudden and unexpected move. In the morning he delivered the presidential address, in the afternoon he handed in his resignation letter.

At the recent PAS congress it was decided to elevate the position of the ulema. Does this, and the generally more "radical" atmosphere during the congress, mean that PAS has adopted the style of the Iranian Islamic revolution?

The leadership function of the ulema has been recognised by the party from the beginning. The party's constitution also places the ulema as the source of authority after the Quran and the Sunnah. So, the decision to create an Ulema Council is merely intended to implement that accepted spirit. It may appear that we are imitating Iran, but this is not true. Perhaps we have been inspired by the developments in Iran, but we are actually just implementing our party's constitution.

What do you think of the present steps taken by the UMNO government to implement Islam in a gradual way?

They are forced to do that. Since the present trend is Islam, the UMNO leaders feel bound to do something Islamic. If not, they will be unpopular.

How do you see PAS' future without Asri?

Those who say that PAS' future without Asri is bleak are just our political opponents who are always looking for opportunities like this. But, in fact, our membership is now increasing very rapidly.

We are also drafting a programme which would more fully implement the party's policies. We are planning to improve our party administration and upgrade our members' knowledge and commitment.

MALAYSIA EYES FLEET OF 77 LARGE OCEAN SHIPS IN 1985

Manila PHILIPPINES DAILY EXPRESS in English 4 Feb 83 p 9

[Text]

P E N A N G , (UNDP)-United Nations Northwest Malaysia, Conference on Trade (AFP) - The and Development government has (UNCTAD) course embarked on a leaders workshop II long-term policy to attended here by about build up Malaysia as a 50 participants from the maritime nation, Philippines, India, Deputy Transport Kenya and Peru. Minister Datuk Abu "We are also Hassan Omar said: building another major

Measures had been taken to increase the handling capacity of Malaysia's major ports from the present 21.9 million tons to 36.9 million tons by 1985.

"We have just commissioned our newest port, the Bintulu port in Sarawak and so far 84 vessels have called there," he said while opening the United Nations Development Program

post in Kemaman off Trengganu and two minor ports at Kemasin off Kelantan and Langkawi off Kedah." He said the Malaysia International Shipping Corporation (MISC) would have 77 vessels with a total tonnage of 2,500,000 deadweight tons plying the high seas by 1985.

The second shipping line, the National Shipping Line (PNSL),

which was set up last year would concentrate on transport of liquid and dry bulk cargo, he added.

Datuk Abu Hassan said achieving the status of a maritime nation required not only increasing the tonnage and number of ships but above all upgrading the quality of services that the ports and shipping lines could offer.

In this respect, a maritime training institute was set up in 1976 and was later upgraded to marine academy in 1981 to train both deck hands and officers for the merchant marine service, he indicated.

CSO: 4200/351

CHOICE OF FUTURE STATUS CAUSES STRIFE

Paris LE MONDE in French 12, 13 Jan 83

[Article by Patrice de Beer: "New Caledonia at the Moment of Choice"]

[12 Jan 83 p 9]

[Text] I. Toward Independence?

Noumea--In this microcosm of opposites, as far from the mother country physically as it is psychologically from the South Pacific that surrounds it, where the two main ethnic groups have confronted one another for 130 years rather than live side by side, an explosion of violence is possible at any time. On Monday, Melanesians ambushed gendarmes near Sarramea, the Territorial Assembly was attacked by European extremists on 22 July, and on 19 September 1981, Pierre Declercq, secretary general of the Caledonian Union (independent), was assassinated by persons not yet formally identified. While it is the extremists on both sides -- or instigators -- who start the incidents, generally ethnic in origin, it is also the local political groups that exploit them and that must make every possible effort to preserve a peace that is precarious but indispensable to the institutional development of the territory.

This evolution was timidly begun during the previous 7-year term, accentuating the split between the Giscardians in the FNSC [Federation for a New Caledonian Society] and Chiracians in the RPCR [Rally for Caledonia in the Republic], which culminated last summer in the breakup of the RPCR-FNSC coalition and the latter's alliance with the Independent Front,¹ headed by Jean-Marie Tjibaou, elected vice president of the Government Council. It continued, after 10 May, at the prompting of Henri Emmanuelli, secretary of state for the overseas departments and territories, and Christian Nucci, high commissioner assigned to Noumea from December 1981 to October 1982, now replaced by Jacques Roynette.

¹ Or the FI, made up, since its first convention in March 1981, of the Caledonian Union (UC), the main independence party, the Kanaka United Liberation Front (FULK), the Union of Melanesian Peoples (UPM), the Caledonian Socialist Party (PSC) and the Amoa faction of Palika (Kanaka Liberation Party). The Palika itself, more radical, has remained outside the Front.

If the calendar is respected, a status of "very, very broad autonomy" not without similarities to that being drafted on French Polynesia, should be passed by Parliament during the spring session. A delegation from the Government Council, made up of Tjibaou and Gaston Morlet (FNSC), met during the year end vacation in Paris with Emmanuelli. The high commissioner should begin talks very soon with all political groupings, followed by the meeting of a nation-territory committee that will draw up a new status. In the meantime, the overseas departments and territories have granted elected officials -- that is, to members of the Government Council -- authority over administrative departments previously held by the high commission.

"Greater autonomy has become indispensable, but beyond autonomous administration, new perspectives must be found," Nucci said upon his departure. His successor told us that he was in favor of "broader autonomy" even involving certain outward symbols such as a Caledonian flag or anthem. The Government Council would no longer be headed by the *haussaire*, the term used in Noumea, but by an elected official. "We shall follow the text to the letter," Roynette added.

Is it a question of taking advantage of the time gained to prepare the conditions for independence calmly? Yes, the local majority and opposition say, for different reasons. In its public statements, the administration remains vague. And yet, in its diplomacy regarding independent countries in the South Pacific, France has not concealed the fact that the territory is moving toward self-determination with a great chance of leading to independence.

Decolonizing in Time

On behalf of the RPCR, Leques, president of the Territorial Assembly, "demands elections for the Assembly," which his party intends to win, "before any discussion of status." "The RPCR," he adds, "has never been against decentralization, but it does oppose a status that would one day lead to independence. The Kanaka and socialist independence" demanded by the FI "is not realistic." "If independence were announced by Paris," Frouin, RPCR member of the Assembly, states, "we would fight on the political level. What do others do? We do not know. We spend our time calming people down!"

He is thus referring to the Caledonian Front of Justin Guillemard, another elected official of the RPCR who is backed by the most radical extremists of the New Caledonians of European origin and the "bushmen." He rejects the "racist Kanaka independence," denounces the "laxity of government authorities with regard to the traditional troublemakers" and intends to "mobilize" in order to prevent the "loss" of "this magnificent, irreplaceable country."

United against the FNSC-FI coalition and behind its leader, Jacques Lafleur, the RPCR does actually appear to be split, which is publicly recognized by Leques when he says that "the RPCR engages in internal reflection on the status of the territory." One finds here departmentalists, decentralists, autonomists and even proindependence people!

Two Melanesian elected officials, Auguste Parawi Reybas and Victorin Boewa, bear witness to this fact, stating before their *Caldoche* European colleagues that "independence is inevitable, but by the year 2000. We must first train upper-level personnel. We want planned independence. We do not want to return to a feudal state. We are not mentally deficient!" they add, thus referring to the clan structures that the FI intends to institutionalize. "We contest certain ideas of Guillemard," adds Parawi Reybas. "He is of the extreme right and he acts for election purposes."

Inevitable independence? That is also what seems to have motivated the choice of the FNSC to join forces with proindependence individuals. "Since it was not possible to bring about reforms with the RPCR," Jean-Pierre Aifa, president of the FNSC, states, "and since there were grave economic and social problems, the solution was to try to form a majority with the FI, which was not easy." "In 1980, the proindependence group wanted independence for the 'top 82.' Now they speak of the 'top 84.' For us, as autonomists, it is not a question of checking the movement, but of controlling it. If there is independence, we must safeguard the interests of everyone to the maximum extent. It is with the proindependence group that we can safeguard the interests of France in the region. By antagonizing them, we will turn them into anti-French."

Like Aifa, Morlet wanted a rapid modification of the status in the direction of greater autonomy. He was very disappointed that an order was not promulgated to that effect when the FNSC, acting on reasons of principle, opposed the Assembly's passage of the orders. He is worried that "the French will not know how to leave." "In order to decolonize, blood has to run. The English left, but they are still there!"

"We have sworn that we would avoid new incidents such as those in September 1981," Morlet says, while Aifa goes further: "We shall do everything so that Tjibaou succeeds." This is a courageous attitude because in the case of moved up elections, it would cost elected officials from the FNSC their seats. Worried, subjected to the political offensive of the RPCR, the Europeans who supported the FNSC seem to have mainly rallied to Lafleur, whence the determination of the FNSC to quickly obtain a new territorial status quickly. Moreover, according to Morlet, "if they give us autonomy, nothing proves that the FI will remain united, because there is a rivalry between its members."

For his part, Tjibaou emphasizes: "Relations are not easy with our partners in the FNSC, who are naturally our adversaries." But, the vice president of the Government Council immediately adds: "The fact that they agree to go a ways with us is the only intelligent wager: They are making the wager of the *Caldoche* that the Kanaka is not inherently bad and that with him, even if it is difficult, one can negotiate the future." For "the demand of autonomy is for us a phase.... I believe that the FNSC knows this. We shall participate in the negotiations on the status if the government looks to the opening of discussions on the following phase in the same package'."

Conflict of Legitimacies

Furthermore, says Gabriel Paita, alternate for Roch Pidjot, socialist-related deputy, leader of the Caledonian Union, "Paris cannot speak of independence;

that is not its responsibility." This is a kind of echo of the positions of the government which, in speaking of "self-determination," does not intend to make too hasty a decision about either result. Many now doubt whether a referendum on independence would gather a majority of the votes: The Kanaka represented only 41.7 percent of the population in 1976 -- compared with 38.1 percent for Europeans -- while Polynesians made up 12 percent and other groups 8.2 percent. Aided by the high birth rate, the Kanaka will not have a majority on the island until the year 2000.

Political independence proclaimed in September 1984, on the occasion of the Fourth Festival of Arts of the Pacific, to take place in Noumea? But will economic independence be much more gradual for a territory heavily dependent on the mother country and having few resources, with its main resource, nickel, experiencing a very serious crisis? Tjibaou cautiously refuses to go into detail, speaking instead of a "de facto accession of the Kanaka people to a nationality," of the "recognition of native legitimacy" based on the proposed constitution worked out in the fall by the Caledonian Union, but which will be "subject to negotiation."

This "native legitimacy" excludes that of the Caldoches, Wallisians and Tahitians, for the FI, because they are "immigrants." In August, Tjibaou said (LE MONDE, 6 August 1982): "Only the native people, with the exclusion of the French who have settled here, must be consulted about the possibility of gaining independence." Since that time, the proindependence group has asked that only the Caldoches living in the territory for over 20 years could be consulted. The proposed constitution of the Caledonian Union also provides, according to its president, Lenormand, that with the exception of those who aided in the struggle for independence, non-Kanaka will not obtain full and complete Kanaka nationality until after a period of 11 years.

Obviously, such a position is considered to be unacceptable, not only by the RPCR, but also by Roynette: "The solution for the future of Caledonia rests on a double condition: first of all, complete recognition of the Kanaka identity, its right of priority; this is fundamental. Next comes the right of those who have come here, especially those who have put down roots here, who must have their existence recognize and have the right to remain. If either one of these two conditions is not respected, we shall never move forward. France has duties to the Europeans here." Furthermore, such a basic position is scarcely in keeping with the constitution, even if it is negotiable. Not to mention its timeliness, for how does the FI intend, as it wishes, to convince Europeans and other ethnic groups to remain and obtain the votes, indispensable in a referendum, of a substantial minority of them if it disputes their right to become citizens of an independent Caledonia?

Paradoxically, outside of political circles, there seem to be few non-Kanaka who realize that their future is at stake now, before their very eyes. Few also are those who realize that their present behavior will affect their future on this earth. And finally, few have understood the emotional, cultural and almost mystical relationship that binds the Melanesian to his land, beyond any occupation dating from the colonial period or any Western legislation on the right of individual property.

[13 Jan 83 p 13]

[Text] II. Land and Customs

Beyond the sometimes murderous incidents that are again taking place in New Caledonia, everyone knows, hopes or fears, in political circles on the island, that the evolution of the status of this overseas territory can in the long run lead to independence. But will it come about against or with the Europeans who have settled here? (LE MONDE, 12 January)

Noumea--In promulgating the land ordinance, the government took into consideration the customary claims of the Melanesians, who are often the cause of incidents between Kanaka and European settlers, some of which have degenerated into violence. According to the report to the president of the republic which precedes it, the text recognizes that the "unequal sharing" of land between Kanaka and Europeans "is all the more resented because a large part of the appropriated land is the object of unadequate working." The report states that European property represents 400,000 hectares, compared with 160,000 for "reserves" in which the land is still governed by the clan system of collective ownership. In 1983, the majority of the Kanaka still lived on "reservations."

This order, without a doubt the most important in the series of reforms, has given rise to a great deal of comment, although it actually affects only 1.6 percent of the European population (figure in this article are taken from publications of the Noumea Statistical Department). Since the order affirms the "preexistence of common law rights," the RPCR denounces a text that "is for feudal priority by the first occupant, which is in contradiction with the socialist philosophy." "Could it be a matter of the collectivization of land in the guise of 'Kanakization'?" Jean Faure asked the Assembly on behalf of the RPCR. We also heard such phrases as "the risk of horrible carnage," "the organization of civil war," "the withdrawal of land from small, poverty-stricken settlers," "the transformation of the class struggle into a race struggle."

Redistributing 100,000 Hectares

And yet, the RPCR claims to support agrarian reform whose goal would be "a redistribution of the land of those possessing too much without doing anything with it, giving it to those without land or without enough land and who would put it to good use" (Faure). But private property would be respected. The Chiraquians do not believe in tribal ownership.

This point of view is shared by the Melanesians in the RPCR, who do not want a return to feudalism. Here, they are probably closer to the more radical independence seekers, who deny that independence means the institutionalization of old structures with their social limitations and common law chiefs.

The FI-FNSC majority does not share these feelings and supports the reforms, even if the FNSC finds an "excessively metropolitan viewpoint" in them. "The orders?" Paita asks. "I am partially responsible for them." He is satisfied

with a procedure that leads to negotiations, within the communal committees, by representatives of tribes claiming their ancestral land and settlers: "We must force the Kanaka and the Caldoche to have discussions on the communal level. The Caldoche must get down off his pedestal and talk about the land. We have never come together to talk. After that, many things will change." "These discussions will make it possible to find a compromise between people who want to live together." But, for the Melanesians, land is a "common law question."

Paris estimates that some 100,000 hectares will be directly claimed by the Kanaka. If the system operates at the anticipated speed (LE MONDE, 16-17 May 1982), we are told in Noumea, some 20,000 hectares could change hands a year. A credit of 30 million francs is planned for the purpose in 1983. Outside of the land being claimed, some believe that the Europeans could take advantage of the opportunity to get rid of property they would otherwise have difficulty selling: "By maintaining the pressure, they hope to drive prices up," we were told by one official. However, if the Melanesians accept and back this procedure, they only consider it as a phase toward renewed possession of "all Caledonia, its air, its land, its sea" (Païta).

Once the land is back under tribal authority, the Kanaka could either take over its cultivation themselves or rent it to other tribes or other ethnic groups. "Our proposed constitution provides that property is inalienable, but that one can take in other clans, Europeans," in exchange for the payment of lease fees, we were told by Lenormand. These fees are provided for by the land statute and are labeled "the tribute of vassalage" by Faure. "The unfortunates who eventually agree to pay them will be no different from the serfs, who were talliable and liable to forced labor at pleasure," adds the RPCR elected official.

Païta nevertheless admits that the land law will not settle all problems: "I have told the others: 'Your differences with us are not as great as those between the Kanaka themselves. The Kanaka must recognize one another after 130 years of living like sardines. There will be difficult discussions between Kanaka who have stayed where they were and those deported far from their traditional land. All their rights will have to be outlined.'"

The FI realizes that the future will be difficult. That is why "economic independence" will come after "political independence," through two kinds of 5-year plans. This "socialist, Kanaka independence" will be, according to the FI, of the same type as that enjoyed by other independent states in the South Pacific, whether Melanesian or Polynesian. Within the traditional framework, the proposed constitution of the UC provides for a double structure: modern with local, regional and national assemblies choosing a government; common law on the level of the family, tribe and district, with a main district chief and a council, and on the level of the region, capped by a senate.

These structures may be awkward and detrimental to individual initiative, limited by the authority of the chiefs and elders. "I am mayor of my town, but outside of my mayoralty, I am nothing," said one Melanesian elected official. Complaining of the poor and ill-adapted training given to Melanesians,

one metropolitan high official said: "They train young people who will not have the right to speak before the age of 20. It would be better to train chiefs. That is what the independent islands have done. We have never used the power of common law on the economic level." Few Melanesians have a university diploma or advanced technical certificates.

Cargo Cult

Common law, which alienates individual freedom and independence, "that will lower the standard of living by half" and "turn our proindependence leaders into international beggars": These are the evils of which the RPCR tries to warn the territory in a document entitled: "Confronted with the Caledonian Crisis, We Must Remain Rational" (January 1982). The document also denounces "the mythical views of independence, a modern transposition of the cargo cult." The solution? "National solidarity," says Frouin, and reforms. One may wonder why these reforms were not put into practice before by those who now criticize the ones of today and who still have not given up their paternalist attitude toward the natives: "Well over 80 percent of the receipts in the territorial budget (...) come from the activity, work and investments of the some 70,000 New Caledonians not content to stick out their hand while nursing a beer or who do not dream of reducing to ancestral servitude all those who could be made to believe that this prehistoric system is the wave of the future," Faure told the Assembly.

If the Caledonian economic situation is catastrophic, it is not only the fault of the Kanaka, long kept in diapers. "The settlers must bear complete responsibility. Algeria was exploited.... The Europeans cannot say that if land is given to the Melanesians, they will not work it," says one high official preferring to remain anonymous. In fact, living for too long under the mirage of nickel, the territory has come to neglect its agriculture and industrialization because of it. In 1981, New Caledonia imported food products for a sum representing 27 percent of all exports, including fruits, vegetables and meat. Neighboring Fiji, also Melanesian and independent since 1970, produced 43 percent of its own rice and was practically self-sufficient in beef, pork and fowl, in addition to its tourism that is the envy of Noumea.

In 1971, Caledonia's resources were 76 percent from exports and 24 percent from transfers from the administrative fund (including salaries of civil servants). In 1980, the figures were 57 and 43 percent respectively. One economic official on the island saw the solution to the crisis in the sending of more government employees, gendarmes and military men, which would step up trade and construction. The number of government employees (7,650 in 1982, compared with 5,105 in 1979, an increase of 48 percent) represents 24 percent of all persons employed. Could the constant appeal to the mother country not also be likened to a kind of cargo cult?

11,464
CSO: 4219/33

MELANESIANS ARRESTED FOLLOWING SARRAMEA AMBUSH

Paris LE MONDE in French 12 Jan 83 p 9

[Text] A major police operation got underway on Tuesday morning, 11 January, in the Sarramea region in central New Caledonia, aimed at finding those responsible for the previous evening's ambush in which two mobile gendarmes were killed (LE MONDE, 11 January).

Headed by four squads of mobile gendarmes, who were supported by five helicopters, the operation resulted in the questioning of 15 members of the Melanesian tribe of the Koinde, after the village had been surrounded.

Among the 15 is a former employee of the forest development whose activities caused the incident. Several guns were seized. One member of the tribe fled. Roynette, high commissioner of the republic in New Caledonia, has banned the bearing and transport of firearms in the territory.

High Emotion

The ambush of Monday, 10 January, in central New Caledonia, during which two gendarmes were killed, gave rise to great emotion in the territory.

The RPCR (Rally for Caledonia in the Republic), whose president is RPR deputy Jacques Lafleur, condemned "the blind fatalism that guided the action of racist extremists encouraged by the irresponsible remarks of those preaching destabilization." He issued an appeal for calm, asking the people "not to give way to their legitimate indignation and not to fall into the trap of violence."

The Caledonian Brotherhood Association (anti-independence and multiracial) has denounced what it calls the "criminal, apparently concerted action" of the events in Sarramea. For the association, it is "an act of declared war." It calls on inhabitants of the territory to "remain close to the live forces of Caledonia."

In Paris, Jacques Chirac said on the RTL [expansion unknown] on Monday that "the government was extremely imprudent when it invented what I can only call a maneuver to modify the majority on the Government Council in an arbitrary fashion and refused to hold general elections so that all the people might

speak. A situation of tension has resulted, but in such a situation, we must not lose our heads. We must remain calm and enforce the law."

Awaiting more precise information on the circumstances surrounding the incident, Henri Emmanuelli, secretary of state for overseas territories and departments, confined himself to the following remarks on Monday: "In order to judge Melanesian affairs, one must know New Caledonia well and never forget that there exists common law to which the people are very attached, but which is sometimes in contradiction with the modes of application of our legislation."

11,464

CSO: 4219/33

NICKEL COMPANY EXPERIENCES STEADY LOSSES

Paris LE MONDE in French 13 Jan 83 p 13

[Article by Francois Renard]

[Text] SLN Nickel, a jointly owned subsidiary of Imetal and ELF-Aquitaine [Gasoline and Lubricants Company of France], is the main employer in New Caledonia, with just under 3,000 persons, or 12 to 13 percent of all personnel. It is one of the world's leading nickel producers, along with Inco (Canada) and Amax (United States).

However, the world nickel market is now called "horrible" because of the world crisis, but also because of the dramatic crisis that has struck the iron and steel industry in nearly all countries, whether Europe or the United States. The main market for nickel is in fact the metal's incorporation into special types of steel, stainless and other, together with chrome.

World nickel consumption has been down for three consecutive years (total of 30 percent) and prospects for 1983 are not particularly brilliant. As for prices, after a 5-percent drop in 1981, they plunged nearly 40 percent in 1982.

The result is that the ore roasting facilities of the SLN Nickel are operating at one-third capacity, or 25,000 tons a year instead of the theoretical 75,000. The financial results are catastrophic, with operating losses of over 300 million francs in 1982 and an accounting loss of just under 500 million francs, for a turnover on the order of 700 to 750 million francs (financial costs make up 24 percent of turnover).

These losses join the deficits built up over the past 4 years and force shareholders, actually ERAP [Petroleum Prospecting and Activities Enterprises], to grant enormous advances. Personnel must be constantly reduced: from 3,500 persons in 1979 to 3,000 at the beginning of 1981 and 2,800 at the present time. This is done through natural departures and retirements and the total should soon fall to 2,400 persons, following 370 layoffs, with the optimal figure being 2,200 persons.

11,464
CSO: 4219/33

DIOKNO SEEN AS EMERGING LEADER

Cebu City VISAYAN HERALD in English 20 Jan 83 p 4

[Article by Danny M. Gonzales]

[Text] THE PHILIPPINE opposition has long been searching for a leader. Of course, two names that are considered strong contenders for leadership are Ninoy Aquino and Raul Manglapus. Both are former Senators, and considered credible oppositionists. However, they are out of the country. Thus, their assumption of opposition leadership will have to wait until they come back.

Other Names

IN THE PHILIPPINES, only few names are mentioned as probable leaders: Tanada, Laurel, and Diokno. As for the brilliant and sincere Lorenzo Tanada, his only disadvantage seems to be his age. He had been a consistent oppositionist. And he's honorary president of the Pilipino Democratic Party as well as president of LABAN. Had he been younger, observers say, he would have made an ideal leader for the opposition.

Doy Laurel

ON THE OTHER hand Doy Laurel is young. He's also brilliant. Too brilliant, in fact, that some opposition leaders complain that he sometimes issues press releases to boost his image without proper consultation with other opposition groups. The setback of Doy is his having been previously identified with the ruling party--the KBL. However, in fairness to Doy, he has worked hard and spent much to improve his credibility as an oppositionist. Having the name and the resources, he could still become the No. 1 opposition leader. But he needs to do some fence-mending with no less than his fellow top opposition leaders.

Diokno

LIKE NINOY Aquino, Diokno tasted life in the stockade during the early part of martial rule in this country. Since the time he was released, he has been consistent as an oppositionist. Recently, he became a controversial man when he did the commentary for the BBC film which incurred the ire of top administration people. More recently, he became the object again of attacks coming

from the minions of Mr. Marcos for the interview he gave to Newsweek magazine. In fact, Diokno was branded a discredited politician.

Not Discredited

HOWEVER, judging from the speaking engagements Diokno has all over the country, he is far from being discredited. If anything, the demand of people for his presence and his thoughts indicate both admiration and following. In fact, Diokno is slowly slipping into the top circle of opposition leaders. He suffers from not being identified up to now with a solid opposition political group. However, if he succeeds in projecting himself nationally, he may yet become the long-awaited national leader the opposition has been looking for--in the absence of Ninoy Aquino and Raul Manglapus.

CSO: 4200/349

PARTIES BARE ELECTION PLANS

Manila BULLETIN TODAY in English 30 Jan 83 pp 1, 10

[Article by C. Valmorla, Jr.]

[Text]

Three opposition parties disclosed yesterday plans for the coming election of members of the regular Batasang Pambansa as another opposition leader urged the government to grant similar privileges to all parties.

Misamis Oriental Gov. Homobono A. Adaza said all political parties should be given the same privileges being enjoyed by the ruling Kilusang Bagong Lipunan (KBL).

The Nacionalista party (NP) said it will definitely field candidates in all the country's 13 regions with or without the electoral changes sought by the opposition.

The Pilipino Democratic party-Lakas ng Bayan (PDP-Laban) announced it will hold its second national convention in Cagayan de Oro city on Feb. 5-6 to draw up plans for the elections next year.

Assemblyman Reuben Canoy of the Socialist Democratic party (SDP) filed a resolution with the Batasang Pambansa calling for the election of regu-

lar Batasan members and the president of the Philippines this year.

In a press statement, the NP said its platform and program of government are different from those of the ruling Kilusang Bagong Lipunan (KBL).

"The NP strongly believes in allowing the people to enjoy fully their civil rights and liberties and adheres to the Filipino First policy instead of making the country subservient to foreign businessmen," the NP release said.

Cagayan de Oro city Mayor Aquilino Pimentel, Jr., announced in behalf of former Senator Lorenzo Tañada, PDP-Laban chairman, that while there is no certainty that PDP-Laban will field candidates in the Batasan elections, the party will discuss its annual plan with the elections in mind.

In the resolution filed with the Batasan, Canoy said the holding of elections for regular Batasan members in 1984, in the midst of a crisis, might lead to a political polarization or confrontation inimical to democracy in

the country.

He said election of the president together with the first regular National Assembly would eliminate the necessity of extending the term of the incumbent President for the purpose of synchronization.

Putting all parties on the same footing, Adaza said, would bring about a multi-party system where the people would have a wide field of choice.

Speaking before the UN Walkers Club at the Manila Hilton, Adaza said a multi-party system will allow the participation of all elements of society in the electoral process.

The administration's plan to install a two-party system in the draft election code would be fatal, the governor said. It would further erode the administration's credibility and prove that it is not seriously interested in just, honest, and free elections.

Adaza said creating a two-party system would repeat the blunders of the old system before martial law was proclaimed. The Liberal and Nacionalista parties were not different from each other since both were parties of the elite, subscribed to a free enterprise economy, and were equally friendly to the United States.

PEACE AND ORDER SITUATION IN MINDANAO

Manila BULLETIN TODAY in English 31 Jan 83 p 23

[Article by T. Pe. Rimando]

[Text]

COTABATO CITY —
The almost complete restoration of peace and order in central Mindanao topped the accomplishments of the regional autonomous government last year.

Lupong Tagapagpaganap ng Pook Chairman Simeon A. Datumanong attributed the feat to the government's pacification and rehabilitation program in the Muslim-populated region through the cooperation of the military, led by Central Mindanao command chief Brig. Gen. Jose P. Magno, Jr. and Recon 12 chief

Brig. Gen. Valerio Perez, as well as local government officials and various agency field officials.

Datumanong, endorsed recently by Regions IX and XII political and civic leaders as chairman of the merged regional executive council, reported that 1982 saw the surrender of an unprecedented number of lawless elements who realized the government's sincere and honest intention to uplift the people's socio-economic life.

The restoration of peace and order in Region XII, he said, helped bring about progress in the area as seen by the improvement in the people's living conditions.

Peace normalization in the region, Datumanong added, also hastened the implementation of government infrastructure projects in the region's rural communities, like construction of roads and irrigation systems which helped increase their food production and the marketing of their produce.

Datumanong said the implementation of the KKK last year further boosted the socio-economic condition of local inhabitants, including rebel-returnees who saw in the program a bright hope for them to start life anew.

The LTP chief predicted that 1983 would be a more productive year in the southern Philippines due to the growing concern of the government for its progress. (Tony Pe. Rimando)

LARGE NUMBER OF DELINQUENT SOLDIERS OUT

Manila PHILIPPINES DAILY EXPRESS in English 26 Jan 83 pp 1, 6

[Text] THE ARMED FORCES has kicked out of the service 782 erring military personnel.

The purge, the biggest in the military in recent years, was made public yesterday by Gen. Fabian C. Ver, AFP chief of staff, after prosecuting 2,711 cases filed against military personnel last year.

Those dismissed were found guilty of various charges, ranging from harassment of civilians to misuse of public funds.

The dismissals brought to 35,782 the total number of soldiers and other military personnel dismissed since the clean-up in the military started in 1972.

GENERAL VER ordered the dropping of cases against 1,192 other soldiers after investigation showed that the complaints against them were harassment cases.

It took the military courts two months to complete their findings and recommendations which were upheld by higher authorities.

Records showed that some military personnel were summarily dismissed after investigation showed they left their posts without notifying their superiors to engage in business.

Others reported back for duty but found that they have been replaced or dropped from the service roster.

The reinstatement of 115 other military personnel previously dismissed was ordered after a review of their cases showed the charges against them were without basis.

GENERAL VER advised complainants to be sure of their cases before filing them.

He said the military cannot be used for selfish interests "because the military is also bent on protecting the innocent while purging bad eggs in its ranks."

Maj. Gen. Josephus Q. Ramas, army chief, said finding replacements for erring military personnel is not a problem.

He referred to recruitment records showing that about 50 applicants are on the waiting list for every vacated post of enlisted men.

The same records indicated that there are about 30,000 applicants for enlistment in the armed forces, as against 700 available slots.

CSO: 4200/349

'ARMY COMMANDERS SAID USING 'COLONIAL WAYS' IN COMBATTING REBELS

Manila PHILIPPINES DAILY EXPRESS in English 30 Jan 83 pp 1, 6

[Text] Army commanders throughout the country were ordered yesterday not to rely blindly on foreign tactics in the fight against rebels.

Maj. Gen. Josephus Q. Ramas, army chief, criticized field commanders who still think that counter-insurgency strategies of foreigners are more superior than those evolved by Filipinos.

Ramas strongly hinted that the reverses suffered by some military units in the hit-and-run attacks of small bands of rebels could be traced to "colonial ways" of commanders concerned.

The army chief assessed the performance of field commands upon arrival from a field survey of the peace and order situation in Central Luzon and nearby regions.

The field commands he inspected included taht of the famed Special (Rangers) Warfare Brigade in Laur, Nueva Ecija, credited with having repulsed several rebel attacks in recent months.

Ramas revealed that not one of the commands which have employed counter-guerilla tactics evolved by the rangers have lost in clashes with the rebels.

He told a gathering of field commanders that no less than the highly rated Fort Bragg in the United States had borrowed counter-insurgency strategies of Filipinos through a manual of the ranger brigade authored by Filipino military strategists.

He disclosed that officials from Fort Bragg have admitted that Filipino Ranger techniques are superior than those of the Americans after a visit to Philippine training grounds in the jungles.

Ramas recalled the guerilla exploits of President Marcos in the last war "when he used tactics and maneuvers that awed Americans"

The army commanding general stressed that "Filipino scout ranges have nothing to copy from foreigners when it comes to guerilla and counter-guerilla methods."

In this "confidence training," a soldier holds a balloon until another soldier shoots at it.

He said he became more convinced that the Filipino tactic is more superior than that of the US after a visit last year of US training complexes.

He said the biggest difference between the US and Philippine techniques lies in the toughness and length of training. American training is only eight weeks, as against four months of Filipinos, Ramas said.

CSO: 4200/349

ARMY TEAMS GO AFTER TERRORISTS

Manila PHILIPPINES DAILY EXPRESS in English 4 Feb 83 p 2

[Text] JUNGLE FIGHTER teams were sent yesterday to Bukidnon to go after 25 NPA terrorists who attacked Tuesday a sitio there and killed nine residents after burning and looting several houses. Four of the massacre victims were women.

Maj. Gen. Josephus Q. Ramas, army chief, ordered the rangers to the field after meeting with Gen. Fabian C. Ver, AFP chief of staff.

THE RAMPAGE took place at about 10 a.m. at sitio Panapunan, barangay Lagandang in Dumulog town, about an hour's ride from the nearest military headquarters.

It was the biggest assault by rebels in that region in recent months, Camp Aguinaldo said.

The sitio, known for its anti-insurgency sentiments, was first shelled with grenades before the 25-man assault group attacked.

The raiders apparently knew in advance where their targets were staying.

THOSE slain were identified as Felix Fruto and Reynaldo Reyes, both doubling as militiamen; Natividad Fruto, Alberta Fruto, Baldovina Baldovino, Francisco Baldovino, Aida Baldovino and Emilio Queroy. The ninth victim was unidentified.

The raiders took four carabaos and other valuables.

Several other civilians were wounded during the shelling.

Relief troops from the army special warfare brigade (SWB), the PC, the local police and militiamen failed to make contact with the terrorists.

THE LATEST terrorist attack followed an assessment that the NPA, the military arm of the outlawed Communist Party of the Philippines, has shifted their armed operation to Mindanao and the Visayas.

General Ver said the shift in armed attacks was touched off by the reverses suffered lately by the NPAs in northern and southern Luzon.

Ver saw the rash of ambushcades and other atrocities of rebels in Mindanao as a maneuver to divert the attention of the military from Luzon.

THE HOLD of the NPAs on the Quezon-Bicol region has considerably weakened because of intensified civil-military operations.

The rebels have already fled to Libras, Carmen in North Cotabato when the troops arrived.

CSO: 4200/349

NPA HOLDS BARIO FOR DAYS

Manila BULLETIN TODAY in English 30 Jan 83 pp 1, 10

[Text]

LA TRINIDAD, Benguet, Jan. 29 — A group of heavily armed members of the New People's Army entered the barrio of Bacu, in Bakun, Benguet, and took over the hinterland village for three days.

This was learned this week from a letter of Bakun Mayor Nicolas Pulicay to Benguet provincial commander Lt. Col. Rogelio Aguana and Benguet Gov. Ben Palispis.

Mayor Pulicay said the armed group, which included a medical nurse, entered the barrio from Sugpon, Ilocos Sur and stayed in the place from Jan. 10 to 12.

The group reportedly took over the Bacu Elementary school and made it as its headquarters where they gathered the pupils, teachers and other inhabitants for a three-day lecture and instruction on the NPA movement.

The Bacu incident, the report said, showed that the dissidents have launched a counter-offensive in retaliation for the death of rebel priest Fr. Zacarias Agatep. (Isidro Chammag)

CSO: 4200/350

SAUDIS TO HELP FUND MADRASAHs

Manila PHILIPPINES DAILY EXPRESS in English 3 Feb 83 p 3

[Text] SAUDI ARABIA is ready to help upgrade the quality of Madrasahs Islamic schools in Mindanao, particularly in Regions 9 and 12.

The assurance was conveyed to President Marcos by a three-man Saudi delegation which yesterday called on him in Malacanang.

Madrasah schools are run by "ustads" or religious leaders, offering courses in Arabic and mathematics.

THE PRESIDENT discussed the details of the implementation of the assistance offer with Secretary General Mohammed Naswer Alboudi for the Islamic Dawah, Secretary General Ali Mohammed Moktar for the Supreme Council for the Mosque, and Director General Mohammed Abdulrahman Al-Bassam of the cultural department of the Saudi foreign ministry.

During the state visit of the President to Saudi Arabia last year, the late King Khaled had agreed to send Saudi experts to help design the curriculum and later train teachers and administrators for the Madrasah schools.

AMONG THE matters taken up during the meeting were:

- Development of a common Arabic and Islamic curriculum for Madrasah.
- Establishment of training centers to train teachers, both public and private, in institutions of higher learning like the Western Mindanao State University and the University of Southern Mindanao.
- Training administrators of existing Madaris.
- Establishment of sharia centers to train teachers for Sharia and Islamic jurisprudence.
- Establishment of a school consortia to make fullest use of resources of existing public schools and the Madaris.

--Establishment of Islamic centers similar to those of the University of the Philippines and Mindanao State University, to develop the use of the Arabic language.

THE SAUDI delegation will fly to Zamboanga City, Marawi, and Cotabato to visit the madrasahs, mosques and universities, and confer with the ulamas and ustadzes.

CSO: 4200/349

FINLAND SEEKS MORE TRADE WITH PHILIPPINES

Manila BULLETIN TODAY in English 31 Jan 83 25

[Text]

The Finnish government has expressed interest in expanding two-way trade between the Philippines and Finland in the next few years.

Esko Ollila, trade and industry minister of Finland, told newsmen Saturday night that Finland foresees the doubling of export and import activities of both countries because of the "great growth potentials" among the developing countries in Asian region.

Ollila was in Manila on a three-day official visit upon the invitation of Philippine Trade and Industry Minister Roberto V. Ongpin.

He took up with the country's trade and economic officials measures that will promote trade between the Philippines and Finland and further economic cooperation between the two countries.

The Finnish minister held discussions with Ongpin, met with representatives of the Board of Investments and other government agencies, and discussed with various pri-

vate sector interests possibilities of investment.

Ollila also called on President Marcos in Malacañang, and on Asian Development Bank president Masao Fujioka.

Philippine trade with Finland registered a total value of \$41.5 million in 1981. Bilateral trade exchanges posted an average annual increase of over 100 per cent in the past five years.

Both exports and imports exhibited increasing trends from \$0.3 million to \$4.5 million and from \$2.6 million to \$36.9 million, respectively.

Trade balances were heavily in favor of Finland throughout the five-year period, with the Philippines incurring deficits ranging from a low of \$2.2 million in 1977 to a high of \$32.4 million in 1981.

Major Philippine exports to Finland were pineapples, preserved tuna, leaf tobacco fillers and binders, garments, umbrellas and sunshades, mixed

fruits and others.

Imports, on the other hand, consisted of specialized machinery and equipment for particular industries, metal-working machinery and other mechanical handling equipment.

The Finnish economy is oriented toward industrial exports. It could be a very good and rich market for Philippine products. Philippine potential exports to Finland are mixed tropical fruits, green coffee, leaf tobacco, dried bananas, dried mangoes, travel goods of leather, footwear and other finished and semi-finished products.

Ollila also said that because of the Philippines' growth potentials, the Finnish gov-

ernment and its various private enterprises are interested in pouring equity investments in the local major industrial projects.

Pertti Voutilainen, president and chairman of the board of Outokumpu Oy of Finland, even said that his company is interested in providing new technologies that will expand the refining capacity of the new PASAR copper smelter mill in Leyte.

Outokumpu, a leading Finnish mining company, also would like to offer its technology and, if possible, place equity investments in the integrated steel project as well as the copper fabrication project.

CSO: 4200/350

BANKING SYSTEM TO EXPAND CREDIT

Manila BULLETIN TODAY in English 26 Jan 83 p 10

[Text]

Domestic credits of the banking system will be allowed to expand by 16.4 per cent or P21 billion this year to support a monetary program formulated by the Central Bank in 1983.

Speaking before the Makati Business Club yesterday, Governor Jaime C. Laya said the monetary policy this year is intended to ensure the supply of credit to productive investments in the private sector, contain inflation and support an adjustment program in the external accounts of the country.

He pointed out that of the P21 billion increase in net domestic assets programmed for the year, the bulk of 58 per cent or P12.2 billion will go to the private sector.

The public sector, whose share of credits rose sharply last year on account of the deficit spending by the national government in the amount of P14.4 billion or 4.3 per cent of GNP, will get only 42 per cent or P9.8 billion of the program-

med increase in new credits this year.

As worked out by the CB, total domestic credits of the banking system will reach P160.9 billion by the end of the year compared to P138.9 billion last year.

Laya said the demand-induced growth in total liquidity in 1983 is projected to grow by 14.6 per cent. Much of the expansion is expected to be in the form of deposits in interest-bearing accounts in response to the high real interest rates.

Money supply is expected to rise by 15.3 per cent and deposit substitutely by 10 per cent, raising the total supply of money and quasi-money by 14.4 per cent.

Laya said the projected increase in credits of P21 billion is believed adequate to finance most essential requirements of the private sector and to finance a small government budgetary deficit.

PHILIPPINES

OVERSEAS WORKER WAGE REMITTANCES

Manila PHILIPPINES DAILY EXPRESS in English 26 Jan 83 pp 1, 6

[Article by George T. Nervez]

[Text] STARTING Feb. 1, Filipino workers overseas will be required to remit monthly to the Philippines at least half of their basic salary on pain of having their passports not renewed or extended, the Central Bank said yesterday.

Mandatory remittance is part of the implementing rules and regulations of Executive Order No. 857 issued last December. It applies to any Filipino working abroad.

Under the rules, workers whose contracts provide for free board and lodging are required to remit 70 percent of their basic salary.

Those whose contracts do not provide for these benefits, and domestic and other service workers are affected by the 50 percent requirement.

THE MANDATORY remittance program was ordered by President Marcos to make sure that the foreign exchange earnings of overseas workers are sold to the banks, instead of being channeled to the black market.

CB Gov. Jaime C. Laya said that in 1982, about \$700 million was remitted by overseas workers through the banking system. However, he said, this could easily have been \$1.5 billion.

The CB also said that P15-million worth of prizes will be available every month from a massive raffle for overseas workers.

The CB will sponsor the monthly raffles among the beneficiaries of overseas workers. A raffle ticket will be issued for each \$100 remitted through the banks.

The tickets are expected to be distributed in March 1983 for the first raffle in April.

THE RULES on mandatory remittance also require recruitment and placement agencies authorized by the Ministry of Labor and Employment (MOLE) to have

mobilization expenses for Filipino workers, including air fares and other incidental expenses, remitted to the Philippines and sold to the banks.

The licenses of recruitment and placement agencies will be cancelled if they do not comply with the mandatory remittance requirement.

In addition, the rules provide that no accreditation will be issued to an employer and no license or authority will be granted to an agency or entity unless they submit proof for the remittance of the foreign exchange earnings of Filipino workers.

CSO: 4200/349

TUCP HITS CHEAP LABOR POLICY

Cebu City VISAYAN HERALD in English 18 Jan 83 pp 1, 2

[Text] A labor leader has exposed the government policy of maintaining cheap labor in the country in order to accommodate foreign investments.

Ernesto "Boy" Herrera, vice president of TUCP-ALUVIMCOMTU, was interviewed last night and said that because of this policy of the government, our labor unions have been kept docile.

But the result of this, according to Herrera, is that foreign investors have only taken advantage of this cheap labor. The benefits that Filipinos get out of this privilege is nil. Our workers have remained poor.

The Philippines has the cheapest labor in the whole world, second only to Sri Lanka, Herrera said.

The preferential treatment given to multi-national corporations and foreign investors is to be deplored in Herrera's view. He pointed out that these giant corporations even go to the extent of borrowing our own money when they are expected to bring in more dollars as capital investment.

Herrera also bewailed the bad effects of these companies. He said they have helped greatly in draining our natural resources.

Another disadvantage is that our banks have given preferential attention to big-time groups. Despite the 20% of bank funds which are allotted for small and medium-scale industries as stipulated in a presidential decree, the cottage industries and small industries are usually discriminated against in credit availment.

Going into an analysis of our ailing economy. Herrera charged the administration of encouraging "crony capitalization." That is why, Herrera said, these cronies of the President have become rich. However, as you can see, their corporations have gone bankrupt.

Pointed out by the TUCP leader are the corporations of Silverio, Decini, and others. Also mentioned were five star hotels in Manila which are under receiverships by banks. Of the 18 hotels in this category, Herrera said, only 5

are now viable, including the Manila Garden Hotel. All others are bankrupt or on the verge of bankruptcy.

Migs Enriquez interviewed Herrera in Saksak-Sinagol DY LA in last night's edition.

CSO: 4200/349

PRICE HIKE FOR CIGARETTES APPROVED

Manila PHILIPPINES DAILY EXPRESS in English 26 Jan 83 pp 1, 6

[Article by Mel Mauricio]

[Text] PRESIDENT MARCOS has signed an executive order increasing the retail prices of locally-made and imported cigarets by as much as 40 centavos per pack, the Bureau of Internal Revenue said yesterday.

Under Executive Order 863, the President also authorized the collection of higher specific taxes on the cigarets, ranging from 1.5 centavos per pack for cigarets packed in 30's to 6 centavos per pack for cigarets in 20's.

Earlier estimates by the BIR said that the increases will generate an additional P178 million annual income for the government.

The increases took effect on Jan. 1, BIR Deputy Commissioner Tomas Toledo said.

THE PRESIDENT'S Order, Toledo said the following are the new maximum retail prices for cigarets packed in 30's:

--For those whose present retail prices are pegged at 90 centavos, P1.10.

--91 centavos to P1.25: P1.11 to P1.45.

--P1.26 and up--P1.46 and up.

This means that, for cigarets packed in 30's, the increase in the retail prices ranges from 10 centavos to 20 centavos.

Maximum retail prices for the cigarets packed in 20's have been placed at 40 centavos more than the present rates, which range from P1.45 to P3.40.

THE NEW specific taxes for cigarets packed in 30's are:

--P3 per one thousand sticks for those whose retail prices are pegged at P1.10, or an increase of 2.12 centavos per pack.

--P5, also per one thousand sticks, for those whose retail prices are between P1.11 and P1.45, or an increase of 1.5 centavos per pack.

--P8, also per one thousand sticks, for those whose retail prices range from P1.46 and up, or an increase of 3 centavos per pack.

The new tax rates for cigarettes packed in 20's are up by a uniform rate of P3 per one thousand sticks, or an increase of approximately 6 centavos per pack. The tax rates range from P17 to P58 per one thousand sticks.

ON IMPORTED cigarettes, the new tax is P92 per one thousand sticks (or around P4 per pack), regardless of the retail price or contents.

In issuing the order, the President noted that the increasing cost of production of local cigarettes has rendered the existing statutory maximum retail prices unrealistic.

THE BUREAU of internal revenue will continue with its investigations on the income tax returns of businessmen and professionals.

BIR Deputy Commissioner Tomas C. Toledo made this clarification yesterday to correct "misimpressions" that BIR's newly-adopted "no tax investigations" policy covers all taxpayers.

He said the policy adopted under the modified gross income tax scheme applies only to fixed income earners or those whose incomes are solely derived from salaries and wages.

CSO: 4200/349

MULTICROPPING PLAN PUSHED

Manila BULLETIN TODAY in English 31 Jan 83 p 40

[Text]

The Ministry of Agriculture said yesterday that multi-cropping in coconut lands is now being pushed nationwide to save the country's coconut farmers from the adverse effects of depressed coconut prices in the international market.

Assistant Agriculture Secretary for Crops Domingo Panganiban said that emphasis is being placed on the planting of cash crops which can be harvested within a short period of time.

The launching of the program was ordered ear-

lier by President Marcos. Some P50 million has been released to finance the program.

In an interview over the "Meet the Press" program on television, Panganiban said that seedlings of cash crops such as vegetables, coffee, cocoa, and corn are now being propagated in MA nurseries throughout the country.

He said that coconut farmers can avail themselves of these seedlings at very low prices.

Panganiban, who is also director of the bureau of plant industry (BPI),

said that information and technology on the raising of cash crops which could be harvested immediately or within three years are being made available to coconut farmers participating in the program.

The propagation of seedlings of cash crops is being financed by the P25-million fund allotted by the President to the ministry, he said.

Another P25 million is being used in multi-cropping researches by the UP-Los Baños (A.M. Lobo).

CSO: 4200/350

NEW CORN PROGRAM LAUNCHED

Manila BULLETIN TODAY in English 3 Feb 83 pp 1, 8

[Article by Alfredo M. Lobo]

[Text]

The Ministry of Agriculture redirected yesterday the Maisagana program to enable the country to achieve self-sufficiency in corn and do away with huge importations by 1984.

Agriculture Minister Arturo Tanco, Jr. ordered the planting of corn in 200,000 hectares of agricultural lands this year to accelerate corn production.

He also asked the country's corn farmers to plant a yellow corn hybrid instead of the traditional yellow corn variety to increase yield.

He said that if 160,000 hectares or 80 per cent of the 200,000-hectare corn area will be planted to the hybrid, the country will harvest 800,000 tons of yellow corn next year.

This will make the country self-sufficient in corn and do away with importation of corn for

feedgrains placed at 250,000 metric tons annually, he said.

Tanco said hybrid yellow corn seeds yield five tons per hectare or five times over the traditional variety's yield of 0.9 tons per hectare.

He said the use of hybrid seeds will also increase farmers' income as they can harvest up to seven tons per hectare when pesticides are used.

Tanco said farmers can earn P6,500 per hectare compared with only P1,300 per hectare realized from use of the traditional variety.

He said farmers participating in the Maisagana program will continue to be extended loans and hybrid seeds.

Tanco asked the National Food and Agriculture Council to promote the planting of hybrid yellow corn nationwide after a review of the Maisagana program.

CSO: 4200/350

BRIEFS

TUCP WANTS EPZ WAGES PEGGED TO DOLLAR--THE TRADE Union Congress of the Philippines has asked the government to peg the earnings of workers in the export processing zones in the country to the fluctuations of the dollar to protect, the group said, the salaries of the workers. TUCP president Democrito T. Mendoza said earnings in real terms of these workers have gone down much faster than other workers because of the deterioration of the peso against the dollar. "In effect, because of the disadvantaged position of the peso, foreign firms in the EPZs in Mariveles, Mactan and Baguio City are actually paying workers less this year than they did a few months ago," he said. He said workers who were earning P28 (about \$3.36) a day when the exchange rate was P8.35 to a dollar, now only earn P24.63 a day because the exchange rate has gone up to as much as P9.50 in the unofficial rate. "Pay scales in the zones are already way below the standards for Metro Manila, and foreign firms there are often exempted from the effects of labor laws protecting workers," he said. Mendoza said the workers' problem is compounded by high prices of basic commodities in the processing zones because merchants in the area put a big markup on their goods considering the distance in bringing the goods to the zones. [Text] [Manila PHILIPPINES DAILY EXPRESS in English 3 Feb 83 p 3]

ISRAELI JOINT VENTURE WELCOMED--THE FIRST LADY and Human Settlements Minister Imelda Romualdez Marcos yesterday heard Israeli offers of joint ventures in agriculture and industry. A delegation organized by the Israeli government called on Mrs. Marcos at Malacanang with offers of "relevant and up-to-date" technology, knowhow and experience. The delegation head, Yehuda Atsmony, told the First Lady that the Israeli government believes in a "great future" for the Philippine economy. Mrs. Marcos, who is secretary-general of the KKK program, said she would set with a mechanism to facilitate cooperation with Israeli businessmen. The trade mission included representatives from companies which had developed modern agricultural technologies and supply irrigation equipment and food processors. The delegation was accompanied to Malacanang by Israeli Ambassador Aviad Jacob. Included in the mission are Avishai Furmanski, manager, Industries Development Corp.; Aryeh Gilat, manager, Omen Metal Products; Shlomo Givon, managing director, Tehen Export Co.; Ruben de Porto, export manager, Ravit Irrigation Systems; Y. Natav, director, IKN Agricultural Services; Emanuel Gluckberg, managing director, Ormeca orient mercantile agency; Barouch Harel, director of Koor industries; Eli Levin, managing director of United Development Corp.; and Avner Shapiro of Plassim. [Text] [Manila PHILIPPINES DAILY EXPRESS in English 3 Feb 83 p 7]

CENTRAL BANK LOAN SET FOR MARCH--THE Central Bank is expected to get the \$300-million jumbo loan, its first and only major borrowing this year, from 16 international banks. CB senior deputy governor Gabriel Singson said recently that the loan is scheduled to be signed here this coming March 4 with representatives of the lending institutions that include the largest American and Japanese banks. Proceeds of the jumbo loan will go to the CB Consolidated Foreign Borrowing Program for relending to the private and public sectors. Actually, a total of about \$1.15-billion worth of foreign financing is expected to be obtained by the government in the first quarter this year. Aside from the jumbo loan, the government is also tapping about \$850-million worth of loans from the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. THE IMF financing are the \$345-million (315 million special drawing rights) standby arrangement and, a \$205-million (188 million SDR) compensatory financing facility. Proceeds of the IMF loans will be used to finance the anticipated balance of payment deficit in 1983. The IMF loans have already been approved by the IMF staff. It will be presented to the IMF board this coming February 18. Approval of a \$302.3 million structural adjustment loan from the World Bank is also expected shortly following the completion of negotiations in Washington, D. C. [George T. Nervez] [Text] [Manila PHILIPPINES DAILY EXPRESS in English 3 Feb 83 p 10]

CSO: 4200/349

MILITARY AFFAIRS AND PUBLIC SECURITY

SENIOR COLONEL INTERVIEWED ON INDUCTION IN HANOI

Hanoi HANOI MOI in Vietnamese 24 Nov 82 p 2

[Interview with Sen Col Do Hoang Mao, deputy commander of the Capital Military Region, by HANOI MOI]

[Text] Question: What changes have been brought about over the past few years by the educational task aimed at disseminating the concept of all-people's national defense, especially among the youths in the capital city?

Answer: First and foremost, let me outline the situation after 1979. To speak of the national defense concept is to talk about the execution of specific tasks based on the two strategic missions of building and defending the socialist fatherland which have been set forth in the resolution of the Fifth Party Congress. A close review of the situation between [The beginning of] 1979 and mid-1980 has revealed that there were occasional local signs of neglect of leadership and lack of vigilance caused by an inadequate understanding of the situation and missions with the consequences that the tasks of building and strengthening the militia and self-defense forces, providing technical and tactical training, maintaining public order and security, inducting the youths for military service and so forth were neither highly effective nor adequate to fully meet the requirements of combat readiness.

The Capital Military Region has failed to fulfill its function as a skillful staff to party committees at various echelons. The Military Region Party Committee has reviewed the situation seriously and submitted a report to the Municipal Party Committee to enable the latter to promptly exercise guidance and quickly take corrective measures.

Since then, the Municipal Party Committee has issued Resolution No 13 on the local military task. The education aimed at disseminating the concept of all-people's national defense has been conducted through the manifold task of inducting the youths, achieving combat readiness for a people's war to defend their own localities, and maintaining social security and order. As two backbones in implementing this task, party members should set good examples while union members should act as a shock youth force. Ever since its promulgation, the law on military obligation has been studied thoroughly by more than 90 percent of the total number of party organizations and chapters. Activities such as those included in the "Traditional Festival on

Heroic Defense of the Fatherland" have been used to educate the youths and make them understand the duty to build and defend the fatherland. During the second stage in 1980 and the successive stages in 1981-82, the induction of youths has been carried out satisfactorily in the city and put gradually into the right track from both the quantitative and qualitative points of view. Therefore, it can be said that favorable changes are taking place once the task of building and strengthening national defense has been fully understood by party committees at various echelons and by the administration, mass organizations and various sectors.

Question: What effects has the aforementioned situation had on the implementation of the manifold local military task in our city during the 1981-82 period?

Answer: Following are the noteworthy results of the local military task conducted in our city in the past 2 years:

--The combat power and standard for the local armed forces have been increased and raised. The plans for basic, specific combat action have been supplemented and improved from the municipal to the precinct, district and city levels and to basic units and have been materialized through the rehearsals organized at various levels during the 1981-82 period; all units have ensured the combat alert system and weapons and equipment have been managed satisfactorily.

--In conjunction with the public security force, the militia and self-defense forces have maintained public order and performed patrol and guard duties to safeguard the socialist property in organs, enterprises and factories a number of which have set up each a self-defense unit as the core in national defense and security maintenance. At present, the militia force exists in 249 villages and the militia and self-defense forces in 11 wards are entrusted with the task of acting as a mobile combat-ready nucleus and firmly maintaining social security, order and safety.

--All central and local units and organs have carried out the youth induction satisfactorily. The result of this task has been fairly even, unlike the previous years when orders were not executed strictly in some areas.

--The building of the militia and self-defense forces has been organized on the basis of strong party installations, a strong administration and strong mass organizations. This strength has been materialized in the direct leadership provided by the party. The ratios of party and union members in the militia and self-defense forces throughout the city which were 16.78 and 36.92 percent respectively in 1981 have risen to 17.64 and 37.81 percent respectively in 1982. As of 15 October this year, while performing production, more than 96 percent of the total number of villages and 89 percent of the total number of self-defense units have completed training with the central task being to provide advanced practical training for the contingent of cadres to heighten their unit command and management standards. An initial step has been taken to build a reserve force to cope with the present and long-term situation and mission.

—concerning the building of district military fortresses and combat precincts, various plans have been formulated which clearly show their positions.

Question: Will you please tell us the initial experience in youth induction following the promulgation of the new law on military obligation.

Answer: In my opinion, there are four experiences, namely:

1. It is necessary to understand the all-people's national defense policy thoroughly and deeply and to materialize it by carrying out the two strategic missions indicated in the resolutions of the Fourth and Fifth Party Congresses and in Resolution No 13 of the Municipal Party Committee.
2. All administrative levels and mass organizations must take appropriate measures and all sectors and mass organizations must clearly understand their respective functions and missions and must work uniformly.
3. It is necessary to form and improve military cadres at various echelons so that they may act as clever and active staff members, to carefully build local military organs and to link the induction of youths to the building of party installations, administrative organs, cooperatives, wards and so forth.
4. It is necessary to develop the combined strength and collective ownership spirit of the people as well as the motivating and educational function of the mass organizations and sectors concerned so as to ensure joint action and responsibility and to achieve completion of each task within the time limit.

Question: What weaknesses have been revealed in the process of inducting the youths according to the new law?

Answer: I wish to say that the revolutionary tradition of our people in the capital city is the principal factor because throughout the years of protracted resistance [against French colonialism] and anti-U.S. fighting, over 200,000 youths in our city of Hanoi joined the army and many households lost their children and young brothers and sisters in the fight for the fatherland. In the process of inducting the youths according to the new law, however, weaknesses and shortcomings have shown up because the two missions indicated by the party have sometimes not been understood thoroughly in some localities. Consequently, this [induction] task has not been led and guided firmly and the result has been passiveness and perplexity.

There still are negative manifestations which can be seen in medical examinations and in the habit of applying for deferment or for assignment to units stationed in nearby areas, etc. A number of installations have not yet paid attention to the need to improve, train and educate the youths. Some localities have failed to enforce the law strictly. The legal character [of induction] has not yet been ensured in carrying out this task. Weaknesses can still be found in the responsibilities of the local Military Obligation Councils as well as in the effectiveness of their activities.

9332

CSO: 4209/190

MILITARY AFFAIRS AND PUBLIC SECURITY

DEFICIENT PUBLIC SECURITY AGENTS IMPROVED BY IDEOLOGICAL EDUCATION

Hanoi HANOI MOI in Vietnamese 24 Nov 82 p 2

[Article by Vinh Yen: "How Have the Hang Bac Ward Public Security Forces Changed the Behavior of Weak Combatants?"]

[Text] In implementing Directive No 92 on the building of wholesome, stable and strong forces over the past 2 years, the public security forces in Hang Bac Ward (Hoan Kiem Precinct) have paid special attention to the need to change the behavior of weak combatants. Though representing only one-fifth of the total numerical strength, these weak combatants have greatly hampered the fulfillment of political and special missions not only because they have made it impossible to uniformly implement many policies and measures against lawbreakings but also because their erroneous acts have, under certain circumstances, reflected badly on their unit's prestige and broken down plans for special tasks.

Before setting forth appropriate educational themes and measures, the unit has divided these combatants into two categories—weakness from the professional point of view and weakness in matters of ethics and behavior—and has also analyzed carefully the causes of these weaknesses.

The predominant guideline applied throughout this process has been to avoid both prejudices and references to former shortcomings, to respect human dignity and to extol progress and achievements, even the minor ones. This has proven to be a fundamental factor which has shown the weak combatants that the collective intends to give them a heartfelt guidance and which has incited them to repent their past mistakes and to resolutely accept the collective's assistance in correcting their shortcomings.

A specific inquiry has revealed that the public security forces in Hang Bac Ward have applied effective measures such as designating skillful combatants as coaches to command and patiently guide those with insufficient abilities and to "hold the latter's hands and point out to them what they should do." Regular activities have been carried out to draw experiences in detecting criminal cases [phas ang] and symposiums have also been held to give the

weak combatants an opportunity to learn professional matters and raise their standard of knowledge. In particular, the symposiums on regional police work have drawn experiences in motivating the masses, relying on their support and coordinating with local organs and mass organizations.

With regard to policemen in charge of public order, attention has been paid to educating them, making them aware of the need to execute the law, showing them how to behave with decorum and strictly forbidding arrogance and assault and battery [in dealing with the people].

Concerning combatants who are weak in ethics and qualities, cadres and party members have been designated to contact them, to inquire about their social relationships and to coordinate with their families to educate them. Applying the "training in minor jobs, mutual assistance in making progress" slogan as a guideline, combatants have urged each other to adopt a correct bearing including clothing, haircut and the manner of speaking, addressing each other, etc. The unit has taken every opportunity to join the combatants' families in educating and admonishing their relatives, especially if the latter are new recruits. If the family of some [weak] combatant lives in Hanoi, the unit commander or [a member of] the party chapter committee will pay them a visit in order to find out the reasons for his mistakes and then to formulate appropriate measures to educate him. If the [weak] combatant is stationed far from his family, the unit commander and the party chapter committee will contact his parents or elder relatives--whenever they come to visit him--and will raise the problem of coordinating efforts to motivate and advise him.

In addition to ideological education, the unit has also paid attention to the material and moral life of cadres and combatants. By offering three meals [a day], setting up a refreshment point to serve combatants when they take a break and founding an assault arts, letters and wallpaper cell, etc., the unit has succeeded in creating a stable and joyful life style in an enthusiastic atmosphere which precludes unwholesome thoughts and acts.

On the occasion of the recapitulation of the work done in the past 2 years to build the public security forces, the director of the public security forces in Hanoi and the party and chapter committees in Hang Bac Ward have confirmed the achievements registered in transforming the weak combatants in this unit. These achievements are illustrated by the fact that almost all the formerly weak combatants have now fulfilled their special mission and that a number of them have even accomplished it brilliantly. Contrary to their former bad habit of misusing public property, some combatants are now fighting in earnest against bribery. Some others have displayed a high sense of service to the people by giving first aid to accident victims and bringing stray children back to their families. Despite numerous difficulties in livelihood and the complexity of tasks in the operational area, there has been an obvious decrease in negative manifestations versus a notable increase in positive factors. For 1982, the unit has held a debate, elected three emulation and determined-to-win combatants and asked [the higher level] to examine and approve their case--against only one such combatant for the whole unit in the past. The education of weak combatants has had the effect of making the

emulation movement even and uniform and increasing the working abilities and combat strength. This is one of the reasons for the clear-cut reductions in bicycle thefts and for the discovery of 17 cases of smuggling and merchandise counterfeiting in Hang Bac Ward.

9332

CSO: 4209/190

MILITARY AFFAIRS AND PUBLIC SECURITY

VIGILANT VENDOR ASSISTS IN CATCHING ROBBERY 'VICTIM'

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 20 Dec 82 p 3

[Security Front column: "Man Willing To Be Robbed"]

[Text] It was 2300 hours. The railroad station of the Municipality of Nha Trang was still full of people waiting for the trains. Mrs Nguyen Thi C. was cheerfully inviting people to buy the cakes and drinks she was selling. The whistles of a train were echoing from afar. The station suddenly became alive. A middle-aged man with disheveled hair came to her counter, bought a cigarette and lighted it to smoke. His eyes were quickly searching the crowd as if he was to meet with somebody. Then he walked toward the pedicab drivers. Mrs C. was attentively observing the man who appeared quite strange to her. From the station a neatly-dressed man, with a handbag in his hand, was walking toward the middle-aged man. Suddenly the latter snatched the bag from the former's hand and ran.

"Help! Catch that thief, there!", Mrs C. stood up and shouted.

The people and public security men rushed over from all directions. The thief was caught. Mrs C. turned her head to look for the victim but he was nowhere to be seen. She said to herself: "That's strange. The victim of a robbery who did not scream and then did not show up to get the bag that was lost. Why is anyone willing to be robbed?" She asked the lady of the next counter to take care of hers and went along with the robber to the public security station in Phuong Sai Subward. There the bag was opened and found to contain just a few ordinary jewels. After hearing Mrs C.'s report, the public security men decided to look for the victim of the robbery. She was leading a public security team going to the railroad station.

At the ticket counter where tickets for the train going to Ho Chi Minh City were being sold, a large crowd of passengers were busily buying tickets. A public security man was carefully checking every passenger's papers. The neatly-dressed young man who was about to reach the ticket counter suddenly left

the line. Two public security men were following him closely. Right at that moment, Mrs C. walked over. She pointed to the man and said he was the one who was robbed of the bag. The public security men arrested the neatly-dressed man, searched him and found a number of secret documents of a reactionary organization. He said the thief was a member of his gang. They staged the bag-snatching incident to divert the public security men's attention so that they could get onto the train going to Ho Chi Minh City with a plot to undermine the revolutionary administration.

By the time Mrs C. returned to her counter it was close to 0100 hours. Although she was tired, she was very happy because she did something useful, a contribution to guarding the fatherland's security.

5598

CSO: 4209/191

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, TRADE AND AID

BRIEFS

SOVIET-BUILT CAR REPAIR STATION--On 14 December, the Dich Vong Railroad Car Repair Station in Hanoi with a repair output of 20 cars per day officially began operation. This is the 54th of more than 100 train repair stations placed in use with Soviet aid. This new repair station creates favorable conditions for the Thong Nhat Passenger Car Corporation in Hanoi to better achieve car maintenance and repair standards, to assist in raising the number of good cars and to assure technology and safety for the presently available 600 passenger cars. In a project transfer ceremony, the Director of the Thong Nhat Passenger Car Corporation and the trade representative of the Soviet Embassy pledged to swiftly perfect and well-maintain station operations to promptly serve passenger transportation on the Hanoi railroad lines. [Text] [Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 16 Dec 82 p 1] 7300

PARTY ACTIVITIES AND GOVERNMENT

PARTY SCHOOLS REORGANIZED

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 10 Jan 83 p 1

[Article: "The System of Party Schools on the Various Levels Is Reorganized; in Addition to the Nguyen Ai Quoc High Level Party School, Three Party Schools Directly Subordinate to the Central Level Are Established in Hanoi, Ho Chi Minh City and Da Nang"]

[Text] On 2 January 1983, the Party Secretariat issued a decision concerning party school work. After clearly stating the task of the party schools in the new stage, the Secretariat dealt with the reorganization of the system of party schools on the various levels. This system, which is both a tool of education and an organizational tool of the party, has the task of teaching Marxist-Leninist theory and the necessary knowledge of leadership and management to cadres who are now on the job and their successors selected in accordance with planning in order to train the corps of key leadership cadres and management cadres on the various party committee echelons and the various levels of government as well as within the mass organizations.

The party school system consists of:

1. The party schools that are directly subordinate to the Party Central Committee, which will be reorganized as follows: in addition to the Nguyen Ai Quoc High Level Party School, three party schools directly subordinate to the Party Central Committee will be established in three different regions on the basis of reorganizing the Nguyen Ai Quoc School annexes:

Nguyen Ai Quoc School I will be established in Hanoi through the merger of Nguyen Ai Quoc School I, Nguyen Ai Quoc School II and Nguyen Ai Quoc School VI.

Nguyen Ai Quoc School II will be established in Ho Chi Minh City on the basis of strengthening Nguyen Ai Quoc School VIII.

Nguyen Ai Quoc School III will be established in the municipality of Da Nang through the merger of Nguyen Ai Quoc School IV, the Central Highlands Party School and Central Propaganda and Training School II.

In order to provide advanced training in theory, politics and professional skills to the cadres of the party's ideological sector, Central Propaganda and Training School I will be established on the basis of merging the Central Propaganda and Training School and Nguyen Ai Quoc School V (for cadres from Thuan Hai northward) and Central Propaganda and Training School II will be established on the basis of merging Propaganda and Training School III and Nguyen Ai Quoc School IX (for cadres in the provinces of Nam Bo).

2. The party schools directly subordinate to the provincial and municipal party committees.

3. The district, precinct and city party schools.

Together with strengthening the party school system, we must strengthen and improve the quality of operation of the on-the-job theory and politics schools of the party.

Over the next few years, the economic management schools must continue to hold short-term advanced training classes in economic management for key leadership cadres and management cadres from the central to the district levels who are not now attending party schools.

The School of Administration must continue to provide short-term, advanced training in theory, professional skills, state management and social management to the vice chairmen of the people's committees in charge of internal affairs, committee secretaries, the heads and assistant heads of the people's committee offices, government organizational cadres, etc.

The programs and methods of study at the party schools will be improved and more attention will be given to the elementary and advanced training of instructors.

7809

CSO: 4209/205

PARTY ACTIVITIES AND GOVERNMENT

HIGHLIGHTS OF ACHIEVEMENTS IN 1982 SUMMARIZED

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 31 Dec 82 p 1

[Article: "In Light of the Fifth Party Congress Resolution -- New Progress, New Factors"]

[Text] . All three rice crops were successful. The first year in which the grain production goal set in the plan was surpassed: 16.26 million tons.

- . Grain collection was unprecedentedly high: 2.9 million tons.
- . Remarkable increases in animal husbandry involving hogs, water buffaloes, as well as cattle.
- . Forestry: The first year in which the afforestation plan was overfulfilled.
- . Industry: It was maintained and there was a degree of development, although less raw materials, energy and spare parts were available than in the previous year.
- . Capital construction concentrated more than in the previous years on the key projects, a number of which began to be productive.
- . Export increased by 27 percent over 1980.
- . More than 50 socioeconomic positions and policies had the effects of promoting development of production and stabilizing the standard of living.
- . More than 50 districts were outstanding, with different economic structures.

However, the socioeconomic situation still encountered major difficulties that would need to be gradually overcome in 1983 and our people have the capability of overcoming them.

5598

CSO: 4209/191

ECONOMIC PLANNING, TRADE AND FINANCE

END OF YEAR BONUS POLICY EXPLAINED

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 10 Jan 83 p 4

[Article: "Concerning the Policy on End of the Year Bonuses for the Completion of Tasks"]

[Text] In reply to the many readers of NHAN DAN Newspaper who have inquired about the policy on end of the year bonuses for the completion of tasks for cadres, manual workers and civil servants within the administrative and professional sectors, military officers and specialized military personnel and people's public security personnel, the Ministry of Labor offers the following explanation:

The implementation of the bonus policy must be based on the results of the work performed during the entire year by each manual worker, civil servant, military officer, specialized military personnel and public security personnel on the basis of the duties, tasks, program, plan and volume of work assigned to them. Persons who record many achievements receive a large bonus; persons who record few achievements receive a small bonus; and persons who do not complete their task receive no bonus.

The scope of application: this bonus policy does not apply to those production, business and professional units that have implemented the bonus system based on decision number 51/CT dated 11 March 1982 and decision number 146/HDPT dated 25 August 1982 by the chairman of the Council of Ministers and the various instructions from the Ministry of Labor concerning bonuses paid from the wage fund and bonuses based on the profit distribution policy.

The persons eligible for this bonus are all cadres, manual workers and civil servants who belong to a permanent labor force, all military officers and specialized military personnel and all people's public security personnel who are remunerated in accordance with the wage and salary scales of the state. Persons who have left their jobs in order to attend school or undergo long-term medical treatment and are no longer being paid from the wage fund of the agency or unit are not eligible for this bonus.

Bonus standards: bonus standards must be clearly defined and should not be too many in number. The main standard should be completing the assigned task,

duty, program or work plan, not committing a disciplinary infraction as a result of implementing a policy or regulation incorrectly and not committing a crime against socialist property.

Standards that are not directly related to the completion of a task or the fulfillment of a duty should not be used as the standard for determining whether or not to award a bonus. In some control units, the number of persons who were awarded bonuses amounted to 70 to 80 percent of the total number of cadres, manual workers or civil servants at the unit, which is incorrect.

On the basis of the bonus standards for each type cadre, manual worker and civil servant and on the basis of emulation achievements, achievements can be categorized as class A, class B or class C achievements for the purpose of awarding bonuses. Class A encompasses emulation warriors and persons who excellently complete the task assigned to them. Class B encompasses persons who earn the title progressive laborer and persons who complete their tasks in a manner reflecting high quality. Class C encompasses those persons who complete their tasks in a manner that reflects ordinary quality.

Bonus rates: on the basis of the bonus fund and the number of persons who qualify for the various classes of achievements, the head of the unit and the secretary of the Trade Union set the bonus rate for each class of achievements within the range of the following percentages: class A: from 155 to 200 percent of the base wage and the subsidies of each person; class B: from 100 to 150 percent; and class C: from 50 to 90 percent. These ranges of percentages are the basis for computing the specific bonus to be paid to each persons within each class of achievements. The higher and lower limits of these percentages are determined by the value of the achievement and the size of the bonus fund.

No one may receive as a bonus more than two times their new base wage and regional subsidy (if any).

The organization of implementation: the awarding of bonuses must be coordinated with the review of emulation conducted at the end of the year in order to lay the groundwork for correctly evaluating the achievements recorded in the completion of tasks by each cadre, manual worker and civil servant. The ministries and sectors on the central level and the localities must, on the basis of the characteristics of and the situation surrounding their work, guide subordinate units in establishing internal regulations on the awarding of bonuses, setting bonus standards for each category of persons eligible for bonuses and establishing bonus rates for each class of achievements that are consistent with the bonus fund. The head of the unit together with the specialized leadership collective and the Trade Union on the same level must, on the basis of the suggestions made by subordinate units, determine the size of bonuses and pay bonuses promptly.

Bonuses must be awarded in a systematic fashion and without requiring overly complicated evaluations.

The establishment of the bonus fund: the total of the new base wage plus the regional subsidy paid during the 4th quarter is multiplied by 4 to establish

the total wage fund for the year, which is used as the base from which 10 percent is deducted as bonus money. As regards retirees, disabled workers or persons who stopped working for a legitimate reason prior to the 4th quarter of 1982 (that is, whose names were not on the 4th quarter wage roll), the wages of vocational students who recently graduated from school and joined the agency during the 4th quarter of 1982 (if any) can be used as the base to compensate for the shortfall. Any shortage or surplus of funds must be explained to the finance agency when the account is being settled.

As regards persons who are transferred to or go to work in other agencies, sectors or localities, the last unit at which they worked evaluates them for a bonus (on the basis of the results of their work for the entire year and a report from their former agency).

As regards persons who decide to retire, persons who leave work for reasons of health and persons who quit their jobs for a legitimate reason some time during the year, the agency at which they worked evaluates their work from the start of the year until they left their jobs and prorates their bonus.

Persons who are on assignments overseas are considered for bonuses by the agency that pays them.

As regards persons who are attending elementary or advanced political, technical or professional training schools and are still on the rolls of and receiving a salary from an agency, it is the responsibility of this agency to consider them for a bonus. If their living expenses are paid for from the training fund of the school or class, they are not eligible for this bonus system, even if they are students studying overseas whose training costs are paid for by our country and the country in which they are studying.

Students who graduate and are assigned to an agency are eligible for a bonus from the month they start work, if they record any achievements.

The procedures for considering the awarding of a bonus to the head of a unit are as follows: ministers, vice ministers, persons on the same level or higher, the secretaries and standing committees of party organizations and the chairmen and vice chairmen of the people's committees of the provinces, special zone or municipalities directly subordinate to the central level are evaluated for bonuses by the highest leadership collective at the place at which they work.

7809

CSO: 4209/205

AGRICULTURE

HAI HUNG NATIONAL ASSEMBLY DEPUTY ON AGRICULTURE

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 10 Jan 83 p 3

[Article by Nguyen Van Phuc, National Assembly deputy from Hai Hung Province: "Endeavoring To Rapidly Increase the Output of Agricultural Products and Commodities"]

[Text] Although the weather during the winter of 1982 has not been favorable and although there has been a significant decline in the amount of area under the cultivation of subsidiary food crops, we must focus our efforts on intensive cultivation, especially the intensive cultivation of the two rice crops, in order to compensate for the reduced output of subsidiary food crops, determined to produce 880,000 tons of grain or more in 1983 and between 930,000 and 950,000 tons in 1985. We must endeavor to raise the output of jute from 14,000 tons in 1982 to 16,000 tons in 1983 and 17,000 tons or more in 1985; the output of meat from 19,000 tons in 1982 to 22,000 tons in 1983 and 25,000 tons in 1985; the output value of local industry (including small industry and the handicraft trades) from 140 million dong in 1982 to 150 million dong in 1983 and 180 million dong in 1985 (70 percent or more of which will represent consumer goods and export goods); and the value of exports from 220 million dong in 1982 to 250 million dong in 1983 and 350 million dong in 1985.

We will continue to reorganize and improve distribution and circulation and will, on the basis of production, organize purchases, put control of the majority of the sources of goods in the hands of the state, insure that all obligations to the central level are fulfilled better and stabilize and improve the standard of living of the people within the province while performing good cultural and social work, maintaining security, performing good national defense work and strengthening and perfecting the socialist production relations.

Even if it makes the greatest possible effort, the locality cannot meet all of its needs on its own; therefore, it must receive assistance from the Central Committee and the central sectors.

To begin with, in the plans that are assigned to the locality, the central level must use calculations that are more realistic. In the implementation

of plans, both the central sectors and the locality must display a high sense of responsibility in a spirit of equality, must display communal responsibility. The locality has the obligation to contribute enough to meet each plan norm assigned by the central. The central sectors must provide a full, timely and convenient supply of the capital, materials and goods required under their plan to the locality. Of particular importance are the capital for investment in capital construction, fertilizer, insecticides, lumber and essential goods in the daily lives of the people. The central sectors and the locality must review the specific implementation of these plans on the basis of the seasonal nature of each type material supplied for production.

Each quarter, the Ministry of Foreign Trade should inform the province of how much foreign currency the locality may use during each quarter and the entire year and must pay this foreign currency to the locality in the form of materials and goods supplied in accordance with the needs of the locality. All accounts should be settled before the next year begins.

For many years, the state and the people have been investing in the construction of material and technical bases but have not been able to fully utilize these bases. Therefore, investments must be concentrated in three areas: improving the farmland water conservancy system, purchasing fertilizer and achieving mechanization in order to accelerate and increase the output of products and commodities. As regards contributions to the state, we suggest: when the state assigns the annual stable grain obligation, it is necessary to calculate how much will be distributed within the territory for which the locality is responsible, which includes the central agencies and enterprises that are located within the province. The transfer of grain from the province should only be carried out after this has been done. If it is necessary to trade with farmers for agricultural products, the state must have the materials and goods needed to engage in fair trade as this is the only way to create a position of stability and self-sufficiency for the locality.

The policy concerning the food products obligation should be researched with a view toward making it a more reasonable policy.

The division of management levels within the economic field must be stronger in order to create the conditions for the locality to achieve high returns in its economic development.

The possibility of redefining the functions of the specialized committees on the district level in order to help the districts effectively manage their various areas of work should be researched at an early date.

7809

CSO: 4209/205

AGRICULTURE

LAND REGULATION, MORE COOPERATIVES SET UP

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 20 Dec 82 p 2

[Article by Thien Anh and Tuan Anh: "Ho Chi Minh City Steps up Land Regulation, Quickly and Steadily Expand Movement To Establish Agricultural Cooperatives"]

[Text] After the day the municipality had been totally liberated, implementing the directives and resolutions of the VCP Central Committee and the resolution of the party organization congress, Ho Chi Minh City was carrying out the struggle to wipe out all forms of exploitation by the colonialists, feudalists, landlords, rich farmers and rural bourgeois and at the same time readjusting land ownership by taking land from the families that owned a high average amount of land and giving it to the farmers who owned little or no land in order to step up production through collective work.

The municipality has so far expropriated more than 30,000 hectares, which mostly had been left idle during the 2 recent wars of resistance, and built 8 state farms and many new economic zones and centers that accommodated people from urban areas; nearly 85 cases of illegal seizure of land were handled, with more than 3,200 hectares of land that were retrieved being distributed to 6,000 landless families, mostly tenant farmers who had been tilling the same land for a long time. The municipality also made adjustments among farmers (primarily among upper middle farmers) involving more than 3,000 hectares. Given land to till, farmers went into collective work in cooperatives and production collectives. As of September this year, the municipality as a whole had 400 collectives and 10 cooperatives involving over 15 percent of the cultivated area and nearly 20 percent of farmer families. It now had more than 80,000 hectares of cultivated land (nearly twice as much as before), including the newly-opened and -broken land. Grain production exceeded 200,000 tons, which was enough for the rural farmer population. The high-yield rice-growing area and the areas specialized in growing vegetables, industrial crops and medicinal plants have been set up. More and more scientific and technical progresses have been widely applied in the food-growing belt. Many

outstanding models, such as Pham Van Hai, An Ha and An Phu state farms; collectives No 3 in Subward 22 (8th Precinct) and No 6 in Subward 12 (Go Vap Ward); and the specialized vegetables-growing collective of Dinh (Cu Chi District), have appeared. The majority of farmers who were given land to till have been doing well.

Those were initial results. The municipal party organization has completed a preliminary review and evaluation of the struggle to wipe out exploitation and the regulation of land in the rural areas aimed at overcoming the remaining difficulties and making the movement to establish agricultural cooperatives progress in the right direction and obtain good results. In the rural areas, currently the exploiting people still account for 3.3 percent of the families, with the average per capita land ownership amounting to 6,000 square meters. They also exploit other people in the form of hiring people, doing business in machinery, renting draft and transportation animals, lending money at high rate of interest, speculating and hoarding, etc. and by associating with bourgeois and dishonest businessmen in the urban areas to compete with the state in buying and selling and to undermine the market, particularly in connection with grain, foods and industrial crop products. The number of farmers who still have excess land accounts for 7.3 percent, with the average per capita land ownership amounting to 3,300 square meters (more than 2.5 times the average of rural farmers). Meanwhile, 7.7 percent of farmers do not have any land; 20.3 percent have too little land; and 14.9 percent are not taking part in agricultural production -- they all need to be reorganized. There still are some cadres and party members who do not fully understand and implement in an exemplary manner the line on socialist transformation of agriculture and the land-related policies. To regulate land ownership in conjunction with the plan for developing the movement to establish cooperatives has not yet been achieved enough. As a result, although in some localities land regulation has been completed, it has not yet brought about any noteworthy changes.

The municipality affirms that the present task of making land adjustments and wiping out the remnants of feudal exploitation is the class struggle in the rural areas; that only by making good land adjustments can it wipe out exploitation, guarantee for farmers the right to be owners of the land and the countryside, gradually bring agriculture to the socialist large-scale production and build the new countryside; and that this is considered its immediate key job to do. It strives to basically complete by mid-1983 the task of regulating land ownership to create favorable conditions for extending the movement to establish agricultural cooperatives and basically achieving it by the beginning of 1985.

The Standing Committees of the Municipal VCP Committee and Municipal People's Committee recently instructed Binh Chanh District to carry out on a

trial basis land adjustments in conjunction with stepping up the movement to establish agricultural cooperatives in An Phu Tay Village, for the purpose of creating a model and drawing experience for the benefit of the precincts and districts in the outskirts of the municipality. An Phu Tay was a small agricultural village that had been temporarily occupied for an extended period of time. During the resistance, it was located within the "white land" zone. The village as a whole had 784 families consisting of more than 4,600 people, with the average per capita land area amounting to nearly 1,000 square meters. In addition, it had 133 families whose occupation was paper-making and 24 business families. Although the rich farmers and rural bourgeois here were few, exploitation, hiring and lending money at high interest rate were a threat for the landless farmers. In only 20 days, the village as a whole made adjustments involving 80 hectares of land taken from 16 rich farmers and 27 middle farmers and distributed among more than 100 farmer families having little or no land. As it was carrying out the task, An Phu Tay knew how to coordinate and do all of the jobs in a concentrated, clear-cut and synchronized manner (the jobs of urging the masses through propaganda and mobilization to declare, offer and cede their land; making surveys and investigations to know exactly the number of people still holding lots of land; accepting and distributing land; preparing conditions in connection with seeds, fertilizers and farm implements for farmers to grow crops on schedule, etc.) After the land regulation was completed, the cultivated area in the 1982 summer-autumn season increased by 40 hectares as compared with the same season last year. All rich farmers' families voluntarily wrote letters to offer their land, thus creating an enthusiastic atmosphere among farmers. While making land adjustments, An Phu Tay was stepping up, consolidating and developing the movement to establish cooperatives. The village had 2 production collectives, with almost all of their members being poor farmers and the average per capita land area being 560 square meters. These collectives have acquired 18 additional hectares of crop land during the regulation of land. An Phu Tay has established 21 additional production solidarity teams with all of the farmers in the village joining them.

5598

CSO: 4209/191

AGRICULTURE

SCIENTIFIC APPLICATIONS BRING CHANGES TO AGRICULTURE

Hanoi KHOA HOC VA DOI SONG in Vietnamese 1 Jan 83 p 5

[Article by Agriculture Minister Nguyen Ngoc Triu: "Changes Brought About by Applying Scientific and Technical Progress to Ricefields"]

[Text] Victory in Agriculture

In 1982 the country as a whole scored a great victory on the agricultural production front, especially grain production. The total national grain production could be more than 16.26 million tons, exceeding the plan by 260,000 tons and showing an increase of 1.26 million tons over last year. This was the second consecutive year in which all three rice crops were good. Many typical examples of high yield were no longer the scattered achievement of individual cooperatives and production collectives but rather on the scale of entire districts: in the winter-spring season, 38 districts obtained a rice crop yield of 38 quintals or more per hectare. Such districts as Hong Ngu (Dong Thap Province) obtained the highest yield of 65 quintals; Tam Nong (Dong Thap) 54.8 quintals; Cho Moi (An Giang) 52.36 quintals; Hai Hau (Ha Nam Ninh) 44.4 quintals; Dai Loc (Quang Nam-Da Nang) 45.54 quintals, etc. Throughout the country there were 125 cooperatives having obtained a rice crop yield of more than 50 quintals per hectare, or 5 times higher than that in the winter-spring season of the previous year. The yield of the summer-autumn rice crop obtained by many localities was also quite high: Quang Nam-Da Nang 40 quintals/hectare, Minh Hai 34.45 quintals, Hau Giang 33.19 quintals, Phu Khanh 33.16 quintals, Ho Chi Minh City 29.62 quintals, etc.

For the time being, the Nam Bo provinces have not yet completed the harvest of their tenth-month rice crop, but the prospects for having high yield are good; in the North many provinces have obtained high rice crop yield, with a typical example being Hai Hau District (Ha Nam Ninh Province) where the crop yield was 38.44 quintals/hectare.

Many industrial crops, vegetables and subsidiary food crops, such as soybean, peanut, sugar cane, etc., have been quickly developed in terms of both cultivated area and crop yield. The movement to grow mulberries and to raise silkworms and to grow cotton and to make cloth in the form of a scattered activity, which is being widely developed in all regions of the country, has been contributing to partially satisfying the people's need for clothing.

Last year the weather was generally more favorable than in the previous years. Throughout the country, some localities had favorable weather, others unfavorable one, or the weather was favorable at the beginning of a crop season but turned unfavorable in the middle or at the end of that season, or vice versa. On the other hand, the material factors that directly affected agriculture, such as nitrate fertilizer, insecticide, gas and oil, etc., were still limited and adversely affected by the poor management in some fields, but generally speaking agriculture still was able to score important gains.

The progress and new changes in agriculture in 1982 were the reflection of the three revolutions, the result of a hard struggle on the part of the party organizations and people of all localities in the country; the result of a correct and creative application of the party's view and line on agricultural development in every locality and production installation; the result of the leadership, guidance and organizing capacity of all echelons and sectors; and the good effects of the policies and new management mechanisms, especially the product contract system, and more directly the fact that farmers throughout the country have acquired, applied and quickly brought the scientific and technical progresses to the ricefields.

That was the fact that localities and installations knew how to use widely the high-yielding crop varieties. It might be said that the masses and installations had never before requested as many good varieties for them to grow as they did last year. Many provinces, districts, cooperatives and farmers came to the state's seed research and production installations to buy, exchange and order good seeds of all kinds. Many new rice varieties were added to the collection of varieties used in our crop seasons. In the North, the collection of rice varieties for the fifth-month and spring season consisting of NN 75-2, 3, 4, NN-8, dwarf Tran Chau, NN 75-6, NN 75-10, NN 22, NN 23, etc. is being widely used. In the southern provinces, such new rice varieties as NN 3A, NN 6A, NN 7A, NN 8A, NN 2B, NN 3B, NN 4B, NN 5B, etc. accounted for over 60 percent of the rice-growing area in the entire year. An outstanding noteworthy fact was that all localities and installations were paying attention to setting up specialized seed-producing units in order to select, domesticate and supply by themselves the good varieties for on-the-spot planting and to create a four-level seed production system.

Along with the use of new rice varieties for planting, such high-yielding corn varieties as VM1, TH2A, TH2B and soybean varieties as DT74, DT76, MTD6, etc. were also widely used in large areas. The replacing of the old corn varieties with the new ones succeeded in increasing the corn yields by 2-2.5 times. The new short-term soybean varieties helped to allow multicropping in both the one- and two-rice crop land and the subsidiary food crop land, to improve the soil and to open up the possibility of gradually using tens of thousands of hectares of land in the midlands and highlands and millions of hectares of still-one-rice-crop land in the Nam Bo delta.

The localities also attached extremely great importance to the strategic direction of agriculture, namely, crop rotation and multicropping linked with a rearrangement of crop seasons and crop cultivation patterns.

The winter-spring rice season, which is the "hostile" crop but offers high and stable yield in the southern provinces, is being further extended everyday. The summer-autumn rice season, with the high-yielding rice varieties, has also reached its peak so far and is gradually shortening the long-term low-yielding rice season in the Mekong River delta.

Many rather unique and creative crop-rotation and companion-crop formulas adopted by the masses in Duy Tien District (Ha Nam Ninh Province) for the jute-growing area, namely, the formula of four-crops-three-seasons (rice + potato + jute mixed with soybean) opened up the possibility of growing additional crops and increasing production over a jute-growing unit area in the Red River delta. The crop-rotation formula of spring rice-tenth-month rice-winter season became the crop-growing habit in the northern provinces. Recently, Luc Ngan and Lang Giang Districts (Ha Bac) obtained good success in production with the crop-rotation formula of fifth-month and spring rice-summer soybean-tenth-month rice. The highland and Central Highland provinces actively created water sources by building small reservoirs and dams, rebuilding wet-rice land in order to practice multicropping, to increase grain production and to contribute to stabilizing the living conditions and promoting settled farming and settled life for the minority people.

In the soil-improving work and production and use of sources of fertilizers there also were good changes. Although in the past the Nam Bo farmers had been accustomed to using only chemical fertilizers, the habit of using stable manure was being restored. The movement to use stable and green manure is receiving their positive response. In 1982, the provinces in the Mekong River delta and coastal Zone 5 applied 4 million tons of stable manure. In the winter-spring and tenth-month seasons, the northern localities applied from .5 to 2 tons of stable manure per hectare more than the average rate of application in the previous seasons.

A lot of attention was being paid to the measures to treat acidity and salinity and to improve the soil by doing water conservancy work and applying phosphate fertilizer and lime. In the areas of Minh Hai and Kien Giang Provinces, farmers took such measures as elevating the soil and making the soil dry and aerated in order to grow rice in the areas of alkaline soil and succeeded in raising the rice crop yield, which had usually been more or less than 1 ton, to 3 tons/hectare.

A particularly significant fact was the scientific calculations by farmers of the use of different chemical fertilizers aimed at both satisfying the technical requirements and bringing about good economic results. Farmers and cooperative members paid attention to and properly carried out the measure of using granulated nitrate fertilizer and applying fertilizer at the right time. The great majority of families of farmers and cooperative members used additional capital to buy or exchanged paddy for nitrate fertilizer from the state in order to invest in their under-contract land.

The jobs of seeding and transplanting, tending and caring and preventing and controlling harmful insects were all done better than before. Unlike in previous years when the crop schedule had been rather "flexible," in 1982 most ricefields were seeded and transplanting was completed within the optimal period. In the Red River delta alone, seeding and transplanting were completed within the appropriate time in 92 percent of the cultivated area. Sowing and transplanting densities were maintained; weeding was done in time; the "time first, experience second" jobs were restored.

The prevention and control of harmful insects were carried out with combined measures ranging from projecting and forecasting to using insecticide and including holding lantern festivals to catch moths with lights and growing the insects-resistant varieties; harvesting was also done in an urgent manner, which helped to limit losses from falling off and spilling.

A matter that is generating much interest is the fact that in the last 2 years the scientific research organs of the Ministry of Agriculture for the first time were signing contracts to bring technical progress into agricultural production cooperatives. The results of that move were to link research with production and to use production to carry on research, through which to improve and raise the ability of science cadres to direct production and to conduct research, and at the same time to contribute to increasing crop yields and animal husbandry productivity as achieved by the cooperatives and, on that basis, providing more money for research and improving the living conditions of cadres, workers and civil servants.

The results obtained from agricultural production in 1982, particularly on the grain production front, generated and led to many new factors and opened up

the possibility to continuously move agriculture forward in the time to come. One of the moving forces that encouraged scientific and technical progresses, the decisive factor in agriculture, was the effects of the new management policies and procedures: the signing of product contracts with labor groups and laborers in agriculture, with the spirit of their being the real owners in production, gave rise to a widespread movement for labor and creativity. Never before had the scientific and technical measures been carried out, by individuals through self-understanding, and carried out in such a serious manner, as they were in recent seasons. It was due to the fact that both responsibilities and material interests were harmoniously linked together and that the relationships among the three interests were satisfactorily resolved that farmers felt assured as they were trying to increase their production. That situation required even more strongly the application of scientific and technical progresses to the ricefields in a prompt manner. Science and technology thus became the masses' need and was under better conditions for being further developed in production.

More Applications in Coming Years

The 5th Party Congress set an extremely important position for agriculture in the 1980's, with three basic but urgent tasks -- to resolve at any cost the problem of grain and foods to satisfy the need for food of society as a whole, to gradually satisfy part of the need for clothing and at the same time to make sure to have enough raw materials for light industry and to continuously and quickly increase the sources of goods for export. As an immediate step, in 1983 the agricultural sector must strive to achieve at any cost the goal of getting 17 million tons of grain. To do so, in addition to ceaselessly strengthening the material and technical base, ensuring the material factors for agriculture, continuing to consolidate and perfect the production relationships in the northern and central parts and to complete the transformation of agriculture in Nam Bo, we must perfect in order to further develop the new management procedures in agriculture, ceaselessly do research work and quickly apply scientific and technical progresses to production. The quick application of scientific and technical progresses to production not only reflects their key role but also constitutes a measure having decisive effects on the first steps toward moving agriculture from the small-scale production to the socialist large-scale production. While we still lack the material factors and while the material and technical base of agriculture is still too weak, to study the biological and progressive crop-growing measures and to apply and bring them into production will actively contribute to raising crop yields and animal husbandry productivity and bringing about good economic results.

The direction to take in the time to come in connection with studying and applying scientific and technical progresses to production is in terms of objectives to first concentrate on the principal grain and food crops, the important

industrial crops for export, the domestic animals and birds that quickly produce meat, eggs, etc. We must direct the research organs and science and technology cadres toward resolving the practical problems that now appear in production and mainly concentrating on practical research, research and development and the economic goals of research and services. Importance must also be attached to reviewing the masses' production experiences so as to quickly disseminate them on a large scale.

In 1983, continue to perfect the technical progresses about which conclusions have been drawn and actual testing in production has been found successful. They are the high-yielding crop varieties that have been selected, the combined technical measures, the production pattern and crop-rotation, companion-crop and multicropping formulas that have good economic and technical values; the crop-growing measures applicable to areas of alkaline and saline soil; and the measures to protect production, with greater concentration of cadres and means on the topics that cover production, purchases, processing, storage and consumption of crops and subsidiary food crops of all kinds -- an important direction for resolving the problem of grain for people and feed for domestic animals -- which in recent years as well as at the present time tend to remain unchanged and to decline.

With capable and experienced science and technology cadres, with the existing research installations and means, if we have correct ways to organize and manage scientific research and know how to link research with production and to take the needs of production as research objectives, with the experience already acquired and the momentum generated by the successful crops, we will certainly have in the coming years new technical progresses, about which realistic conclusions will be drawn and application to production will steadily take place, to directly contribute to creating major changes in agricultural production.

5598

CSO: 4209/193

AGRICULTURE

EDITORIAL ADVOCATES INCREASED AGRICULTURAL INTENSIVE CULTIVATION

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 17 Dec 82 pp 1, 4

[Editorial: "Intensive Cultivation Fundamental Course for Increasing Agricultural Production"]

[Text] The Third Plenum of the Party Central Committee pointed out important courses for exploiting every capability to create a new economic and social change, including the capabilities for more strongly developing agricultural production. The Plenum, considering agriculture as the foremost front, proposed methods aimed at concentrating efforts to promote agricultural production in order to resolve the food problems of all society, to insure raw materials for consumer goods industry and to further increase the source of export goods. In agricultural production, intensive cultivation must be taken as the primary method.

Intensive cultivation is an in depth development course in farming, creating high biological productivity on each area unit. It is the basic development course of socialist agriculture, allowing crop yields to become increasingly higher and farming soil to become increasingly richer. Intensive cultivation, specialized cultivation and integrated business activities are the fundamental course presented by the Fifth Plenum of the Party Central Committee to the agricultural and forestry sectors in order to well-utilize labor and soil and to increase social products.

In developing agricultural and forestry under conditions in which the land per capita is little, uncultivated land is great and the number of bare hills is still large, it is necessary to simultaneously engage in intensive cultivation and area expansion by multicropping and land clearance. However, intensive cultivation must be continuously and immediately carried out to the extent that the area expansion reaches. During the past few years, because a number of local areas and primary level production units expanded the area for growing subsidiary food and industrial crops and reforestation without fully understanding the intensive cultivation course, crop yields were low, did not match the efforts made, the land was leached and instead of immediate benefits, long-term harm was caused.

In the intensive cultivation course, there must be a thorough understanding of the crop varieties and seasons. Because in each type of soil the intensive

cultivation requirements for each crop variety differ, cultivation must be carried out precisely in accordance with technical regulations before high yields are acquired. Under the tropical conditions in which the land of our country can be rotation and multicropped, many production seasons in one year are possible. The final annual output per area unit with catch and multicropping formulas which differ in accordance with the conditions of each location are a yardstick for measuring achievement of the intensive cultivation course in that location.

Under conditions in which technical materials are limited, supervision of intensive cultivation suitable to each area will return high economic effectiveness.

In areas where the soil is relatively fertile, water conservancy projects assure crop irrigation and the laborers are relatively skilled in farming standards, the effect of only a few technical factors will create stabilized high yields. Stable and high output in these areas will create overall output stability for the entire nation. Following this course, many local areas have established "high output" rice and subsidiary food crop areas. In reality, the agricultural output of these areas has assisted in swiftly increasing the total output of the entire nation.

Throughout the nation as well as in each local area, there are still areas of low yield. Coordinating the introduction of progressive technology to production and improving management will elevate uniformity. Uniformity in production will assist in swiftly increasing agricultural output. Because the production conditions are difficult in a number of areas and grain output and yields are low, rice must be transported from other locations to answer the consumer requirements of the people. Investment to achieve intensive cultivation in these locations will have high economic effectiveness, alleviate transportation expenses and allow those local areas to take the initiative in resolving the consumer requirements of the people and consequently have both an economic and social significance.

Locations conducting good intensive cultivation are locations uniformly conducting all methods. Basically, it is necessary to build the material and technical base for agriculture, first of all water conservancy, crop varieties, fertilizer and disease prevention and control. Widespread dissemination of technical knowledge while simultaneously achieving a management apparatus closely coordinated with the responsibilities and rights of the laborer concerning the final product will encourage the laborer to conduct the technical methods necessary for intensive cultivation.

The capabilities for conducting intensive cultivation of various crop varieties are still great. In the same geographic-economic area, the yields of crop varieties differ by up to one-third. Achievement of intensive cultivation and elevation of field yield uniformity is a realistic capability for swiftly increasing agricultural output and allowing the crop land to become increasingly more fertile. This is also a thorough understanding of the spirit of the Third Plenum of the Party Central Committee, self-strengthening self-reliance, exploitation of every capability and creation of new development steps in agricultural production.

7300

CSO: 4209/210

AGRICULTURE

FOOD MINISTER DISCUSSES STATE CONTROL OF GRAIN

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 28 Dec 82 pp 1, 4

[Article by Minister of Food La Lam Gia: "The State Must at All Cost Control Grain; This Is the Order of Life"--passages within slantlines denote boldface as published]

[Text] /A Pressing Task/

Implementing the resolution of the 5th Party Congress and the directives of the Party Central Committee Secretariat and Political Bureau, marvelous progress has been made in grain production in recent years. During the past 3 years, the grain output has increased steadily by more than 8 percent each year, the per capita grain output in 1982 was 1 percent higher than in the 1976-1980 period. At this level, it can be said that the minimum need of grain of each citizen has been met and that we are almost capable of solving the grain problem with our own forces.

At present, the capability of achieving a balance between the state-controlled volume of grain and the demands which the state has to meet is still weak while difficulties concerning grain still take place daily under one form or another and in one locality or another. This situation stemmed from the many shortcomings in managerial work, as well as from the failure of the state to control an overwhelmingly large part of marketable grain by regulating it rationally and in accordance with specific plans so as to satisfy the needs of society and the needs arising from work related to economic development and national defense in particular.

Why is it that the state still cannot control an overwhelmingly large part of marketable grain? The following are the fundamental causes of this situation:

First of all, we have failed to pay adequate attention to making the cadres, party members and peasants understand their responsibilities in work related to the fulfillment of the grain obligation to the state and in insuring that

the state is capable of procuring grain ever more steadily and with an ever greater volume.

Many localities, especially those in the South, have conducted business according to a free market system, thus restricting the state's ability to control all the sources of grain. Actually, we can procure only 50-60 percent of the surplus grain from the peasants while rich merchants retain control of the remainder for speculative and exploitative purposes. It is illogical for the state to spend billions of dong for the purchase of paddy from the peasants at agreed-upon prices--which are so high--at a time when the peasants themselves have not yet turned over as many as 300,000 tons of paddy they still owe the state in the form of agricultural taxes or under two-way contracts.

The signing of two-way contracts directly between the state and the peasants has not yet been fully implemented and is still heavily affected by the use of simple business methods. While we are still short of certain kinds of materials to supply to the peasants in exchange for paddy under two-way contracts, these materials have been used in an unprincipled manner.

Due to laxity in the control of the grain market, competition in buying and selling has taken place, thus causing prices to skyrocket, the laborers to encounter difficulties in their daily life, and all manifestations of negativism to remain unchecked.

And, finally, there is the sluggishness and non-uniformity in the process of preparing for and carrying out grain procurement of various localities, the grain sector and other sectors concerned.

Faced with this situation, embarking on 1983, the Party Central Committee Political Bureau has instructed: "In order to stabilize the socio-economic situation and to take the initiative under all circumstances, one of the pressing tasks at present is that the state must, at all cost, control grain and improve the management of grain under a unified system."

The Mobilization of Grain Under Obligations

In 1983, we have many advantages in our favor; however, we still face difficulties, difficulties which demand that the entire country make the greatest possible effort in the field of production, raise yields and output and insure that the state mobilizes grain, 25 percent more in the North, 33 percent more along the central seacoast and in the Central Highlands and 43 percent more in Nam Bo compared to 1982.

This year, as regards the measures that will be taken, the state advocates the following: "Unifying, on a nationwide, basis, the application of the policy on the mobilization of grain under obligation. This obligation consists of two parts: agricultural taxes and purchases made under stable obligations through two-way contracts."

Under this policy, the first requirement is to give farmers a correct understanding of the agricultural tax obligation and their responsibility to repay their debts to and fulfill their two-way contracts with the state.

Our entire nation waged a war of resistance filled with hardship and sacrifice to win back our land, our fields and gardens; the party and government invest billion of dong in agricultural production each year. The working class and revolutionary intellectuals are working night and day to find new ways to introduce science and technology in fields. We have intensively cultivated fields that produce two or three crops per year and yield 5 to 7 tons, even 10 tons, per hectare per season. Clearly, the paddy and rice that farmers have are a product of society, a product that the entire party and all the people have helped to produce. For this reason, farmers have a reciprocal responsibility and obligation to the party, to the people and to all society. This responsibility and this obligation must be fulfilled in a self-conscious manner.

In addition to the taxes and debts that must be paid in full to the state, we must encourage farmers to sell nearly all or all of their surplus grain to the state in the full spirit of responsibility of a citizen of a country that won its independence by shedding its own blood. This year, the state has decided to make all of these purchases by means of two-way contracts and in the spirit of insuring that the interests of the state and the interests of farmers are satisfied. Products will not be purchased or sold at high prices and will not be traded for goods nor will bonuses or support prices be paid. Purchases will be made in accordance with long-term, two-way contracts lasting from 1 to 3 years. The signing of these contracts will be an expression of the stable and long-range relationship of responsibility and obligation between the state and farmers. The state has the responsibility and the obligation to create the conditions for increasing the production capacity of farmers and concerning itself with every aspect of their living conditions. Conversely, farmers have the responsibility and obligation to produce more and better products with each passing day, achieve higher efficiency and sell practically all of their surplus paddy, rice and agricultural products to the state. This reciprocal relationship strengthens the alliance of workers and farmers and serves as the base for the development of society in every field.

In the recent past, this relationship has not been the best possible relationship; as a result of objective and subjective difficulties, neither the persons who guide implementation nor the persons who implement economic contracts have correctly understood the nature of this relationship, consequently, emphasis has been placed solely upon the buying and selling relationship. Our party and state care for the interests of the masses, who include the class of farmers, better with each passing day; as a result, in the process of implementing the new contracts, all problems and antagonisms can be resolved. The state must continue to make improvements in those areas in which its efforts are not yet satisfactory and we must patiently explain to farmers why some of their demands are excessive so that they understand this fact and sympathize with the state.

In 1983, the state needs a much larger volume of grain. However, it still encounters difficulties concerning cash and goods or material and technical

bases in general to insure that grain procurement is carried out steadily as expected. For this reason, the motto designed to make the 1983 grain procurement task a success is that "the central and local authorities work together and the state and the people work together." Apart from rationally distributing the amounts of goods and money received from the central government, all localities are duty-bound to prepare and exploit sufficient sources of local goods and money to support the need for grain procurement in accordance with the norms set by the state. They can achieve this by producing industrial goods and controlling all the sources of these goods; collecting orchard taxes; selling out the quantities of goods still in stock and the quantities of slowly circulated goods; launching a widespread movement for economization with emphasis on grain consumption to help reduce the quantity of grain to be supplied by the state and to reduce spending so that more money can be deposited in the bank; and encouraging those who can buy grain at established prices to pay first and receive their grain later. Grain consuming centers such as Hanoi, Haiphong and Ho Chi Minh City should make contributions of goods and money to the central government to insure that sufficient grain is procured to meet the needs in their localities. In implementing two-way contracts, apart from the possibility that the state would supply materials and goods to the peasants in advance as it has been doing, we should also point out the need for the peasants to deliver paddy to the state in advance at a time when the harvest season is in full swing but the state still does not have enough materials, goods and money to give them in return.

The quality of grain is also a major problem to which all local, leading echelons and sectors and the peasants should pay attention in this year's grain procurement.

We procure grain to feed our cadres and soldiers so that they can fight the enemy and do their work. For this reason, grain cannot be sold by the peasants and purchased by the state without regard to its quality. As stipulated by the Council of Ministers, prior to its storage, grain must meet four requirements--water ratio, impurity ratio, hollow grain ratio and mixture ratio--aimed at reducing unnecessary losses and damages; preventing various manifestations of negativism such as theft and pilferage while in the process of delivery, transportation, preservation and milling; and insuring that it still can provide the necessary nutrition to the consumers when it reaches them. It is necessary for all localities to provide close guidance for the peasants and encourage them to assist all procurement stations and the grain sector in satisfactorily fulfilling these requirements.

/Control of the Grain Market/

Whether the state can control a large volume of grain depends partly on the results of the control of the grain market. One of the main measures for the successful control of the grain market is to effectively motivate the peasants to sell all of their surplus paddy to the state and not to private traders. It is necessary for the state to strictly prohibit the speculation and hoarding or transportation of grain for sale in other localities, satisfactorily control the forces of small merchants and the forces engaged in food supply services on a small scale, and strictly prohibit competition in

selling and buying or the illegal export of grain. In addition, the state must quickly put the organized grain market in order. It is necessary for the grain trading forces to rapidly expand their sales network so as to abundantly satisfy the needs for grain by society, take over the control of the grain market and resolutely maintain or lower its prices.

Solving the problems of feeding and clothing a society is a foremost task of constant concern for our party and our state. The present correct policies and measures will pave the way for our country to gradually solve the grain problem with our own forces. In addition to our valuable experiences of the past years and ever-growing agro-industrial production, we have a contingent of cadres and party members who have been tempered by the two wars of resistance and many years of hardship in national construction, and a large working class and a large peasant class which have always been loyal to and united under the leadership of the party. These factors will insure undoubted success in our decisive struggle to basically solve the grain problem in the entire country.

CSO: 4209/212

AGRICULTURE

MEASURES TO IMPROVE QUALITY OF STATE GRAIN PROPOSED

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 29 Dec 82 p 2

[Article by Hong Hanh, of the Ministry of Food: "Limit Grain Losses Due to Storage of Bad Quality Product"]

[Text] Huge Losses

In the field of agricultural production, the average yearly increase in the gross output of grain is usually only between 3 and 4 percent. In our country, however, the average yearly increase in grain output has risen to more than 8 percent in the past 3 years (1979-82). This represents a noteworthy endeavor.

While strenuous efforts are being made to increase the output, the losses incurred after the harvest have been huge—from 20 to 25 percent of the gross output and even between 30 and 35 percent according to [Foreign] specialists.

Losses take different forms and occur from the harvest time and during the distribution process to the consumption stage. The losses caused by the bad quality of grain are the most serious. If the rice put into stores has a high degree of moisture, is mixed with plenty of foreign matters and contains too large a volume of defective—that is, flat or half-full—grains, there will be not only a reduction in the actual quantity of rice but also serious consequences leading to heavy losses. These will include the high cost of preservation, a low ratio of the finished product obtained from the milling process, and rice deterioration (gluten and fat reduction, increased acidity, etc.). Moreover, innumerable negative manifestations must also be taken into account which will begin to develop in society under the pretext that the quality of the grain put into stores had not been guaranteed in the first place.

In view of the amount of grain collected yearly by the state, let us suppose that there is an increase of 1 percent in the quantity of water and another 1 percent in the volume of mixed foreign matters over the currently allowed ratios (generally for the paddy to be put into stores, the regulations of the Ministry of Food stipulates that the quantities of water and foreign matters should not exceed 14 and 1 percent respectively). Even with these low ratios, the state has spent about 200 million dong buying dozens of thousands of tons of water, earth, sand and inedible matters—not to speak of the cost of

"preserving" and transporting these substances and the above-mentioned unforeseeable consequences they may bring about.

Such losses are enormous. We need only to reduce them by 1/3 or a half to get an equivalent of all the bumper crops harvested in the space of a year.

The causes of grain losses can be classified into three principal groups of factors: The first group is composed of inorganic factors such as weather, transportation means, preservation equipment and poisons; the second group comprises biological factors such as birds, rats, grain weevils, insects, fungi and the biochemical changes occurring to the grain itself; the last group is constituted by human factors such as collection policy, managerial system, the organizational standards, specialized abilities and sense of responsibility of cadres and so forth.

In this article, we will discuss some basic causes related to the third group and the largest rice growing area in the country—that is, the Mekong River delta.

As long-standing producers of commodities both in the past and for the present, our peasants have been growing rice mainly for sale and have thus got into the habit of threshing and drying paddy on the fields as soon as it is harvested and then carrying it to the selling place. For this reason, paddy usually has a high moisture ratio—up to 17 or 18 percent—together with 2 to 3 percent (sometimes 5 to 7 percent) for foreign matters which have been mixed with but not removed from paddy. To date, this harvesting habit has not been subjected to any major change because the motivation, propaganda and educational task aimed at forming a new habit has not been carried out thoroughly among the peasantry. In addition, since our current purchasing and selling method is not yet truly rational (in the sense that the same price is paid for both good and bad commodities), it has failed to motivate peasants to overcome difficulties inherent in the drying and winnowing process and has also failed to restrict their concern about personal interests. Consequently, some of them have mixed earth, sand or water with paddy to increase its weight (though this tendency is not prevalent). The movement to fulfill the obligation to deliver grain to the state has a seething mass character in the Mekong River delta and has been satisfactory in many respects. However, certain localities have sometimes paid insufficient attention to qualitative standards because they have impatiently hastened to fulfill the quantitative norms for grain delivery.

Another important cause is the shortage of material-technical bases. Paddy is sundried on roads. Whenever it is collected in large quantities, paddy is heaped up on the ground to sustain the efforts of rain and sunshine and is afterward carried away in separate batches by vehicles and boats. As a result, paddy is exposed to dirt and moisture so that the wasted quantity becomes large. Taking advantage of this negligence, negative practices start to develop and so forth. Generally speaking, drying yards, winnowers, graneries and bags are insufficient and do not correspond to the ability to collect grain.

We all know that after being harvested and threshed, a grain of paddy is still a living organism which continues to breathe and exchange matters. Under the above-mentioned conditions (moisture ratio of more than 14 percent, foreign matters ratio of more than 1 percent and a temperature exceeding 30 degrees C in the preservation environment), the biochemical process in the grain of paddy is activated, breathing becomes stronger and the paddy heap warms up rapidly with the result that nutritious substances in the grain dissolve quickly.

Remedial Measures

In view of the actual situation in the past few years, the Ministry of Food has conducted a research and promulgated temporary standards to be used as a basis for determining whether a paddy is qualified for storage (in the southern provinces only). Based on scientific data, these standards have been set after calculating the economic effects with the aim of limiting the grain losses which have been and are being sustained, especially in the concentrated rice cultivation area of the Mekong River delta. This problem must receive the attention of the local party committees at all echelons and of the local administration both of whom must provide guidance and organize propaganda and educational activities among peasants to make them fully realize their duty to deliver paddy in conformity with qualitative standards. After drawing practical experiences from various localities, it is possible to organize exchanges of views between cadres, party members and mass organizations in the rural areas on the advantages or disadvantages involved in delivering paddy of goods or bad quality into granaries. It is possible to write slogans, to compose folk songs and to carry out propaganda by means of loudspeakers in order to include this topic in the cultural activities in the rural areas and launch an emulation movement to dry and cleanly winnow paddy and to deliver it quickly and neatly into state granaries. To positively help purchasing stations store up grain that meet qualitative standards, peasants must contribute materials to the state, build additional drying yards, entrust experienced persons with the task of inspecting paddy prior to delivery, and mobilize bags and transportation means to carry paddy safely to state granaries, etc.

Displaying a high sense of discipline, purchasing stations must firmly reject bad paddy. Economic and administrative measures must be taken to deal severely with collectives and individuals who refuse to implement regulations on the good quality of paddy delivered to state granaries.

Motivating everyone and every local level and village to make the most of all favorable conditions to dry grain and to winnow it neatly at its origin is an important and most effective task in the whole process of ensuring grain quality and preventing losses.

To encourage peasants to sell good paddy to the state, it is advisable to consider and implement soon the method of purchasing paddy after categorizing it--that is, by paying a high price for good paddy and a low one for bad paddy. The delivery, receipt, preservation and transportation processes must be better organized. Each purchasing station must have a drying yard capable

of accommodating 5 to 7 tons of paddy in case the paddy brought in by peasants does not meet the storage standards or in any emergency case requiring quick action. In areas where granaries are concentrated and where paddy are to be preserved for many days, gradual improvements must be made to meet sanitary conditions and simultaneously to effect fumigation and segregation if necessary, etc. The various stages of the preservation process must be carried out uniformly and must include both preventive and destructive measures [against harmful insects and diseases]. It is advisable to provide areas where granaries are concentrated with certain types of paddy treatment appliances which we have the abilities and conditions to produce such as ventilation winnowers, paddy dryers, dust exhausters, foreign matters removing sifters, automatic rakes and loading and unloading machines, etc. The various localities must set up a testing and analysis network from [provincia] grain services to district grain offices and in granary areas and must equip it with simple and inexpensive essential appliances to carry out regular inspection and to guide and correct activities in the scientific-technical field.

The efforts made to collect grain according to qualitative standards and to reduce postharvest losses to the minimum will be highly significant in the sense that they will contribute to successfully achieving the target set by the Fifth Party Congress which is to solve the grain problem ourselves by using the domestic potentials.

9332

CSO: 4209/190

AGRICULTURE

HA SON BINH RECORDS HIGHEST GRAIN PRODUCTION

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 10 Jan 83 p 2

[Article by Phan Huy: "Ha Son Binh Achieves Self-Sufficiency in Grain"]

[Text] Ha Son Binh Province has recently concluded a year in which it recorded its highest results ever in grain production. For the first time, the province exceeded the "5 ton threshold," producing more than 460,000 tons of grain, thereby far exceeding many other years of bumper harvests and even exceeding the targets of many years.

We who have witnessed and worked together to overcome the many difficulties we have faced over the past years in the process of trying to resolve the locality's food problem have an even deeper understanding of the significance of the results that have been achieved. I remember the time during our period of greatest difficulty when, following unusual flooding, the province produced less than 350 tons of grain during the entire year. The Ha Son Binh Provincial Party Committee set a target of 430,000 tons in order to balance the supply of grain with the population at that time and provide 300 kilograms of grain per capita during the year. Meeting our own need for grain and not requesting grain from the central level, even during times of crop failures, were a major issue that was raised and intensely debated at the Ha Son Binh Party Organization Congress held more than 3 years ago. To a province that has many potentials, such as Ha Son Binh, this target was not the least bit high. Many voices filled with revolutionary sentiment arose from the basic level, voices that were worthy of recognition: "Before we begin producing much grain for contribution to the central level, we should first try to meet our own grain needs!" Everyone clearly recognized our capabilities and our ability to move forward, but when we turned our hands to providing guidance, we met with difficulties and problems caused by numerous restraints and restrictions, which we wanted to eliminate but could not. The realities of everyday life on the basic level helped the persons who were providing guidance to overcome the difficulties being faced by tapping the spirit of collective ownership of the laborers through the expanded use of product contracts within agriculture. Having experienced four production seasons under the new management mechanism, everyone in Ha Son Binh is rather fully aware of the practical results that have been achieved by closely linking the responsibility and the interests of the laborer to the final product. Not

overlooking the weather over the past 2 years, which, generally speaking, has been favorable, especially during the 1982 10th month season, which was a season of weather so favorable that it is rarely seen, the production installations honestly reported that more than 90 percent of farm families exceeded their contract quotas by 15 percent or more. In the lowlying area of Ung Hoa, the average family has exceeded its contract quota by 100 kilograms each season; in 1982, the district increased its output by nearly 6,000 tons of paddy, the equivalent of the paddy output produced by three large villages in the space of 1 year. It is truly difficult to say precisely how much of an impact the new management mechanism within agriculture has had upon the specific realities of production; however, it is possible to make comparisons with years in which the weather was better and more supplies were available than in 1981 and 1982 but more than a few localities within the province still experienced crop failures because they "plowed and transplanted late," thus causing thousands of hectares to lie fallow. Between 1976 and 1980, the annual average grain output of the province was 370,000 tons, with the highest output, 410,000 tons, occurring in 1979. In 1981, Ha Son Binh produced 420,000 tons, thereby exceeding its annual average for the 5 previous years by 50,000 tons. In 1982, the average annual output for the 5 previous years was exceeded by 25 percent, that is, increased by more than 90,000 tons. During the 10th month season, all seven lowland districts recorded rice yields ranging from 29 to 35 quintals per hectare, an increase of 6 to 8 quintals per hectare compared to the 1981 10th month season.

As a result of four consecutive bumper harvests, each one larger than the one preceding it, the countryside has begun to have a "full rice bowl." The between-season grain shortage has been overcome. The special concern of the province has been how to provide a full supply of grain to the more than 350,000 persons within the non-agricultural production sector. Although it is now known as a province that meets and exceeds its grain obligation each year and as the province that is always the first in the country to deliver its grain to the central level; prior to 1980, the central level had to annually supply to Ha Son Binh Province slightly less than 20,000 tons of rice. Endeavoring to achieve self-sufficiency and eventually build grain reserves has been a long and sharp struggle with the soil, with nature and even with ourselves because everyone has had to try to abandon the thinking of waiting for and relying upon others. Between 1976 and 1980, Ha Son Binh annually deposited in state granaries about 50,000 tons of paddy while requiring nearly 60,000 tons of rice from the state each year. This deficit indicates that the difficulty being encountered by the province with grain was truly not small. In 1981, following two seasons in which product contracts were implemented and bumper harvests were recorded, the province mobilized more than 72,000 tons; however, compared to its grain needs, it still lacked nearly 10,000 tons. This answered those who skeptically asked why there was not enough rice to sell to cadres, manual workers and civil servants when the press was reporting that a bumper crop had been recorded! At the time this article was being written, Ha Son Binh had exceeded its grain mobilization quota for 1982, depositing in granaries a total of more than 85,000 tons. With the grain now in granaries, Ha Son Binh can, for the first time in many

years of arduous effort, meet its own need for grain and provide a full supply of grain to the armed forces of the province and the nearly 20,000 persons participating in the construction of the Hoa Binh Hydroelectric Power Plant on the Da River.

As we begin 1983, Ha Son Binh is focusing its efforts on meeting the target of the plan: 480,000 tons of grain (400,000 tons of paddy and 80,000 tons of subsidiary food crops, in paddy equivalent). We maintain that this target is a very modest one in view of the capabilities that have emerged. At present, the province has seven lowland districts that are recording yields of approximately 6 tons and one mountain district that is averaging 5 tons of paddy per hectare for the entire year. However, having completed two rice harvests, many persons still acknowledge that rice yields could be still higher in these localities. The reasons for this "could" are the shortcomings in the guidance of the intensive cultivation of rice, which is truly not decisive and has not created models of intensive cultivation, and the very wide gap between the prices recording the highest yields and the places recording the lowest yields. Clearly aware of their shortcomings, the persons engaged in agriculture within Ha Son Binh realize that they still have much potential for rapidly increasing the total output of rice by means of building high yield, large-scale rice growing areas and making investments in depth in the lowlying area in which the yields of both rice crops are low on more than 20,000 hectares. Only by making investments in the intensive cultivation of rice is it possible to achieve a large grain output. It is encouraging to note that, on this new front, the district level is moving forward and the provincial level is truly attaching importance to mobilizing the combined strength of the entire province to firmly resolve the food problems for all society. In 1982, Ha Son Binh supplied to its farmers more than 25,000 tons of nitrogen fertilizer, an increase of nearly 8,000 tons compared to 1981, by exporting agricultural products in exchange for nitrogen in order to carry out the intensive cultivation of rice and subsidiary food crops. Although the quantity of supplies and fertilizer that it has been receiving has not met the requirements of intensive cultivation, Ha Son Binh has procured supplies and fertilizer on its own by means of local exports and imports and is charting a correct course for the years ahead. The province has adopted the policy of giving the highest priority to the purchase of fertilizer in order to gradually create a reserve supply of fertilizer so that the initiative can be taken in allocating nitrogen for intensive cultivation, thereby gradually eliminating the problem of fertilizer not being available when it is needed and not arriving until rice is heading.

In grain production over the past 3 years in Ha Son Binh Province, there has been one problem deserving of concern, namely, the fact that subsidiary food crop output has declined significantly as rice output has risen at a rapid rate. In 1982, the province's paddy output increased by 45,000 tons compared to 1981 but its subsidiary food crop output, in paddy equivalent, declined by 4,500 tons. As many persons still think, this was not entirely due to "ignoring subsidiary food crops as a result of bumper rice harvests," rather, there are many problems concerning the decline in the subsidiary food crop output that must be resolved in a reasonable manner and at an early date, such as the investment policy, the price policy, management and so forth. The policy concerning the use of subsidiary food crops in meals and within the

processing industry is not clear and does not provide incentive for producers or consumers. One fact that must be clearly stated is that the average annual amount of grain per capita in Ha Son Binh would be dozens of kilograms higher than it is now had the output of subsidiary food crops not declined. And, in the grain stores of the province, we surely would not have to use cash to compensate for the subsidiary food crops that should be distributed under grain ration standards each month to persons not engaged in agricultural production.

7809

CSO: 4209/205

.

AGRICULTURE

TIEN GIANG EXTENDS RICE-GROWING AREA, USES LABOR BETTER

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 20 Dec 82 p 2

[Article by Tran Quoc Khai: "Tien Giang Province Extends the High-Yield Rice-Growing Area and Uses the Social Labor Force"]

[Text] In 1981, Tien Giang Province had a grain crop-growing area of only 120,000 hectares and a population of 1.3 million people. The average per capita rice-growing area was only close to 940 square meters. This figure was even lower for such zones as Cai Be, Cai Lay, Cho Gao, My Tho, etc. Located in the heart of the vast western section of Nam Bo and having the characteristics of a province in the Red River delta, how did Tien Giang exploit its strengths in agriculture?

Extending Rice-Growing Area

Tien Giang farmers had practiced intensive rice cultivation before. Decades ago they had been growing two rice crops per year and using organic fertilizer in ricefields already. But the fact that they were working in a spontaneous and unscientific manner lately resulted in rice crop yield reaching up to only 5.6 tons/hectare/year in the recent years. And the area that offered high yield was also small.

To fully exploit the land to obtain high rice crop yield and large volume of production within a short time, Tien Giang built a high-yield rice-growing area extending from 10,000 to 40,000 hectares. It invited agricultural scientists and technicians to the province to help it to conduct surveys, to make new production plans, to determine season and crop cultivation patterns, to make rational investment in making fertilizers, etc. It offered the new production plan for extensive discussion among the people, whose backbone was production solidarity teams and production collectives. To get new rice varieties for planting in a large area, with the motto "The state and the people work together," in the past 2 years Tien Giang was setting up a network of seed-producing teams within the solidarity teams and production collectives (the

number of seed-producing teams went up from 121 to 167). As a result, the new high-yield rice variety quickly became the main-crop variety of the entire province. The Tien Giang high-yield rice-growing area was extended to 10,000 hectares in the 1980-1981 winter-spring season and 40,000 hectares in the 1981-1982 winter-spring season. Thanks to the application of progressive techniques having to do with seeds, fertilizers and water conservancy and the rational season and crop cultivation patterns, the rice crop yield increased from 5.6 to 8.4 tons per hectare per 2 crops; the quantities of paddy sold to the state were raised from 400 kilograms to 1,380 kilograms per hectare. The high-yield rice-growing area alone accounted for 87 percent of the total grain-mobilizing capacity of the entire province. The average per capita grain production increased from 420 kilograms (in 1980) to 510 kilograms (in 1982).

The 55 villages in the high-yield rice-growing area this year have fully completed the 3 socialist projects in the countryside: building schools, public health stations and cultural centers. Not only did the high-yield rice-growing area result from a concentration of energy on scientifically and creatively exploiting the potential of land, but it also reflected the superiority of the new production relationships in the countryside.

Mobilizing Social Labor Force

Tien Giang has 500,000 social laborers. Although this labor force is large, in average an agricultural laborer works less than 100 days per year. The number of agricultural laborers remaining idle is still quite large. There also are hundreds of thousands of idle laborers in urban areas, a situation that gives rise to many negative aspects in society. How do we organize, exploit and use this very large labor force to serve agricultural production, to carry out welfare programs and to build the new socialist countryside?

To link transformation with construction, to create lots of products for society and to make labor an obligation of all people -- those were the urgent matters Tien Giang was to face. It issued decisions about the socialist labor system and obligation for different kinds of labor in the locality. To mobilize the socialist labor for carrying out agricultural production projects and building the new countryside in the long term was put under provincial, district and municipal management. In addition to short-term labor, there also was long-term labor required from those who were of military-obligation age but were allowed to remain in the locality because of some inaptitude -- they would be sent to build the province's state farms or to take part in opening new land for new economic zones in a period of 3 years. This policy was totally in conformity with sentiment and reason, for during the war of resistance many revolutionary families had been contributing men and wealth to the country's common undertaking and now many of their sons went away to help defend the fatherland;

meanwhile, there were families that had not yet contributed to the common undertaking, had had several members remaining at home and now, as they had to fulfill the labor obligation, should contribute to building their native land and the country.

As the result of that manner of working, in only the first 6 months of 1982, the province was able to mobilize 4.2 million man-days, or 3 times as much as the labor mobilized in the entire year of 1981. It organized large manual work sites that attracted hundreds of thousands of laborers for doing water conservancy work, building rural roads, opening new land in the alkaline-soil area north of Nguyen Van Tiep Canal, building state farms specialized in growing pineapple, jute, sugar cane, etc. Thanks to this manner of organizing labor, in only 2 months it succeeded in completing an important road 44 kilometers long running along this canal, thus creating favorable conditions for goods and people's movement, as well as for cultural and educational development, in the former revolutionary base area, where there had been many difficulties in production and the standard of living. The province as a whole completed 152 large and small water conservancy works. When they evaluated the results that have been obtained, the province's leaders pointed out that as the result of an appropriate policy on labor system and obligation that conforms with both sentiment and reason, the province has been able to mobilize its labor to carry out for the first time the policy of "the state and the people work together," has exploited the local labor potential for raising crop yield through intensive cultivation, has carried out welfare programs and has been building the new socialist countryside.

In the last few years, Tien Giang had new mass movements and good working methods aimed at moving its agricultural production forward at a faster rate. The way the province is now exploiting the two strengths -- land and labor -- is also a creative one under the locality's actual conditions.

Tien Giang is drawing some experience in order to calculate a more effective way to invest in further extending the high-yield rice-growing area and to be striving in the next 2 years to obtain a rice yield of 10 tons per hectare per year. It is launching a movement to make green manure and to grow leguminous plants as a companion crop in the two rice crops in order to boost soil fertility, as well as to actively open new land so as to extend the areas devoted to short- and long-term industrial crops. Tien Giang Province is also drawing some experience in order to mobilize the social labor in an effective manner in the process of rationally arranging and distributing this force, for the purpose of serving production and life in the countryside better and better everyday.

AGRICULTURE

GRAIN PRODUCTION PROBLEMS EXAMINED

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 16 Dec 82 p 2

[Article by Huu Tho: "II Society's Food Problem; Prospects and Difficulties"*]

[Text] Resolution of society's food problem is both an urgent and basic problem of the economic-social mission. This most important mission must be resolved in an integrated manner, comprising at least the following aspects: production and processing, a population growth policy, a policy of increasing the number of non-agricultural laborers and distribution and circulation. These problems must be resolved in a synchronized manner following an overall strategy. Any problem which is not well-resolved will immediately adversely affect the living standards of a portion of the population in a number of areas even though production is good.

This article will touch only on the problem of production because in the final word, production is the source determining supply of the most important needs in the lives of the people.

We must properly evaluate the agricultural production achievements made because they are the results of the line, course and policy of our party and state and of the creative labor efforts of tens of millions of laborers.

The year 1982 was one more year of a bumper grain crop. Output exceeded planned levels by about 200,000 tons in paddy equivalent. Thus, this was the second year in a row in which grain production planned levels were exceeded. In 1981, there was an increase over the previous year of 760,000 tons of grain in paddy equivalent and this year, the increase over last year 1.1 million tons. This rate of increase is fairly high compared with the overall rate of Southeast Asia in which the country with the highest increase was only 4 percent.

By analyzing available data, we can clearly recognize the following points:

First: In total grain output achieved, the increase rate of rice is very good, plus or minus 8 percent annually since beginning the third 5-year plan. Last year, the increase was 966,000 tons over the previous year and this year, 1.2 million tons over the previous year. Subsidiary food crops meanwhile are declining.

Second: Because the level of planned cultivated area was not achieved, the increase in grain output is primarily due to increased yields. Output increase by intensive cultivation is a pleasant fact and the proper course but cultivated area failing to reach planned levels is an item which requires analysis. In the intensive cultivation course, not just any crop yield should be increased.

Third: We have formed "high output" rice areas throughout the country and in each area. Data from the tenth-month crop is not yet complete but during the winter-spring crop with 20.1 percent of the area, provinces in the Mekong Delta contributed 26.5 percent of the rice output of the entire nation, worthy of the title as one of the two key areas of greatest grain output throughout the nation. There appeared in provinces along the coast of central Trung Bo districts working three rice crops with a yield of more than 10 tons per hectare and two crops achieving 7 to 8 tons. In the Red River Delta, the provinces of Thai Binh and Hai Hung maintained their tradition of leading in intensive cultivation. However, a new occurrence requiring analysis is the rapid advance of units with inherently low yields. While generally speaking, the entire Red River Delta during this tenth-month crop increased output by 15.3 percent compared with last year, Haiphong City had an increase of 22.8 percent; Ha Son Binh had an increase of 29.3 percent and Ha Nam Ninh an increase of 19.3 percent. Nghe Tinh Province with severe storms still achieved a grain output nearly equal to last year. The uniformity between provinces, districts in one province and fields in one cooperative was an important contribution to the grain output increase. This has not only an economic but also a social significance.

Above are the problems worthy of analysis in order not only to recognize the trends but also the capabilities for continuing to rise.

Those following grain production in our country recently had many discussions on the problem of subsidiary food crops. Subsidiary food crop production is declining, from 2.6 million tons to 2.5 million and this year 2.4 million tons in paddy equivalent. This means 2 years of decline in a row with a decline during the past year of about 100,000 tons in paddy equivalent.

During the first 5-year plan, grain output increase was primarily due to an increase in subsidiary food crops. The annual rate of increase during that plan was 4.5 percent in grain output with rice accounting for only 2.5 percent and subsidiary food crops up to 18.2 percent. Beginning this 5-year plan, the situation is reversed.

This problem must be analyzed in a more detailed and specific manner because there are many opinions. The decline in subsidiary food crops is first of all due to a decline in cultivated area in nearly areas but each area has different causes. On the basis of my research, I wish to present the following matters on causes leading to the continuous decline in subsidiary food crops during the past few years.

In a number of midland and highland areas, after several years of working field expansion subsidiary food crops on various types of sloping land, thinking began that it was necessary to limit the expansion of the cultivated area at a fixed slope degree and begin intensive cultivation. Subsidiary food crops are grown on dry land, usually in locations without an initiative in water sources. Consequently, intensive cultivation of subsidiary food crops on sloping land is

not easy and is costly and therefore, it is impossible to produce a great deal at one time if a cultivated area with stabilized high yields is desired.

In the Red River Delta area, winter grain output during some years has achieved up to 300,000 tons in paddy equivalent. With grain on multicropped land, the provision of products during the pre-harvest period is extremely valuable. However, crops during the past few years have declined. Concerning the objective conditions, these 2 years had late rain which is unfavorable to winter crop production. Subjectively, the policy of encouraging the winter crop was abandoned (primarily nitrogen fertilizer supply), a policy of nitrogen fertilizer investment was adopted which exchanged grain and goods (but not exchanging nitrogen fertilizer for western or sweet potatoes) and the cost of gasoline, oil and electricity rose so the farmers calculated their profits and losses and a number did not wish to do a great deal on the winter crop. If we correct a number of policies for consistency, the winter crop in the provinces of the Red River Delta can still well-develop.

In a number of locations, land growing subsidiary food crops was shifted to rice, peanuts and tobacco, more profitable types of crops.

In a number of specialized cultivation areas or in many locations in the midlands and highlands, difficulties were encountered in processing, transportation and consumption. The harvest of subsidiary food crops was in accordance with the agricultural season but marketing and transportation were imprompt. A number of preprocessed (dried, baked, sliced, etc.) prices were not yet proper. Consequently, in some locations manioc has been left for up to 2 years with no laborers for handling and no locations for consumption while the farmers had no land for planting new manioc.

Therefore, the problems of subsidiary food crops must be brought forth and resolved in a uniform and specific manner in each area and for each type of crop so subsidiary food crops still have a capability to develop. Nevertheless, area should not be rapidly increased and emphasis must be placed in the direction of intensive cultivation. The average yields of many types of subsidiary food crops are still low with corn achieving only 11.2 quintals per hectare, sweet potatoes 57 quintals, manioc 76 quintals, western potatoes 80 quintals and taro 129 quintals. Increasing yields in order to increase subsidiary food crop output is a realistic capability.

When discussing and summarizing the previous the previous 5-year plan, a number have asked the question: because during the past few years, grain output has increased primarily due to an increase in cultivated area, should we begin field expansion or not? This idea cannot be accepted because we cannot ask for the yields on multicropped fields and new soil at the same time as the yields on main crop fields and mature soil and therefore, an average yield for calculation cannot be obtained. Nevertheless, this matter also is worthy of thought.

During the past few years, although we have not been pleased concerning the level of intensive cultivation, we have clearly recognized that the course to follow is intensive cultivation. We have used a number of new varieties but the material and technical base has made an unappreciable increase and generally speaking is only a better application of presently available progressive technology.

Defining progressive technology to increase yields is the job of the scientist and technician and of all the laborers. However, wide dissemination of this progressive technology is a social and management problem. Here is clearly recognized that the specific economic organization forms and policies have an extremely important role. During the past 2 years, we have recognized clear tasks influencing the intensive cultivation of grain, first of all rice, as follows:

First: The product contract system has finally led to the laborers creating a power stimulating the masses to enthusiastically achieve technical methods if fully disseminated in order to conduct intensive cultivation.

Second: The economic contract policy between organization and scientists as regards production units has created a better attachment between science-technology and production and between socialist knowledge and the farmer. Although this has not been carried out a great deal, is not fully in accordance with policy and presently has new complexities, it is the proper course.

Third: With promulgated policy, more control has been assigned to the local area; consequently, many locations have not waited, self-supplying a portion of their needs in fertilizers, insecticides and petroleum products, adopted importing and exporting and economic unity activities and promptly supported agricultural production.

These are new factors assuring the development trend. Many think that if investment is greater and more concentrated, economic effectiveness would be still higher. Although coordinated activity between industry, circulation and distribution with agriculture has made progress, difficulties still exist which limit the control in production of the local area and the primary level unit.

In speaking of the food problem of society and of each family, one important problem cannot be forgotten. It is the close coordination between the collective economy and that of the family.

For many years, we have neglected the family economy. Only during the past 2 years has the proper recognition returned. Many scientists have set forth examples. People say G.P.P. (gardens, ponds and pens) in the lowlands. People say F.G.H.P. (fields, gardens, housing and ponds) in the midlands and highlands. In reality, in villages from the lowlands to the midlands and highlands, many gardens, ponds and domestic animal pens are seen.

In the gardens are fruit and grain crops.

In the ponds are fish and fish have high productivity. On the embankments are grain crops. And in spaces over the water are food crops growing on trellises.

Fruit growing areas have actually been formed by combining the small gardens in each family in the crowded and heavily populated land in the middle of the Red River Delta.

Products of the family economy are becoming increasingly richer, contributing no small part to the diet of society.

Although fairly good progress has been made in grain production, there are still many difficulties. No matter what the progress, grain production still only supplies a little more than 280 kilograms of grain per capita in 1 year. While initial progress has been made in transportation, it is still not truly good. There are also a number of areas which cannot help encounter difficulties. The increase in population is still great. The weather is still irregular and bumper crop years must compensate for years in which the crop is lost. Normally, our country must calculate a rate of two favorable years for one year of difficulty. The experience in Thai Binh Province of establishing a grain reserve is extremely worthy of study in order that each local area can take the initiative in production and life under any situation which may occur.

* Continued from NHAN DAN 15 Dec 82

7300

CSO: 4209/210

AGRICULTURE

QUANG NINH INCREASES MARINE PRODUCTS OUTPUT

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 10 Jan 83 p 2

[Article by Tam Huyen: "Quang Ninh Records a Bumper Harvest of Marine Products"]

[Text] During the years from 1975 to 1977, Quang Ninh's fishing industry developed strongly; the industry was skilled in fishing and ranked among the best of the provinces in the North in terms of the purchasing of marine products. From 1978 to 1981, the province's fishing industry declined, reaching the lowest level in 1981, a year of low labor productivity. The fish catch only amounted to slightly more than 6 tons [as published] and the state only purchased 3,100 tons, which was not enough to supply fish and fish sauce to the cadres, manual workers and troops of the province.

The above mentioned decline was partially the result of the war unleashed by the Chinese expansionists, as a result of which more than one-half the labor force skilled in fishing was lost, the organization of production was thrown into a state of chaos and fishing grounds were reduced in size; however, a more important reason was that the management organization and policies did not stimulate production and, in some cases, even restricted the development of production. Cooperatives incurred heavy losses. Laborers and their families live very difficult lives. Many persons left cooperatives to work on their own and sell fish and shrimp on the free market.

In early 1982, the Standing Committee of the Quang Ninh Provincial Party Committee adopted practical policies designed to resolve the problems being encountered by the fishing industry. The marine products sector has focused its efforts on guiding the various measures involved in organizing production, bringing the management mechanism up to date and abolishing the heavy subsidization that exists within the fishing industry; at the same time, it has been determined to resolve those inefficiencies that current policies do not.

As regards the organization of production, the most progress has been made in the struggle to become the masters of the sea. Depending upon the season and the type of fishing being practiced, fishing is carried out in lines of 40 to 50 ships that remain at sea for many days in coastal and offshore fishing

grounds in order to push Chinese fishing ships far out to sea, protect fishing grounds and protect the commercial waters bordering China. New ship construction has been organized rather well, ships and boats are repaired rapidly and fishermen are promptly supplied with gasoline and fishing gear. The purchasing, processing and storage of products, especially the processing of frozen shrimp for exportation and salted fish, have been organized rather well. Noteworthy progress has been made by strengthening and improving in-shore fishing (using square nets, square dipping nets and winnow nets deployed in three layers to net shrimp) and by developing offshore fishing by coordinating many different types of fishing in each fishing ground, within each production unit and one each ship and boat so that fishing operations can be carried out throughout the year. Mention must also be made of the coordination of fishing operations and the cultivation and planting of marine products in thousands of hectares of salt water and brackish water in the flood plain and swamps along the seacoast.

As regards the organization of management, we have, on the basis of the production and product purchasing plan, assigned a stable obligation to each cooperative governing the harvesting and the purchasing of marine products. The cooperatives enter into product contracts governing fishing and purchasing with each type fishing vessel, contracts that are closely linked to the responsibility of each labor (they no longer have the obligation to sell 70 percent of their catch, rather, their obligation has been stabilized at 50 percent of their catch: 135-140 horsepower ships, which catch 120 tons, sell 60 tons; 90 horsepower ships, which catch 110 tons, sell 55 tons; 23-33 horsepower ships, which catch 100 tons, sell 50 tons and so forth).

With fuel priced at 5 dong per kilogram (three units of fish for every one unit of diesel fuel) and grain selling at 5 dong per kilogram (3.5 units of fish for every one unit of grain), the average selling price of fish is 5.2 dong per kilogram. If the price of fuel rises to 7.5 dong per kilogram, the price of fish will have to be raised accordingly. The province has permitted the expanded utilization of purchases at negotiated prices coupled with the trading of materials (for about 30 percent of the quota which, in essence, is a form of price support amounting to 20-30 percent of the directed price) and negotiated purchases not involving the trading of materials (for about 20 percent of the fish catch). As regards shrimp, nearly 150 tons are purchased solely on the basis of negotiated prices and sent for refrigerated processing in order to be exported. During the final months of 1982, permission was given to procure additional goods (primarily cloth) for two-way trade with fishermen. Many of the products that were left over were sold at negotiated prices by cooperatives and production teams, distributed among cooperative members or sold at retail counters established by cooperatives and production teams on the organized market. The organization of purchasing has been improved and now has a direct, reciprocal impact upon production. The Marine Products Supply and Marketing Corporation has organized nine area purchasing stores (two of which are on the islands) and two mobile purchasing units at sea. The Marine Products Corporation has also implemented a system of purchasing product contracts for each laborer, who receive a bonus of 30 to 50 percent of their average wage for meeting their plan quotas, a bonus of 100 to 120 percent for exceeding their plan quotas and also share in the profits of the business. For this reason, purchasing units have remained at sea for many

days and utilized the services of fishermen who are familiar with channels to make purchases on the small islands and carry out contracts to purchase shrimp and fish from naval troops and units from friendly provinces that fish in the waters off Quang Ninh. In mid-1982, the province boldly assigned to the coastal districts the responsibility for strengthening the cooperatives, organizing offshore fishing lines and purchasing products both near and on the shore, thereby bringing about a new change: the cooperatives have been strengthened well, fishing has improved, many more products are being purchased and the incidence of many negative phenomena has declined.

As a result of these efforts, new factors have appeared within the Quang Ninh fishing industry and changes for the better are occurring. The industry ended 1982 with a catch of 11,000 tons of shrimp and fish, 10 percent more than planned and 4,500 tons more than in 1981; it purchased 5,400 tons, 8 percent more than planned and 2,300 tons more than in 1981; it processed 3 million liters of fish sauce, 100 percent of its plan quota; and it prepared enough salted fish to make 3.5 million liters of fish sauce in 1983. Some 380,000 dollars worth of marine products were exported, 6 percent more than planned and an increase of 180,000 dollars compared to 1981. All six enterprises of the marine products sector (the Marine Products Corporation, the Cam Pha Fish Sauce Enterprise, the Dai Yen Fish Sauce Enterprise, the Tien Yen Boat and Ship Enterprise, the Tien Phong State-Operated Pisciculture Enterprise and the Cua Ong State-Operated Fishing Enterprise) completed their plans. The two districts of Hai Ninh and Quang Ha, in which the Tien Thanh, Tran Hung Dao, Dai Quang, Quang Tien, Hai Tan, Hai Xuan, Ngoc Tien, Minh Hai and other cooperatives, met and exceeded their plan quotas on both fishing and the sale of products to the state. The marine products sector provided an adequate supply of fish sauce and fish under ration standards to the cadres, manual workers and troops within the province. By means of exports, the province imported much equipment, gasoline and oil to support the fishing industry, tens of thousands of meters of cloth were added to the province's supply of commodities and a profit was earned for the first time, with approximately 2.5 million dong being submitted for inclusion in the budget. The income of cooperatives more than doubled compared to the previous year and the average laborer earned 1,000 dong per month. The income of the manual workers within the marine products sector was more than twice as high as their basic wage.

The Quang Ninh Provincial Party Committee has highly evaluated the new factors that have brought about these changes in the fishing industry and has full confidence that the plan targets for the next few years will be met: catching 15,000 to 16,000 tons of marine products, with the state controlling 7,000 to 8,000 tons and 1 million dollars worth of marine products being exported. Not content to merely "use marine products to raise marine products," Quang Ninh will "move forward on the basis of its coal and fish" by means of its existing labor, arable land, forest resources, ocean waters and material-technical bases, by means of establishing an economic association with the central enterprises and neighboring provinces, by means of exports and imports and by means of effective assistance from the state in order to steadily develop the Quang Ninh economy in a comprehensive manner.

7809

CSO: 4209/205

AGRICULTURE

QUANG NINH SHRIMP EXPORTS REPORTED

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 10 Jan 83 p 2

[Article by Nghiem Thanh: "Eighty-Five Percent of Quang Ninh's Exported Shrimp Graded Grade 1"]

[Text] The Quang Ninh Marine Products Service has taken many positive steps to coordinate the harvesting, purchasing and processing of shrimp for exportation within a tightly structured and efficient production line. In order to make the best possible use of its ocean resources of high economic value, the province carefully surveyed the various shrimp grounds and shrimp reserves. Having researched the traditional types of nets, the province improved them to be more suitable and provided guidance in the use of three-layer winnow nets while taking the initiative in providing supplies, fuel and essential consumer goods to fishermen. It has mobilized a large force consisting of twenty-six 33 horsepower boats and hundreds of sailboats and boats of collectives and even self-employed persons to harvest shrimp. Importance has also been attached to trapping, raising and fattening shrimp in salt water and brackish water pools along the seacoast in Yen Hung District, as a result of which nearly 1,000 hectares of water surface complete with a system of sturdy dikes are being used to raise shrimp. As a result, in 1982, the shrimp harvest exceeded 100 tons; average productivity was 3,000 kilograms when harvesting was done by mechanized equipment and 600 kilograms when harvesting was done by medium-size rowboats. Because refrigeration equipment has not yet been installed on ships, Quang Ninh is using insulated sheet metal containers to store shrimp and is encouraging, by means of bonuses, the persons who purchase shrimp to keep shrimp fresh and maintain their grade one quality. Special attention has been given to processing in order to reduce the red tape in intermediary shipping and receiving and insure that shrimp are sent immediately for processing and are processed in the technically correct manner, retain their full nutritional value and meet food product qualitative requirements. Quang Ninh has discontinued the practice of cutting the heads off shrimp and only produces frozen shrimp in three forms: unpeeled shrimp, peeled shrimp, which is the type that most customers prefer, and a very few young shrimp. As a result, the percentage of grade 1 shrimp has risen to 85 percent, which exceeds the grading standard assigned by the state and has resulted in Quang Ninh being awarded two medals.

AGRICULTURE

BRIEFS

NORTHERN PROVINCES' GRAIN COLLECTION--As of 25 December 1982, the northern provinces have put into storehouses 465,877 tons of grain converted to paddy equivalent, or 68 percent of the norm set for collection in the 1982 tenth-month rice crop. That figure included collection of agricultural tax and purchases of within-obligation grain which accounted for 90.9 percent of the goal set in the plan and nonobligation purchases and exchanges which accounted for 51.1 percent of the goal. Three provinces in former Zone 4 reached 100.3 percent of the total goal; 8 delta and midland provinces, 62.3 percent; and 8 highland provinces, 46.7 percent. As compared with the same period in 1981, the rate of grain collection in the tenth-month rice season this year was higher: the absolute quantity showed an increase of nearly 160,000 tons and the percentage as compared with the plan norm an increase of 15.5 percent. [Text] [Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 30 Dec 82 p 1] 5598

CSO: 4209/191

HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE

UNOFFICIAL CULTURAL MATERIALS ENTERING COUNTRY

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 18 Dec 82 p 4

[Article: "Discipline in Circulation of Cultural Material"]

[Text] Recently, a number of locations have not strictly complied with state instructions on film management and registration as a film projection unit. A number of agencies, enterprises, cooperatives, schools, etc. have formed film projection units without registering in accordance with state instructions and have not received their films from the Vietnam Film Distribution and Export Corporation but have arbitrarily rented film from unofficial sources, including foreign agencies and individuals. These "infiltrated" rented films have not passed through the review and distribution approval procedures of the National Film Review Council. Some local film projection companies have even arbitrarily ordered film from foreign film export companies with the intention of distributing the film themselves in their own local area and renting them to other local areas. A number of hotel agencies have organized the showing of "tape films" illegally imported from foreign countries. In the markets, there have also appeared calendars, records, music tapes, pictures and postcards from foreign countries and the old regime which have impure themes.

Local areas must strive to halt the distribution of cultural materials by unofficial routes contrary to the circular of the Secretariat of the Party Central Committee on film dissemination and the instruction of the Party Central Committee on strengthening export leadership and management. All types of cultural materials must be more firmly managed, promptly halting and eliminating cultural materials of a reactionary, decadent and psychological warfare nature.

7300

CSO: 4209/210

BIOGRAPHIC

INFORMATION ON VIETNAMESE PERSONALITIES

[The following information on Vietnamese personalities has been extracted from Vietnamese-language sources published in Hanoi, unless otherwise indicated. Asterisked job title indicates that this is the first known press reference to this individual functioning in this capacity.]

Dương Xuân An [ZUWOWNG XUAAN AN]

*Member of the Secretariat of the Vietnam Confederation of Trade Unions; on 7 Jan 83 he presented an award to a construction unit at the Pha Lai site. (LAO DONG 13 Jan 83 p 2)

Nguyễn Hữu An [NGUYEENX HUWUX AN], *Lieutenant General

Recently he represented the Standing Committee on Motivation, Ministry of National Defense at a conference of the 5th, 7th and 9th Military Regions in Da Nang. (QUAN DOI NHAN DAN 11 Jan 83 p 1)

Nguyễn Văn Biên [NGUYEENX VAWN BIEEN]

Vice Chairman of the State Planning Commission; Member of the Central Economic Zoning Committee; his article "Some Current Problems in Promoting Zoning and Planning" appeared in the cited source. (TAP CHI KE HOACH HOA Jun 81 p 9)

Dương Kế Chử [ZUWOWNG KEES CHUW]

*Chairman of the People's Committee, Quang Ha District, Quang Ninh Province; his article "Establishing a Plan and Providing Guidance in Plan Implementation in Quyen Ha District" appeared in the cited source. (TAP CHI KE HOACH HOA Jun 81 p 33)

Nguyễn Chân [NGUYEENX CHAAN]

Alternate Member of the Central Committee of the VCP; Minister of Mines and Coal; *Chairman of the Vietnam-Poland Friendship Association; on 20 Dec 82 he was present when this association made its first appearance. (NHAN DAN 21 Dec 82 p 1)

Nông Quốc Chân [NOONG QUOOC CHAANS]

Vice Minister of Culture; *Vice Chairman of the Vietnam-Poland Friendship Association; on 20 Dec 82 his name appeared on the list of officials of this new association. (NHAN DAN 21 Dec 82 pp 1, 4)

Cao Đăng Chiêm [CAO DAWNG CHIEEMS]

Member of the Central Committee of the VCP; Vice Minister of the Interior; recently he attended a conference on building up the public security force in Ho Chi Minh City. (NHAN DAN 12 Jan 83 p 1)

Nguyễn Trinh Cơ [NGUYEENX TRINH COW]

Publisher of the journal of internal medicine NGOAI KHOA; his name appeared on the masthead of the cited publication. (NGOAI KHOA Sep-Oct 81 inside front cover)

Nguyễn Việt Cường [NGUYEENX VIEETJ CUWOWNGF]

*Head of the Synthesized and Economic Statistics Department, Statistics General Department; on 15-22 Nov 80 he participated in meetings with a visiting delegation from the Statistics Department, Czechoslovak Socialist Republic. (TAP CHI THONG KE Dec 80 p 1)

Hoàng Diễm [HOANGF ZIEEMX]

Deputy Chief of Cabinet, Statistics General Department; on 15-22 Nov 80 he participated in meetings with a visiting delegation of the Statistics Department, Czechoslovak Socialist Republic. (TAP CHI THONG KE Dec 80 p 1)

Phạm Thị Ngọc Đào [PHAMJ THIJ NGOCJ DAOF]

*Head of the Business and Livelihood Statistics Department, Statistics General Department; her article reviewing 25 years of business statistics appeared in the cited source. (TAP CHI THONG KE Jan 81 p 16)

Nguyễn Đăng [NGUYEENX DAWNGF], *Senior Colonel

His article "Experiences in Recapitulating Issuance of Party Member Cards" appeared in the cited source. (QUAN DOI NHAN DAN 30 Dec 82 p 2)

Trương Kỳ Đức [TRUWOWNG KYF DUWCS]

*Head of the Communications and Transportation Service, Ho Chi Minh City; on 27 Nov 82 he attended a meeting marking the 20th anniversary of the cited source. (GIAO THONG VAN TAI 10 Dec 82 p 2)

Nguyễn Hải [NGUYEENX HAIR]

*Head of the Plans and Finance Department, State Planning Commission; on 15-22 Nov 80 he participated in discussions with a visiting delegation from the Statistics Department, Czechoslovak Socialist Republic. (TAP CHI THONG KE Dec 80 p 1)

Nguyễn Nam Hải [NGUYEENX NAM HAIR]

Vice Minister of Communications and Transportation; *Vice Chairman of the Vietnam-Poland Friendship Association; on 20 Dec 82 his name appeared on the list of officials of this new association. (NHAN DAN 21 Dec 82 pp 1, 4)

Lê Quang Huy [LEE QUANG HUY]

*Deputy Head of the Forecasting Department, Statistics General Department; his article "Forecasting in Capital Construction" appeared in the cited source. (TAP CHI KE HOACH HOA May 81 p 9)

Hoàng Văn Khanh [HOANGF VAWN KHANHS], Major General

His article commemorating the accomplishments of the Air Defense Forces against the B.52 raids of December 1972 appeared in the cited source. (TAP CHI QUAN DOI NHAN DAN Nov 82 p 35)

Đào Đình Luyện [DAOOF DINHF LUYEENJ], Major General

His article "Airborne Landings and Defense Against Airborne Landings" appeared in the cited source. (TAP CHI QUAN DOI NHAN DAN Nov 82 p 23)

Trần Đức Lương [TRAANF DUWCS LUWOWNG]

Director of the Geology General Department; on 11 Jan 83 he greeted a USSR geology delegation in Hanoi. (NHAN DAN 12 Jan 83 p 1)

Lê Minh [LEE MINH]

Secretary of the Trade Union Federation, Cao Bang Province; his article "Exploiting the Latent Capabilities and Organize the Movement of Workers and Functionaries Promoting Production and Thrift To Complete the State Plan" appeared in the cited source. (TAP CHI CONG DOAN Apr 81 p 24)

Phan Thị Minh [PHAN THIJ MINH]

*Ambassador to Italy; on 1-2 Jan 83 she attended and made a speech at the 5th conference of the Association of Vietnamese in Italy. (NHAN DAN 8 Jan 83 p 4)

Vương Quốc Mỹ [VUWOWNG QUOOC MYX]

Vice Minister of Building; on 11 Jan 83 he greeted a USSR geology delegation in Hanoi. (NHAN DAN 12 Jan 83 p 1)

Trần Văn Phác [TRAANF VAWN PHACS], Major General

His article "The People's Army and the Mission of Building a New Culture" appeared in the cited source. (TAP CHI QUAN DOI NHAN DAN Nov 82 p 46)

Lê Thanh Phong [LEE THANH PHONG] Engineer

*Secretary General of the Executive Committee of the Association of Vietnamese in Italy; on 1-2 Jan 83 his election to this position was announced. (NHAN DAN 8 Jan 83 p 4)

Hồ Bá Phức [HOOF BAS PHUCS], Major General

His article "The 9th Military Region Armed Forces and the Mission of Strengthening Village Grass Roots Units" appeared in the cited source. (TAP CHI QUAN DOI NHAN DAN Nov 82 p 56)

Trần Tử Quán [TRAANF TUWR QUANS] Professor

*Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Association of Vietnamese in Italy; on 1-2 Jan 83 his election to this position was announced. (NHAN DAN 8 Jan 83 p 4)

Lê Quang [LEE QUANG]

*Acting Head of the Cadre Organization and Training Department, Statistics General Department; on 15-22 Nov 80 he participated in meetings with a visiting delegation from the Statistics Department, Czechoslovak Socialist Republic. (TAP CHI THONG KE Dec 80 p 1)

Nguyễn Quang [NGUYEENX QUANG]

Head of the Grain Service, Hau Giang Province; his article on Hau Giang's production in 1982 appeared in the cited source. (NHAN DAN 21 Dec 82 p 2)

Đỗ Quốc Sam [DOOX QUOOC SAM] Professor

*Chairman of the State Capital Construction Commission; on 9 Jan 83 he signed a memorandum at the Hoa Binh construction site. (NHAN DAN 10 Jan 83 p 1)

Nguyễn Thị Thanh [NGUYEENX THIJ THANH]

Vice President of the Vietnam Women's Union; *Vice Chairman of the Vietnam-Poland Friendship Association; on 20 Dec 82 her name appeared on the list of officials of this new association. (NHAN DAN 21 Dec 82 pp 1, 4)

Lê Cao Thắng [LEE CAO THAWNGS], *Colonel, Deceased

Former Head of the armed forces journal TAP CHI QUAN DOI NHAN DAN's Research Bureau on Rear Services, Economics and Technology; he died on 25 Oct 82 following an illness. (TAP CHI QUAN DOI NHAN DAN Nov 82 p 70)

Lê Thiện [LEE THIEENJ], Senior Colonel

His article "Observations on Application of War Regulations to Planning" appeared in the cited source. (TAP CHI KE HOACH HOA Feb 81 p 11)

Đặng Thu [DAWNGJ THU] PhD

*Director of the Labor Science Institute; his statistics on the SRV population were used in an article in the cited issue. (NHAN DAN 1 Jan 83 p 3)

Trịnh Xuân Tiên [TRINHJ XUAAN TIEENS]

Publisher of the grain and food journal LUONG THUC THUC PHAM; his name appeared on the masthead of the cited source. (LUONG THUC THUC PHAM Dec 80 back cover)

Phạm Sơn Tông [PHAMJ SOWN TONGF]

*Member of the VCP Committee, Dong Nai Province; recently he reported to Party Secretary General Le Duan during the latter's visit to Dong Nai Rubber Company. (HANOI MOI 5 Dec 82 p 4)

Nguyễn Phúc Trí [NGUYEENX PHUCS TRIS] MA

*Director of the Communications Planning Institute; he wrote an article marking the 20th anniversary of his institute for the cited source. (GIAO THONG VAN TAI 10 Dec 82 p 1)

Vũ Anh Tuấn [VUX ANH TUAANS]

Standing Member of the VCP Committee, Hanoi; Head of the Propaganda and Training Department of the VCP Committee, Hanoi; on 6-7 Dec 82 he participated in a conference to train 700 lecturers on the 10th anniversary of the victory over the B-52's. (HANOI MOI 8 Dec 82 p 1)

Nguyễn Việt Xiển [NGUYEENX VIEETS XIEENR] Deceased

Member of the VCP; Deputy Director of the Central Food Company 2; born in 1924, he died on 6 Jan 83 after an illness. (NHAN DAN 9 Jan 83 p 4)

CSO: 4209/224

BIOGRAPHIC

BIOGRAPHIC SKETCH OF GEN VAN TIEN DUNG

Vientiane SIANG PASASON in Lao 3 Jan 83 pp 1, 4

/Article: "Brief Biography of Gen Van Tien Dung, Politburo Member of the Communist Party of Vietnam Central Committee, First Deputy-Secretary of the Central Military Party Committee, and Minister of Defense of the SRV"

/Excerpt/ Comrade Van Tien Dung was born in 1917 in a worker's family outside the capital, Hanoi.

In 1935 he worked as a weaver, and ever since then he has taken part in the revolution. By the end of 1935 he was a member of the Communist Party of Indochina (now the Communist Party of Vietnam).

In 1939-44 Comrade Van Tien Dung was a member of the party committee of Hanoi, secretary of the provincial party committee of Ha Dong Bac Bing, and secretary of the party committee in the northern area of Vietnam.

He was jailed 3 times by the French colonialists, and was under a death sentence when he disappeared. In 1945, after escaping from jail he was appointed to /a regular member of the revolutionary military committee in the northern Indochinese command/. After that he was assigned to organize and guide the patriotic military forces in Quang Choung, and led the single uprising in the August power seizure of 4 provinces: Hao Bing, Ning Bing, Thanh Hoa, and Son La. After the August power seizure was achieved nationwide, he became a member of the military party committee command in the second area with a total of 8 provinces west of the northern region.

In fighting against the French, Comrade Van Tien Dung was assigned many important duties as chief of the politburo in the Ministry of Defense (now /the chief of the General Politburo of the Vietnamese People's Army/), deputy secretary of the central military party committee, political chief, third military area commander-in-chief, commander and also political chief of the /division/ in the plain. He held the post of supreme chief of staff officers of the Vietnam People's Army from 1953 until the time he became the minister of defense.

As the supreme chief of staff and deputy secretary of the central party military committee, Comrade Van Tien Dung took an important part in constructing

and guiding the Vietnamese military forces and the entire people to defeat the American imperialists, the invaders. He was the representative of the central military party committee and the supreme command. He directly guided the military operation on route 9 in the southern region of Laos. In the spring of 1971 the operation liberated (Ouang Chi), and in the spring of 1972 the operation liberated (Tai Nguyen). In the spring of 1975 he was a commander in the historical Ho Chi Minh operation.

Comrade Van Tien Dung was promoted to brigadier general in 1947, lieutenant general in 1959, and general in 1974.

In the party he was appointed an alternate member of the party Central Committee in the Second Congress (1951). He was a party Central Committee member and an alternate member of the politburo in the Third Congress (1960), a member of the Politburo in 1972, in the Fourth Congress (1976), and in the Fifth Congress (1982). He was also continuously elected to be a member of the party Central Committee Politburo.

He was elected to be a representative of the second-group committee of the National Council and National Defense Council (1960) and to the seventh group (1981).

In May 1978 Comrade Van Tien Dung was appointed by the party Central Committee Politburo to be minister of defense and first deputy secretary of the central military party Central Committee.

Gen Van Tien Dung graduated from the general chief of staff course in the Soviet military force.

He has a number of valuable writings concerning modern Vietnamese military science.

Gen Van Tien Dung has received many of the highest Vietnamese Government medals.

9884

CSO: 4206/41

END